The Moral Foundations of Politics. By Ian Shapiro. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Pp. xii, 289. $25.00
(note: this is copyrighted material)
As Ian Shapiro makes clear in the Preface, this book grew out a lecture course of the same name that he has been offering at Yale University since the early 1980s. The central question in both the course and the book is, > What kind of government is morally legitimate and why?= Different theories of the sources of political legitimacy in Western political thought from the Enlightenment down to the present are canvassed in the six central chapters of the book (Chapters 2-7). The presentation is fairB and fairly standardB though Shapiro has his own views on these theories, which he does not attempt to hide.
Chapters 2 and 3 constitute a clear and concise overview of utilitarianism, conceived of as a political philosophy. For classical utilitarianism (i.e., Bentham= s version), the main purpose of government is to create a stable framework within which people can pursue their own self interest. Bentham= s apparent attachment to small government was never very deep, however. Like many 19th century reformers, he had enormous confidence in the power of science, informed by the Principle of Utility, to guide public policy. This attitude would seem to license government intervention in potentially a wide range of human affairs. For instance, Shapiro notes that classical utilitarianism, together with the principle of diminishing marginal utility, appears to justify substantial redistribution of wealth. Bentham was aware of this, though he believed the redistributive impulse had to be tempered by a consideration of the incentive effects of confiscatory tax rates. The modern preoccupation with figuring out the tax rate that will strike the appropriate balance between efficiency and A equity@ seems to have its roots here. (So too the benevolent dictator model of government.)
Shapiro explains how two standard problems with classical utilitarianism led to important reformulations in the late 19th century. One, the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utilities, led Pareto to formulate a preference conception of utility in which such comparisons were both A scientifically@ illicit and unnecessary for the purposes of political economy. The influence of Pareto, especially on economists, is difficult to overstate, and Shapiro does an excellent job in explaining the sources and nature of that influence. He attributes to Pareto= s denial of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utilities an ethical significance, at least for subsequent economists: namely, that it enshrines A individual autonomy into the core logic of utilitarianism@ (p. 43). A more philosophically sophisticated defense of individual autonomy can be found in Mill= s articulation and defense of the Harm Principle in On Liberty, which addresses the second standard problem for classical utilitarianism, namely, how to make room for rights claims. The main focus of this second chapter on utilitarianism is how the doctrine was modified to make room for rights.
Following the two chapters on utilitarianism are chapters on Marx and on social contract theory. Shapiro stresses Marx= s commitment to the Enlightenment project of applying the scientific method to the study of human behavior, which issued in Marx= s theory of history (Historical Materialism) and his political economy. Marx does not develop his ethical ideas in any detail, and Shapiro must twist the old communist= s arm to get him to address normative issues in general and the question of political legitimacy that frames the book in particular. Although Marx presents his theory of exploitation as purely descriptive (or A positive,@ as economists are fond of saying) Shapiro interprets it in a moralized way, so that the labor theory of value takes on normative significance. On that reading, the labor theory is a variant on the Lockean idea that people are entitled to the fruits of their labor and that exploitation occurs to the extent that they are denied it. As Shapiro notes, Marx rejects this sort of moralizing, but this way of thinking, whatever its difficulties, has undeniable appeal to those sympathetic to the Marxian world view. As to the question of political legitimacy, Marx famously maintained that beliefs about legitimacy were in some manner illusory and that anyway the state was destined to wither away with the advent of communism. This does not prevent Shapiro from finding in Marx=s writings a conception of freedom that can serve as a basis for evaluating political and economic institutions. Though the exposition of Marxism and its difficulties is generally fair and accurate, Shapiro has to distort or depart from what Marx actually said to a greater or lesser extent to get him to address the concerns that frame this book.
The chapter on social contract theory is largely devoted to Rawls. Shapiro locates Rawls= s most important contributions in the latter= s sustained attempt to deal with the political implications of moral disagreement and in Rawls= s belief in the moral arbitrariness of differences between individuals. The former involves all the standard topics famously associated with Rawls= s thought: the original position, the veil of ignorance, and the argument for the two principles of justice. Rawls= s claims about the moral arbitrariness of differences among individuals starts with the observation that people do not deserve their natural talents. He adds that even their habits, such as their willingness to work hard, are due to factors beyond their control. From these and similar observations, Rawls concludes (in effect but erroneously) that people don= t deserve anything at all. This clears the decks for treating natural talents and abilities as assets owned by the community, which in turn sets the stage for redistributive institutions. This implication about deservingness has troubled many of Rawls= s critics, even those on the left. Ronald Dworkin shrinks from this rather extreme view by insisting that distributive justice must hold people responsible for their choices, though not for their endowments. This means that the fact that someone has expensive tastes does not give him any claim as a matter of justice on social resources; on the other hand, it also means that those disadvantaged in the lottery for natural talents are owed compensation from those advantaged in that lottery. As Shapiro says of Dworkin, A in this way he hopes to retain an idea of individual rights and responsibilities within the socialization of capacities framework@ (p. 146).
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with anti-Enlightenment thought and democracy, respectively. The former is a wide-ranging discussion of critics of the Enlightenment project from Burke to postmodernism to communitarianism. The exposition of these views is fair and the criticisms measured. The chapter on democracy opens with a discussion of the tension between academic criticism and mistrust of democracy and its non-negotiable status as a touchstone of political legitimacy. Shapiro retails the standard complaints against democracy, ranging from its cavalier attitude toward the truth to its alleged irrationality (Arrow= s theorem) to the pathologies uncovered by public choice. Despite these problems, Shapiro defends democracy, essentially on the grounds that the defects aren= t fatal and can be significantly mitigated by standard left-of-center reform measures (e.g., campaign finance reform). Readers of this journal will find this the least persuasive part of the book. The chapters on utilitarianism, Marxism, and social contract theory are better organized and more self-contained than these latter two chapters, which have more of the character of a running commentary on a variety of topics that fall under the chapter headings.
A recurring theme in the first five chapters of this book is what Shapiro calls the workmanship ideal in both epistemology and politics. In early Enlightenment epistemology, certainty and thus knowledge is to be found in one= s understanding of what one makes. (E.g., God knows the [descriptive and prescriptive] laws of nature because He creates them.) Because they concern what human beings make or do, ethics, politics, and the human sciences generally had a much higher epistemological standing in the early Enlightenment than they do now and indeed than they did in the later Enlightenment, which was dominated by a fallibilist conception of science and reason associated most famously with Hume. This workmanship ideal gets imported into political philosophy in different ways, starting with Locke= s labor theory of property acquisition. It also appears in Marx= s labor theory of value and in Dworkin= s attempt to pull back from implications of Rawls= s views that lead the latter to deny that anyone deserves anything. This recurring theme, and the associated connections between epistemology and political theory serve to tie together otherwise disparate elements in Shapiro= s story of the intellectual history of the Enlightenment and reactions to it.
The intended audience of this book is not completely clear. It is an introductory treatment of the topic and for the most part breaks no new ground. It could perhaps be used in an introductory course on the subject, though professors often have misgivings about teaching someone else=s course, which is what one would do, if this were the primary text. On the other hand, if a non-specialist sought a relatively brief and straightforward overview of the topic described in the title, this book could be warmly recommended.
(about 1500 words)
Scott Arnold
University of Alabama at
Birmingham