ABSTRACT

SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS & THE AIM OF VALUE FREE INQUIRY

K. Brad Wray

Scientists want to ensure that their preconceptions and interests do not

adversely affect inquiry. In particular, they want to ensure that their

evaluations of competing hypotheses is based solely on the epistemic merits

of the hypotheses. Scientific inquiry is regarded as value free to the

extent that this goal is realized. The institutions and practices

constitutive of science are designed to ensure that scientists are able to

effectively realize these goals (Wray forthcoming). For example, the blind

refereeing of articles ensures that scientists' biases are detected and

corrected for (Longino 1990). But, like any other social institution or

practice, the institutions and practices constitutive of science can become

dysfunctional, and thus undermine the effective pursuit of the very goal

they were designed to aid scientists in realizing (Merton 1973). For

example, the desire for recognition, initially fostered in an effort to

encourage scientists to make their findings public, sometimes leads

scientists to publish prematurely, which becomes an impediment to the

effective realization of their goals (Hull 1988). In this paper, I will

examine the ways in which the institutions and practices constitutive of

science both aid and impede scientists in the effective realization of their

epistemic goals. My analysis will focus on the institutions and practices

surrounding the publication of scientific articles.