The Problem of Free Will and Determinism
1. The Problem of Free Will and Determinism:
a) One way of looking at this problem is as a paradox. What is a
paradox?
b) Recall the definition of an inconsistent set of statements.
c) The problem of free will and determinism can be represented as a
valid argument. We are inclined to believe that the
premises of this argument are true but the
conclusion is false. And we know that can't be right.
d) The premises and the denial of the conclusion are the set of
inconsistent statements that constitute the paradox.
2. First Premise: (1) Determinism is true.
a) Determinism is the doctrine that everything that happens in the
universe is completely determined by antecedent (expl.)
circumstances and conditions.
b) Human beings are objects in the natural world, and their actions are
often highly predictable. As psychology advances,
we know more and more about what causes people
to do what they do.
c) The determinants of human action include our heredity, our
environment, and our past actions.
d) This leads to our second premise.
3. Second Premise: (2) If determinism is true,
then there are no free actions.
a) Obviously, if all of our actions are completely determined, then I
could not do anything other than what I actually do.
b) Of course, I may not know what influences my behavior, but
determinism does not say that we know the causes of
behavior; it just says there are such causes.
c) The fact that I often do not know the causes of my own behavior
creates what I call ‘the illusion of ignorance.' Roughly,
the idea is that when I do not know the
determinants of my action, I believe that I am free to do otherwise.
d) Example: Body English on the bowling ball.
4. Preliminary Conclusion: (3) There are no
free actions.
a) This follows from (1) and (2).
b) We are inclined to disbelieve (3), i.e., to believe that some of our
actions really are free, e.g., the ones we deliberate
about. So, we could formulate the paradox
at this point by saying that we are inclined to believe (1) and (2) and believe
the denial of (3), which of course would be
inconsistent.
c) But, you might say, so what? Let's accept (3). It might be a little
surprising that we really aren't free and the fact that we
think we are is just the "illusion of
ignorance."
d) What's wrong with being a thoroughgoing determinist?
5. The Problem:
a) The problem with this has to do with the notion of moral
responsibility. The lack of freedom seems incompatible with
holding people responsible for their actions.
Praise or blame seems totally inappropriate if a person can't help doing the
things he or she does.
b) But that doesn't seem right.
c) This allows us to restate the paradox by adding two more steps to
argument thusfar:
(4) If
there are no free actions, then no one can be held morally responsible for anything he or
she does.
Therefore,
(5) No one can be held morally responsible
for anything s/he does.
6. The Paradox:
We are inclined to believe the following statements:
(1) Determinism is true.
(2) If determinism is true, then there are no free actions.
(4) If there are no free actions, then no one can be held morally
responsible for anything he or she does.
(6) People can be held morally responsible for their actions.
The paradox consists in the fact that these statements we are inclined
to believe are inconsistent.
7. Resolving the Paradox:
There are a number of ways of resolving the paradox, but they all
involve changing one's beliefs.
Affirms Denies
Hard Determinism (1)-(5) (6)
Compatibilism (1),(4),(6) (2),(3),(5)
Libertarianism
(2),(4),(6)
(1),(3),(5)
8. What is Determinism?
Determinism is the proposition that, with respect to everything that
happens in the world, it could not have been otherwise.
9. Why Accept Determinism? Three kinds of reasons:
a) Logical Reasons
b) Theological Reasons
c) Scientific Reasons
Let us consider each of these in turn.
10. Logical Reasons:
a) It is important to distinguish sentences from statements or
propositions: Sentences are bits of language that are used to
make statements or express propositions.
Different sentences can be used to make the same statement (e.g.,
synonoymous sentences, including sentences from
different languages) and the same sentence can be used to make
different statements (e.g., sentences with
indexicals, syntactically ambiguous sentences).
b) Some sentences don't make statements (e.g., commands, expressions of
emotion).
c) Statements, not sentences, are the bearers of truth or falsity.
d) Aristotle's Three Laws of Thought:
Aristotle identified three fundamental laws of
logic:
(1) The Law of Identity: Everything is
identical to itself.
(2) The Law of Non-contradiction: No statement
is true and false.
(3) The Law of Excluded Middle: Every statement
is either true or false.
Notice that (2) and (3) are expressed in terms
of statements, not sentences.
11. Logic and Eternal Truth:
a) Recall the definition of truth as correspondence to the facts.
b) Consider now the proposition, A Democrat will be elected President
in 2004. This is true if and only if this statement
corresponds to the facts.
c) Now of course no one knows whether or not this statement is true but
that doesn't affect the fact that it is true, if indeed it
corresponds to the facts (and false otherwise).
d) To say that statements about the future are neither true nor false
would mean that logic does not apply to statements
about the future, e.g., arguments including
statements about the future would be neither valid nor invalid, which seems
wrong.
12. Theological Reasons: God's Omniscience:
a) Assuming God exists, he is omniscient. One way of understanding
omnisicience is this:
For every true proposition p, God knows p.
b) Now if propositions about the future are neither true nor false,
then, of course, God doesn't know them.
c) But this means he really doesn't know what he is doing when he
creates the world (universe) he creates. This seems
implausible.
d) If God does exist, it is more reasonable to suppose that He knows
all the things that have happened, all the things that
are happening, and all the things that will
happen. (This would be one way to understand the claim that God is
omnipresent.)
How he knows is, of course, a mystery.
13.. Scientific Reasons:
a) One way of understanding determinism is in terms of the idea that
every thing that happens--every event--is caused or
determined by some other event. What does this
mean? Two things:
Event a causes
event b =df (i) a occurs prior to b,
(ii) A-type events are invariably followed by B-type events
b) Notice that according to the second condition, to assign a thing a
cause is to say that it is governed by some sort of law.
A law of nature is just a uniformity or
regularity that says that one type of phenomenon is invariably followed by another
type of phenomenon. And that is one way of
understanding determinism.
c) LaPlace thinks that the proposition that every event has a cause is
just the PSR, which, he believes, is self-evidently true.
Now we know from our discussion of the
Cosmological Argument, that it is not self-evident.
d) But it is something we are inclined to believe, and indeed, to the
extent we believe in the scientific world view, we
believe that every event has a cause and thus
is completely determined by antecedent circumstances and conditions.
e) Evidence: The crowning achievement of classical mechanics was
the discovery of Newton's universal law of gravitation.
This was used, as LaPlace describes in the
reading on p. 118, to predict the recurrence of Halley's comet.
f) This leads to the vision described at the top of p. 118 of God as a
kind of superscientist able to predict everything.
Science, as we practice it, is simply a way of
moving toward that goal.
g) More specifically, this is done through the so-called ‘human
sciences.' These include psychology, sociology, economics,
political science, etc. The idea is that the
human sciences are real sciences, just like the natural sciences. The same type
of explanations can be given, this time for
human behavior, and all these sciences are ultimately reducible to physics.
h) Free will, on this model, is simply an illusion, a point of view
that is nicely illustrated at the bottom on p. 119.
i) Determinism, then, is a working hypothesis for the sciences
generally, and the human sciences in particular.
14. It is for these reasons--logical, theological and scientific--that determinism
is an attractive doctrine. I am not going to talk
about Compatibilism because of time
limitations. What's next? Libertarianism.
a) Before we can see why Libertarianism is
attractive, it is necessary to get clear about the conception of freedom
that libertarians
believe in. This is not a simple matter.
15. Libertarianism
a) Libertarianism involves the denial of determinism,
what G&K call ‘anti-determinism.' This just says that not every-
thing that happens is
completely determined by antecedent conditions.
Anti-determinism=indeterminism
b) But Libertarianism involves something more
than the simple denial of determinism. It also involves the idea of
personal power. A
positive notion. Explain by analogy with negative and positive political freedom
c) Freedom, as the libertarian understands it,
can be defined as follows:
(1) S is free with
respect to course of action a at time t iff
(i) It is within S's power to do a at time t
AND (ii) It is within S's power to refrain from doing
a at t.
d) Two types of Libertarianism: Radical (Sartre's) and Restricted or
Moderate.
e) Arguments for Libertarianism: There are two types of arguments for
libertarianism: arguments from experience
and the argument from the nature of
consciousness
16. Arguments from Direct Experience:
a) It may be a mistake to call these ‘arguments' from
experience since they amount to no more than brute appeals
to the nature of experience.
b) What kind of experiences? The experience of anguish
(distinguish from fear) and the experience of vertigo. Explain
c) These don't prove the existence of libertarian freedom
however, since they may be entirely illusory. Compare the man
locked in the room that John
Locke describes.
d) As Graham points out, these feelings may be no more than mere
by-products of my brain processes.
17. Deliberation:
a) There is another feature of the human experience that
Sartre calls attention to, viz., the fact that we deliberate.
This fact might be used to build an
argument from freedom.
b) Basic idea: Deliberation can take place only when
there are open possibilities or real options or cases where I have
a choice. I can't for example,
deliberate about whether or not I shall fly home unassisted today. But to have a choice
means that it is within my power to
do it and it is within my power to refrain from doing it (i.e., when I am free). So,
since, obviously, I do sometimes
deliberate, it follows that at least sometimes I really am free. In short, the fact that I
deliberate can be used to prove the
reality of freedom.
c) Note the definition of ‘freedom':
I am free with respect to action a if and only
if
(i) It is within my
power to do a
AND (ii) It is within my power to refrain from doing a.
18. The Argument, More Formally:
(1) Sometimes I deliberate about x, for some x.
(2) If (1) is true, then sometimes I choose whether or not to do
x.
(3) If I choose whether or not to do x, then I had a choice about
x.
(4) If I had a choice about x, then it was within my power to do
x and it was within my power to refrain from doing
x (i.e., I was free with respect to
x).
Therefore,
(5) For some course of action x, I was free with respect to x.
19. Objection:
a) Premise (3) is false. It is possible to choose without
having a choice. Examples abound. Locke's example of the person
in the locked room is a classic
case. So too when I choose not to become a surgeon or a physicist–professsions that
I could not make it in.
b) Diagnosis: The problme is that deliberation only
implies a belief in freedom, not actual freedom. When I choose
without having a choice, I am
unaware of the fact that circumstances–external or internal–are such that I
could not
have done otherwise than what I
actually do.
c) We're back to the illusion of ignorance.
20. Summary:
To put the point succinctly, It is impossible to deliberate
without believing we are free, but it is posssible to deliberate
without actually being free. The determinist says this is
the way it always is, and the libertarian denies this. But we have
no proof of freedom here. That's the bottom line.
21. Explaining Behavior:
a) To understand the argument from consciousness, it is
necesssary to back up a little and consider how we explain
human behavior.
b) Sartre notes that we sometimes try to explain our
behavior to ourselves by invoking various character traits or
personality traits or by
reference to some social role we occupy. Let us call the former Character Trait
Explanations
and the latter Social Role
Explanations. Some examples:
(1) "I was polite to the
professor because I am a student."
(2) "I don't ask
questions in philosophy class because I am shy."
(3) "I didn't get the
assignment done on time because I am lazy."
c) Similarly for other people. We explain their behavior by ascribing
character traits to them. Or, we explain their behavior
by reference to social roles (e.g., Sartre's
example of the waiter.)
22. What Sartre Thinks About This:
a) Sartre says that these attempts to explain behavior are
attempts to explain their necessity, i.e., why people could not
have done otherwise.
b) And he thinks they are all wrong. We treat ourselves or
others as if we or they are mere things who could not have
done otherwise. He calls such an
attitude, "bad faith."
c) What is distinctive about human action, however, is that
it is not uniquely determined in that way.
d) All human action is caused by an act of interpretation,
an interpretation of one's situation, and that act of interpretation
is free.
23. The Argument from Consciousness:
a) Suppose I do some action x
(1) Either my doing x was necessitated or it
was up to me (i.e. it was within my power to do it and within my power
to refrain
from doing it)
(2) If doing x was necessitated, then some
event caused me to do x without my having control over it.
(3) The influence of any event on me depends on
how I "take" it (i.e., my consciousness of it).
(4) How I "take" any event (i.e., my
conciousness of it) is up to me.
(5) If (3) and (4) are true, then an event
cannot cause me to do x without my having control over it.
Preliminary Conclusion:
(7) An event cannot cause me to do x without my
having control over it.
Final Conclusion:
(9) My doing X was up to me, i.e., I was free
with respect to doing x.
b) The validity of the argument:
(1) N or U
(2) If N then C
(3) I
(4) T
(5) If (I & T) then not-C
(6) I & T
from (3) & (4), Conjunction
(7) not-C
from (5)&(6), Modus Ponens
(8) not-N
from (2)&(7), Modus Tollens
(9) U
from (1)&(8), Dilemma
24. Premises (1) and (2):
a) The first premise says that my actions are either
necessitated (determined) or they are up to me. This seems obvious.
b) The second premise just articulates what it means for an
action to be necessitated. For one of my actions to be
necessitated, it would be
determined by events beyond my control.
25. Crucial Premises are (3) and (4):
a) What (3) says is that how events influence me depends on
how I "take" them. By its very nature, consciousness
involves interpreting the
world in some particular way. Examples: the "meaning" of the ringing alarm clock
(89.3), the
"meaning" of
fatigue on the mountain climb (90.1), the meaning of taking a test, etc., etc.
Consciousness, by its very
nature, involves assigning
meaning to some situation.
b) Are there any internal and external factors over which I
have no control which are important to my choices? Of
course. Both have a role to
play in shaping the situation in which I find myself, but even so, what I do about those
factors is up to me.
(1) Internal.
For example, (91.1), I find myself on the verge of getting a "D" in philosophy
and withdraw from the
course. I couldn't help being afraid of getting a "D" but, Sartre would say, it
is up to me whether or not I take that
fear to be a reason to drop the course. My dropping the course was not a necessity.
(2) External.
91.2. Pierre is an orphan and a waiter, but he is neither of these things in the way that
a rock is a rock.
The meaning and influence of these facts about himself on his actions are up to him.
26. Evaluation of the Argument: Premise (4):
a) The argument is, nevertheless, a terrible one. For one
thing, (4) looks like it begs the question. If consciousness is a
genuine act (of mind), then (4)
asserts that it is free, and, of course, what is at issue is whether or not any actions
are
free.
b) In a related vein, the problem for Sartre is he simply
assumes people have positive freedom when it comes to how
they conceive things, but that may
not be true. See the example of face recognition at 92.1.
c) Sartre might respond by conceding that some of our
interpretations are pre-determined by circumstances and
conditions beyond our control, but
that other interpretations are not. See 92.3. This would involve the rejection of
Sartre's radical Libertarianism.
d) But we are still left with a burden of proof
that has not been met.
27. Evaluation of the Argument: Premise (3):
a) Recall that (3) says that the influence of any event on
me depends on how I "take" it (i.e., my consciousness of it).
b) That this may not be true, however, is brought home by
something called ‘the brain-stemming problem.' Basically, the
idea is this: Our
consciousness of a situation may be a by-product of neurophysio-logical and neurochemical
processes. These
processes are the ultimate determinants of our actions; in other words, it might be that
all of our
"interpretations"
are predetermined, possibly, at the biochemical level. Consciousness, then, would be
entirely
epiphenomenal.
28. Sartre's Reply:
a) Sartre could reply by denying that consciousness is the
product of, i.e., is caused by, brain processes.
b) This requires him to embrace Dualism, a theory about the
nature of mind, which is discussed in the next section of
the course.
c) The bottom line, however, is that Sartre has not
discharged a burden of proof, viz., to show that the epiphenomenalist
view of consciousness is incorrect,
which he must do to support premise (3).
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