Concerning the Political Aims of Science

The claim that all knowledge is power, and that all science is inherently political, has become a virtual shibboleth in recent years. Thanks to the work of Foucault (1), Rouse (2), Proctor (3), and, most notably, feminist philosophers of science like Harding (4) and Longino (5), not to mention social constructionists of many persuasions (6), we have learned a good deal about the ways in which both the natural and the social sciences are pervaded by political and even ideological assumptions, practices, techniques and methods.

Thus, sexism, homophobia, eurocentrism, elitism must be added to the usual litany of political involvements by modern science and technology: atomic weapons and environmental degradation, the inequalities in the distribution of technologies (fueled by the connections between capitalism and modern science), colonialism and the degradation of indigenous knowledges and practices.

Moreover, the exclusion of women, people of color and others from the inner and outer circles of academic science is both unjust (by democratic standards) and contributes to gender biases and other types of biases in science.

I have no quarrel with these sorts of claims. But it is worth noting that one could (and perhaps should) make the point that all of these ills ---- no matter how pervasive, normal, or longstanding -- are wrong precisely because they corrupt science by turning into an ideological tool for the powers that be.The argument that modern science always has been political at least since Bacon's utopian ideal that science should relieve the human estate -- which doesn't imply that science is intrinsically political, by the way-- so that we may as well adopt a more acceptable political goal for it, because science must be political, either begs the question or uses the word "political" in a very questionable manner.

One conclusion of my analysis would be to urge that science not be governed by any overarching political aims, even if this political aim is more to our liking, for instance the aim of maximizing democracy, or justice, or the status of women and other historically marginalized and oppressed groups.

It is here that the issues I want to focus on become joined. Harding and Longino (among others (7)) insist that good science has embodied some of these political ills, so that the foregoing strategy will not weed out all ideologiccally disreputable science. Indeed, since the basic framework of science suffers from these political colorations, science must be transformed root and branch. How is this to be done? By making a certain political ideal -- roughly, a kind of radical egalitarian participatory democracy, which spreads outward from feminism to include all the wretched of the earth --the political aim of science. This would at least increase the goal of achieving strong objectivity (Harding) and a genuine pluralistic consensus (Longino's version of strong objectivity).

Let me begin by mentioning the obvious. This political ideal is, to say the least, controversial, as well as suffering from the vagaries of any complex political ideal. Is there a need to argue for this goal? Or is it obvious? Is one to be labelled "anti-feminist" or "elitist" if one demurs? Is it a goal that is to measure each and every scientific activity in all its specificity; and by whom?

Before focusing on the issues, several prelimiary comments are in order.

First, the marxist view, defended by Longino and Harding, that the most oppressed people will have the greatest insights into objectivity, truth, justice,seems to me the most naive sort of romanticism. I certainly agree that the voices of these people and others need to be heard, and their presences felt, both in science and without. But I see no reason to believe Marx, who was a romanticist about these matters. After many years of studying poverty, racism, and so on, we still not have a general agreement about the mechanism of these modern social illnesses. To respond by saying that the poor can explain all of this because they are poor strikes me as totally implausible.

Second, even Foucault never reduces knowledge to power; nor does he claim that all of science (rather, only the human sciences) are political. And that is because of the way discursive and nondiscursive practices mesh in the disciplinary society.

To be sure, Foucault seems to licence a slide, from the idea that knowledge is socially constructed to the idea that it embodies power relations to the idea that it is political (or a mask for the political) to the idea that it embodies various "hegemonic dominations" and thus oppression. But this slide is much too quick. The fact that culture is a human artifice (if it is) does not prove that it is political, much less hegemonic, unless one defines "political" (and "oppression") so broadly that their presence is ubiquitous. Of course, many feminists and postmodernists do use the term "political" in this way (everything is political; the personal is the political); but I have yet to come across an even remotely plausible argument for this conclusion.

Turning to the main issue, my basic worry can be expressed simply. As a Jew, the feminist political goal for science makes me think of Jewish Physics. I know; the Nazis were bastards and Harding and Longino have justice on their side. To be sure. But the notion that science must be judged by whether it furthers some overarching political goal just means that we have to choose the "right" political goal, and then all will be ok. But what is the right political goal for science? The one advanced by Harding and (to a lesser degree)Longino?

Let us grant, for the moment, that we all agree. Would this imply that science must be judged by whether it furthers this political goal? What about the cognitive division of labor? Suppose it is a political goal (as it should be) that we try to keep the ozone layer from becoming more depleted. Does this imply that good research would necessarily accord with this goal? What if the good research shows us that we do not have the technological capacity to do so; or, worse, that it is too late to prevent an environmental disaster to the earth? Would these sort of results count as bad science?

In addition to legimate debates about which goals are politically progressive, there are questions about what actions and policies will further such goals. Similarly, it is not obvious which scientific results would advance the politically progressive agenda of Longino, Harding and other advocates of this view. (The Lysenko case illustrates this point. Lysenko's version of genetics furthered Stalinism; but turned out to be a disaster for Soviet agriculture -- and thus Soviet political goals.)Moreover, does it follow that any science that doesn't further these goals is bad science. Or that any science that does further these goals is good science? Can a Libertarian or a Republican or a totally apolitical (in the standard meaning) do good science? Would there be a board to determine which results would be accepted or directed toward the desired politcal ends? Or would we follow Longino, and have more dialogue and empirical inquiry? Would this require that all involved share the same political goals for science? Or could a debate and evaluation of evidence take place without this? Would this get us back to where Longino and (especially) Harding come in? Could these debates undermine the adequacy of the feminist political goals for science? What do we say about a scientific claim that has no discernible political ramifications (quantum mechanics, say) . What about scientific claims (sociobiology; Hernstein and Murray) that contradicts these political goals. Are they eo ipso examples of bad science? What about silly claims, such as some made by the more spiritual ecofeminists, who someimes sound like Schelling ? Are they good science because they are more in accord with the desired political agenda? Might scientific claims that look to be counterproductive (e.g that there are biological differences between males and females that effect culture)turn out to advance the cause?

It seems to me, furthermore, that there are and should be legitimate conflicts between science and democracy . Moreover, democracy should not always win. This is not elitism. The views I am criticizing are arguably elitist, since they want to impose an a priori political constraint on science.

There may be hard truths that don't sit well with democracy, or with the more radical egalitarianism favored by Harding. Maybe progress is an illusion. Maybe radical egalitarianism is little more than wishful thinking (or would require the creation of Brave New World) What do we do then? There is no a priori or, as far as I can see, empirical reason to assume that science and democracy must always be in harmony; nor that conflicts between science and democracy will always be bad for either.

In particular, the idea that knowledge must be democratic, or compatible with democratic sensibilities, strikes me as at best vague

and at worse dangerously silly. I think some version of standpoint epistemology (a form of perspectivism a la Nietzsche and Weber) is plausible; but this is only if radical egal;itarianism about perspectives is abandoned.

In any case, why must everything be tied to even the most noble political goals? Must everything be political? Is everything in and about science political or in the service of the political ? And what is this supposed to mean?

My basic concern is that political democracy should be the site for struggles over political ideals. Are we in danger of another form of technocratic politics when we advocate imposing a political ideal on science? Does this give too much prominence to science and too little to democratic participation? Are we ruling out the possibility that participatory democracy might be better enhanced if science was not judged by whether it further this ideal? After all, can we be sure about what does or would do so?

The history of even the twentieth century teaches us that the notion that everything is political is the most dangerous of all ideologies. At the very least, it requires an elitist politics by experts (not to mention draconian measures). Christianity, fascism, stalinism, lysenkoism are all cases in point. I am not suggesting that feminist philosophy of science is morally on a par. But it is ideologically and conceptually of a piece with the driving force behind these views, namely that a noble political, religious, utopian vision serve as the acid test for everything that is said or done. And which feminist political visions will determine what counts as good science?

Finally, I would like to suggest that sometimes the most politically useful science may well be science which aims at being objective (in the minimal sense of openminded about results and at least some ends.) Some political reforms, even major ones, have resulted from this kind of approach to political science (8) Research on violence, abuse, pornography and so on is going to produce

more reliable social policies if it is objective in this minimal sense. Of

course, we will be told that we already know -- or could easily find out, by asking victims -- what is going on and how to fix it. But things are not, unfortunately, always that simple. More to the point, I worry that this will become the master argument for answering all scientific questions: We already know what is causing the problem (injustice, eurocentrism, male dominance) and we can be pretty sure which answers -- which scientific results -- will do the trick. I know Longino in particular has tried to derail this worry (9). But how much influence will her wisdom have after the revolution?

In the end, democratic politics must be fought out in debates that may rely upon science. But I don't think science should presuppose answers to those debates, which can and should be objective in Habermas's sense of the term. (Longino agrees with much of Habermas's notion of democratic consensus.(10))

I certainly do not have an adequate theory about the ideal relations between democratic politics in science. Nor does anybody else, in my opinion.

Several possibilities are current. One is that science should follow Max Weber's notion of science as a vocation. This ideal, even in the Positivists, is meant to preserve democratic politics from science or at least scientism. But this view is compatible with strident democratic reformism, as was the case among some of the Progressivists before the rise of Positivism.

But this view requires that science try to be objective. I think Longino and Harding show us how science can be even more objective by becoming more inclusive. But this does not justify their further claim that science have an overarching political aim.Of course, liberalism, and liberal models of scholarship. are not value free either. And they are also political. This raises the question what is the diffeence between the Liberal ideology of social engineering and that of the Feminist view I have been discussing. Roughly (and too briefly) as a first aprroximation I'd say this. On Bacon's ciew, and on the Liberal view, we first engage in inquiry -- perhaps with a practical intent -- and then decide, politically, how to use our knowledge (which is at least meant to be relatively objective.) The feminist view that I am worrying about seems to reverse this relationship. We first decide what is a desirable political goal, and

then look for results ( via strong objectivity) that would at least

make the political goals "possible."

I think the key difference is that, for the Liberal, what I have

called the political dimension is not part of the constitutive aspects of

science, but relates to the way in which and the ends to which science will or should be used to further democratic society (including scientific societies.) In theory, this subjects the uses of science to democratic political control. I am not sure how the views I am criticizing allow for this sort of control.

Another alternative, perhaps shared by marxists and nazis, is that science become totally committed to furthering the dominant political ideology. Some would argue that this is true of Liberalism's view of science, too. (11) I agree with this charge, which is more evident in the relations between technoscience and corporate (neo)Liberalism today. (Merton's thesis that the scientific community is a microcosm of a democratic society does not, imply that democracy is the aim of scientific practice.) I do not accept the Liberal model of science or scholarship, either.What I admire about Harding and (especially) Longiono, is that they show us a way of combining objectivity with a rejection of the Liberal ideal of neutrality. But I am not willing to follow them all the way, to the view that science must have an overarching political goal in order for thei methodology to succeed. (I am open to being convinced.)

A third view is that Longino and Harding are partly right; and that the view I have expressed is partly right. Some aspects of science, both constitutive and contextual (to use Longingo's vocabulary) may be political, and may require alternative political strategies to correct science (e.g, insuring that more women and people of color are given the opportunity to become scientists). Even Harding recognizes some such distinction, when she differentiates two senses in which science is political: roughly, when it is put to political use; and when politics pervades science, e.g, with sexist assumptions.(12) I believe that science should be made more democratric; but I have reservations about scientific research. being judged by how much justice it promotes in the larger society. (By the same token, I also do not approve of the political and economic role of the government and corporate universities in technoscience. (Nor, for Heideggerian reasons, do I think technocscience, when combined with global capitalism, is as wonderful is some believe.)Other aspects of science may involve politics only in terms of issues about the uses or social impact of science. Still other aspects of science may be apolitical and be governed by more rigid standards of objectivity. There may even be a use for the notion of "pure research" in matters relating to political issues and aims. (If science could settle the IQ controversy in this manner that would have important political implications.) At the very least, it is worth noting that no scientific results uniquely determines social policy. If science tells us that children with Down Syndrome have severe learning problems, we can either put them in a hole in the wall or mainstream them. I sometimes suspect that Longino and Harding share the Positivist's view that science must be our savior (or the devil!). The notion that a politically progressive practice will move us closer to utopia seems to enforce this suspicion. At the very least, the notion that knowledge must be democratic (which is multiply ambiguous) strikes me as wrongheaded and quite dangerous, even to democratic politics.

Besides, science for its own sake, which finds no place in the views of the writers discussed in this paper, seems to me still to be a legitimate ideal, at least much of the time. On the other hand, I have serious reservations about the wisdom, even the practical efficacy, of making sccial, economic, and political justice either a condition for the success of science or one of its goals. I also think that the hermenutics of suspicion against knowledge, objectivity and inquiry runs the risk of exceeding the boundaries of intelligibility if we deny that intellectual curiosity is ever free of mendacious political motives of domination and oppression.

I am not sure, in closing, to what extent science should be guided by what Habermas used to call the practial interest or intent in emancipation. This seems part of the Enlightenment project that many feminists and other scholars have raised doubts about in recent years. I am in agreement with many of these criticisms, although I do think that democratic practice and political ideals such as those espoused by feminist philosophers ,of science, many of which I share, put too much emphasis on wedding science to democratic politics. My main worry about this is that much of modern history shows that politics and ideology too often become the tails that wags the dog in these kind of alliances.

Moreover, the attempt to blur all distinctions -- between science and politics, morality and aesthetics, knowledge and democracy -- seems to me much too high a price to pay for moving past the excesses of the Enlightenment Project to a more egalitarian society.The tensions between democratic politics and science need to be preserved, not obliterated in a unified worldview. Finally, the notion that to change science for the better we need to radically transform society always runs the risk of making both society and science worse off.Indeed, history supports the claim that this scenario is more common than we might care to think.

Robert Hollinger

Dept of Philosophy and Rel Studies

Iowa State Universiy