In view of recent tendencies it is pertinent to ask of those who are digging ever deeper into the "stuff" of administration, whose object is to present a section of unvarnished administrative truth or criticism of naive "principles," this question: Have you not gone too far in rejecting principles and embracing an uncritical empiricism? In some sections the pertinent question is whether sophisticated has become cynicism, whether in its nineteenth-century concepts of "principles" the purpose or theory that must enlighten and inform any significant inquiry has not also been denied. Without faith or purpose, individuals or societies stagnate. The future of administrative theory is dependent, of course, upon what happens in the world at large, and particularly what happens in and to the United States. Whether the One World for which we poured out our treasure of life and goods becomes Two Worlds and then, one day, No World—this is the First Fact. If new forms and methods of international—or "world"—cooperation do develop, administrative thinking will be turned in new directions (although to date the considerable amount of "international" writings on administration is generally characterized by a pedestrian, earth-bound quality). Upon the success of our business civilization in meeting the extraordinary economic and social stresses of postwar readjustment depends the course of much future thinking. In one way or another the development and use of atomic energy will have effects reaching to the very foundations of administrative thought. But before its implications can even be projected in imagination it is necessary for the thinking organism to recover from the shock of so fundamental and spectacular a fact. Administrative thought will affect, as well as reflect, the future events. But it will not be one of the Prime Forces, at least in the near future. The number of its devotees and the range of its influence are too limited. It is only now freeing itself from a strait jacket of its own devising—the instrumentalist philosophy of the politics-administration formula—that has limited its breadth and scope.

Whatever the far-reaching implications of work and atomic writing may be, the Second Great War's aftermath of chaos and ill-will seems likely to have more important effects upon administrative thinking in the short run. Two observations as to these effects may be hazarded. The first is that, since crises usually result in centralization and integration of authority, we may expect a strengthening of the currents of centralization and integration—at least in comparison to what might have been the case had the end of the war brought with it "peace" and "normalcy." The second is in some sense the converse of the first: the success of the movement to decentralize and "democratize" administration depends upon the subsidence of threats to the security of America. Whatever force there is in the socialist belief that "you can't build socialism in one country" applies similarly to democracy.

In addition to economic, political, and social events that will influence the future of administrative thought, there are a number of movements and personalities that at present are impinging on administrative thinking and may give it content and direction in the future...

Perhaps most important of the theoretical movements now influencing American administrative study is scientific management. At the level of technique or procedure, borrowing from and liaison with scientific management will undoubtedly continue. Although some doctrines, such as "pure theory of organization," have already affected public administration, how influential other theoretical aspects of scientific management will remain to be seen. In its "democratic" or "anarchistic" doctrines, conceivably, there is enough force to reconstruct present patterns of administrative thought, at least if conditions become favorable. M. L. Cooke,7 Ordway Tead,8 Henri Fayol,9 Oliver Sheldon,10 Lyndall Urwick, and Elton Mayo11 may be mentioned as among the more prominent of those associated with the scientific management movement whose writings may possibly affect the future of public administration—as they have already in some degree. Several of these persons have been influenced by the philosophy of Mary Parker Follett. This is not the place to embark upon a discussion of her theories, but an understanding of some present tendencies must depend upon a reading of her work. For, as with the Second Great War's aftermath of chaos and ill-will seems likely to have more important effects upon administrative thinking in the short run, Two observations as to these effects may be hazarded.
It is possible—that it appears at present unlikely—that Pragmatic philosophy may play a larger role in the future than in the past. In recent essays by Horace S. Frie, for example, an attempt is made to demonstrate that Pragmatism (of the Dewey variety) is not only the philosophy of science, but the proper vehicle for expanding "democracy" in both scientific management and public administration.

The probability that the recent influx of foreign, especially continental, students of administration will exert a measurable influence over theoretical development has been touched upon above. Of the simple fact of influence there can be no doubt, but it is yet too early to state with any certainty what will be its force.

The problem of the place of the expert in a democratic society, particularly the expert in "things-in-general," cannot be regarded as having been satisfactorily treated, and will probably continue to engage the attention of administrative writers. The problem is perhaps too broad to be solved by a few thinkers in a short period of time. The answer should evolve out of experience and the gradual reconstruction of our theory by thinkers in many fields.

Closely related is the problem of providing adequate preparation and a "philosophy" for our administrators. Are training in the mechanics of administration and codes of professional ethics enough? Or should our new Guardian Class be given an education commensurate with their assumed responsibilities and perhaps be imbued with a political philosophy? The present gap between the content of our administrative curriculum and what we announce to be the responsibilities of our administrators is appalling. Presuming that we are in the midst of some sort of "managerial revolution," can we say that either the problem of our philosophy about managers or the proper philosophy for managers has been satisfactorily treated?

The problem of the philosophy that our administrators entertain is intimately related, in turn, to that of the adequacy of "theory of organization." The question is this: Are students of administration trying to solve the problems of human cooperation on too low a plane? Have they, by the double process of regarding more and more formal data over a wider and wider field of human organization, lost insight, perception? Is formal analysis of organizations without regard to the purposes that inspire them but a tedious elaboration of the insignificant?

The main tenets of the public administration movement emerged in the decades preceding 1914; they crystallized into a general political theory in the Progressive years. This "orthodox" point of view is by no means an unchallenged faith, but generally, it is still gospel in our schools, at least in undergraduate courses. Perhaps the tenets of orthodoxy still represent the "truth" for our time and our needs. Assuredly, their air of certainty and stability appeals to the emotions in these days of crisis and confusion. But the apparent likelihood of a disintegration of the old outlook and the synthesis of a new must be recognized. In any event, if abandonment of the political-administration formula is taken seriously, if the demands of present world civilization upon public administration are met, administrative thought must establish a working relationship with every major province in the realm of human learning.

Notes

1. There have been many evidences of a thirst for philosophy in recent years, and not a few invitations to students of political theory to join in broadening public administration. But so fruitful cross-fertilization will take considerable time and await development of a "philosophy for the philosophers." For the "political theorists" have also become objective, scientific; they are now in the position of the art-museum curator of cartoon humor, who "knows all about art, but doesn't know what he likes." Students of administration have generally been unread in the history of political thought, but they have had no doubts about "what they like." Students of theory can offer "sophistication" to students of administration, but they have a long way to go before they can offer much positive assistance with fundamental problems, such as the relationship of administration to democracy, or to science. Cf. Donald Morrison, "Public Administration and the Art of Government," Pub. Adm. Rev. 5 (winter 1945): 83-87, 85, on the divorce of "theory" from "administration"—with eventual multiplication.

2. Perhaps our sorest lack is docketing in the theological sense to govern the flow of cooperative energy in a free commonswealth" (F. Montesin Marx, "The Lawyer's Role in Public Administration," Yale Law Journal 5 [April 1946]: 498-526, 503).

3. The barrier between politics and administration, though being destroyed in the domestic field, is almost completely intact in our thinking about international matters. Urgently needed is some hard, creative thinking in the area lying between advanced administrative thought and advanced thinking on the future of world politics, represented—in my opinion—by E. H. Carr's Nationalism—and After (New York: 1945).

4. See, however, J. M. Gauss, "A Job Analysis of Political Science," Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 40 (April 1946): 217-230, 224-225, on possible "decentralizing" effects of atomic-bomb rivalry. "I found myself... turning again to materials on regional centers, on the future role of state governments, on state capitals as contrasted with regional centers, on the experience of Great Britain during the war with regional commissioners, and a plethora of problems in political geography, comparative government, and administration."


8. The Philosophy of Management (London, 1924). This is widely cited, but it does not appear that all the juice is yet squeezed from it.


11. "Some Democratic Implications of Science in Scientific Management," Advanced Management (October 1940): 147-152; "Liberty and Science," Pub. Adm. Rev. 3 (summer 1943): 268-273. Frie's essays are profound statements of a legitimate viewpoint. But this viewpoint is to me as unsatisfying as the Hindu cosmology—and for the same reason.

12. In an introduction to Scudder Klyce's Universe (Winchester, Mass., 1921), M. L. Cooke expresses the opinion that Klyce's work provides a philosopher's justification for the exercise of power by technical experts. I cannot comment on this, as I am unable to understand Klyce's strange work.

13. Speaking in 1945 to the Washington Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration, Herbert Irons listed as first among the administrative lessons of the war the failure of our administrative curricula to produce adequate line administrators, as distinguished from personnel to do housekeeping and staff work. To the same effect see M. E. Dimock, "Administrative Efficiency within a Democratic Polity," in New Horizons in Public Administration (University, Alabama: 1945), a symposium, 21-43, 41-62.

14. James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution (New York, 1941) is perhaps a significant book. It is not, however, within the scope of this essay. In terms of Burnham's treatment, the literature with which this study is concerned would be the ideological trappings of the new ruling group.
The fundamental defect of Burnham's book, the reviewers have emphasized, is that, despite the fact that the argument is set forth as a refutation of orthodox socialism, it is essentially Marxist. Burnham, that is, to say, has a Marxist past, and the characteristic vices of that habit of mind are carried over—the neat black and white categorizing, the refusal for simplicity, the presumption of omniscience, the proclamation of inevitability. Burnham simply pours new wine in the old Marxist bottles. (In his more recent The Struggle for the World [New York: 1947], in fact, he performs the feat of turning the Marxist approach against the Marxists.) For an essentially Marxist refutation of Burnham's "Marxism," see J. Donald Ingles and David W. Ferber, "The Technicians and the New Society," chap. 14 in Strategy for Democracy (New York, 1942).

This is an interesting essay discussing the general failure of left-wing movements of all kinds to recognize the need for "management" to achieve their objectives and the means by which a bureaucracy can be made to serve the ends of a "democratic collective state."

### The Coopative Mechanism

**Philip Selznick**

To risk a definition: cooperation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. With the help of this concept we are enabled more closely and more rigorously to specify the relation between TVA and some important local institutions and thus uncover an important aspect of the real meaning and significance of the Authority's grass-roots policy. At the same time, it is clear that the idea of cooperation plunges us into the field of bureaucratic behavior as that is related to such democratic ideals as "local participation."

Cooperation tells us something about the process by which an institutional environment in- plings itself upon an organization and effects changes in its leadership, structure or policy. Cooperation may be formal or informal, depending upon the specific problem to be solved.

#### Formal Cooperation

When there is a need for the organization to publicly absorb new elements, we shall speak of formal cooperation. This involves the establishment of openly averred and formally ordered relationships. Appointments to official posts are made, contracts are signed, new organizations are established—all signifying participation in the process of decision and administration. There are two general conditions which lead an organization to resort to formal cooperation, though they are closely related:

1. When the legitimacy of the authority of a governing group or agency is called into question. Every group or organization which attempts to exercise control must also attempt to win the consent of the governed. Coercion may be utilized at strategic points, but it is not effective as an enduring instrument. One means of winning consent is to coax into the leadership or organization elements which in some way reflect the sentiment or possess the confidence of the relevant public or mass and which will lend respectability or legitimacy to the organs of control and thus reestablish the stability of formal authority. This device is widely used, and in many different contexts. It is met in colonial countries, where the organs of alien control reconfirm their legitimacy by coopting native leaders into the colonial administration. We find it in the phenomenon of "corps-patriotism" wherein normally disfranchised groups are temporarily given representation in the councils of government in order to win their solidarity in a time of national stress. Cooperation has been considered by the United States Army in its study of proposals to give enlisted personal representation in the courts-martial machinery—a clearly adaptive response to stresses made explicit during World War II. The "unity" parties of totalitarian states are another form of cooperation; company unions or some employee representation plans in industry are still another. In each of these examples, the response of formal authority (private or public, in a large organization or a small one) is an attempt to correct a state of imbalance by formal measures. It will be noted, moreover, that what is shared is the responsibility for power rather than power itself.

2. When the need to invite participation is essentially administrative, that is, when the requirements of ordering the activities of a large organization or state make it advisable to establish the forms of self-government. The problem here is not one of decentralizing decision but rather of establishing or-