Abstract

It is widely conceded that there is at least one sense in which science isnot value free: the practice of science involves commitments to the value of such things as truth, objectivity, and epistemic justification. What
is more controversial is whether science involves any values that are notepistemic values (as the aforementioned values seem to be). It has been argued (by Harding, for example) that on most traditional views of
science, its practice involves commitment to certain democratic values, such as the equality of all observers. It can be argued that, even if science involves does involve such democratic values, these values function in science as fundamentally epistemic values; this is because science pursues those values not for their own sake, but rather
instrumentally, for the sake of promoting epistemic values such as objectivity. I will explore a way in which it might be argued that, on the contrary, certain democratic values inherent in the practice of science are, or ought to be, valued by scientists (qua scientists) not merely as means to the end of promoting epistemic values. but for their
own sake as well, even in some cases where they would seem to conflict with some epistemic values.