



**The UAB Institutional Biosafety Committee Meeting Minutes
Research Involving Recombinant and Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules
February 12, 2026 9:00 am**

Members	Present (Y/N)	Vote (Y/N)
1. Joel N. Glasgow, PhD, Chair [JNG]	N	N
2. Megan Kiedrowski, PhD, Vice-Chair [MRK]	Y	Y
3. Donna Williamson, MS, RSS [DSW]	Y	Y
4. Amanda F. Smith, BS, RSS, Voting Contact [AFS]	Y	Y
5. Cameron Crosby, MD, OM [JCC]	N	N
6. Julie Allen, DNP, OM [JSA]	Y	Y
7. Lillie Flood, RN-BSN, JCDH [LF]	Y	Y
8. Qiang (John) Ding, PhD, VA [QJD]	Y	Y
9. Andrea Osborne, DVM, ARP [AJO]	Y	Y
10. Justin Roth, PhD, EHS [JCR]	Y	N
11. Brian Lagory, BS, BSO-EHS [BEL]	Y	Y
12. Vineel Reddy, PhD, BSO-EHS [VPR]	Y	Y
13. Julie Gray, BS, EHS [JDG]	Y	N
14. Tyler Uzzell, MA, IRB [TWU]	Y	Y
15. Amanda J. Watts, MS, IACUC [AJW]	Y	Y
16. Chad Dunaway, IACUC [CD]	N	N
17. Tyler T. Wright, PhD, Lab Rep [TTW]	Y	Y
18. Masakazu Kamata, PhD, Lab Rep [MK]	N	N
19. Kevin Harrod, PhD, Lab Rep [KH]	N	N
20. Christine M. Wright, PhD, Lab Rep [CMW]	Y	Y
21. Larisa Pereboeva, PhD, Lab Rep [LP]	Y	Y
22. Theresa Strong, PhD, Lab Rep [TVS]	Y	Y
23. Aftab Ahmad, PhD, Lab Rep [AA]	N	N
24. Adam McClintock, MBA, HSR [AM]	N	N
25. Wesley Willeford, MD, JCDH [WW]	Y	Y
26. Rebecca Johnstone, RSS, Recording Secretary [RMJ]	Y	N
Total	19	16

Guests Present

Laura Caltrider, MS, EHS [LPC]	Caitlyn Sebastian, Biomed Sciences [CS]
Riley Cooper, EHS [RC]	Douglas Fox, PhD, SEBLAB [DMF]
Joseph Palmer, PhD, SEBLAB [JP]	Luselyz Ortiz Torres, EHS [LOT]
Ian Doty, EHS [ID]	Dale Payton, ARP [DP]
	Aisha Hampton, EHS [AH]

The February 12, 2026, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) meeting for research involving recombinant of synthetic nucleic acid molecules was called to order at 9:04 am via web-based video conferencing tool by the Vice Chair. A quorum was present.

Welcome and Introduction of Guests

The Vice Chair welcomed all in attendance.

Approval of the January 08, 2026, Minutes

The January 08, 2026, meeting minutes were distributed in the Committee member packet via email and/or secure cloud storage prior to the meeting. A motion was made to approve the minutes. The motion was seconded. There were two abstentions. The minutes were approved.

Standing Reports

- In the News/Regulatory Visits – There were no updates.
- Faculty Senate – There were no updates.
- Veterans Administration – There were no updates.
- Employee Health – It was announced shots available through Occupational Medicine
- ARP/Facilities Operations – Autoclave in BBRB is now functional, VH repairs for autoclave underway
- JCDH – Flu cases in AL are on the rise.
- IRAP and EHSA – There were no updates.
- Research Safety Updates:
 - PI Arrivals/Departures/UAB Lab Relocations –
Arrivals: Ginger Milne, Elizabeth Doncheck
Moving: Eric Roberson, Keshav Singh, Kristopher Genschmer, Upender Manne
Departures: Runhua Liu
 - Safety Visits – The main corrective actions that were addressed in lab audits were enrollment with Employee Health, reconciliation of chemical inventories, peroxide-former storage and testing, mislabeling/expiration dates, and improper chemical storage

New/Old Business

Old Business – It was noted that NIH membership is due for renewal in March.

New Business – The working group reported on the progress of new AUSI updates that would reflect viral vector specifics of biosafety level containment per NIH guidelines.

Project Review - The review and discussion of projects included: agent characteristics; types of manipulations planned; verification that the PI and laboratory staff performing the research have been appropriately trained in the safe conduct of the research; and containment control measures to be implemented (biosafety level and any special provisions). Please refer to the attached summary of the Committee review outcome for each project.

Transgenic Projects - No transgenic projects were discussed at this meeting.

Adjournment - The Vice Chair asked if there were any further questions or comments. Being none, the meeting was adjourned at 9:46 am. The next meeting date is March 12, 2026, 9:00 am.

Respectfully submitted by:



Rebecca Johnstone, Recording Secretary
Research Safety Committees

Project registration documents submitted by the PI indicate UAB Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) review and approval is required for the following research activities involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid (r/sNA) molecules and/or biohazardous agents. If the nature of the work changes or the listed conditions cannot be met, it is the PI's responsibility to consult with the IBC for additional guidance. It is the PI's responsibility to ensure all individuals listed on the project are enrolled in and compliant with the requirements of UAB Employee Health prior to and for the duration of the work:

Approve	Disapprove	Abstain or Recuse	RSC #	Evaluation
16	--		26-006	<p>Jose Rubio-Mosquera; <i>Advarra IRB: A Phase I, Multicenter, Open-Label Study to Evaluate Safety, Tolerability, Cellular Kinetics, Pharmacodynamics, And Efficacy Of P-Cd19cd20-Allo1 in Patients with Severe, Treatment Refractory Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (III.C.1)</i></p> <p><u>Reason for IBC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Administration of allogenic CAR-T cells (P-CD19CD20-ALLO1) expressing CD19 and CD20 to one or more human subjects. <p><u>Containment conditions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Universal precautions will be used for storage, preparation, and administration of the investigational product. An annually certified biosafety cabinet will be used for thawing genetically investigational product. Any unused IP and/or potentially contaminated materials will be disposed as medical waste or per the sponsor's instructions.
16	--		26-009	<p>Karen Gamble; <i>A Brain-Kidney Axis for Circadian Control of Sodium Homeostasis (III.D.4.b)</i></p> <p><u>Reason for IBC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Administration of Adeno-associated (AAV) viral vectors to animals <p><u>Containment conditions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BSL1 practices and procedures may be used for in vitro manipulations of AAV. ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the posting of an AUSI, will be used for 14 days post-administration of AAV vectors, then ABSL1 may be used.
16	--		26-011	<p>Hui Ying Lim; <i>A Cardiac Wingless-Snail-Tep2 Axis Directs Normal Lipid Homeostasis and Protects Against Diet-induced Obesity (III.D.4.b)</i></p> <p><u>Reason for IBC:</u> Experiments involving transgenic Drosophila Infection of transgenic flies with Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus), a Risk group 2 organism.</p> <p><u>Containment conditions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, will be used for all in vitro work with S. aureus.

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Arthropod Containment Guidelines (ver. 3.2) will be made available and reviewed by all working with transgenic and/or infected <i>Drosophila</i>. • Agent-specific safety and data plans must be made available and reviewed by all personnel working with <i>S. aureus</i>.
16	--	25-125	<p>Yinghua Tang; <i>Gene Therapy Studies in Transgenic Ferret Models (III.D.1.a; III.D.4.b)</i></p> <p><u>Reason for IBC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In vitro and in vivo use of Human Immunodeficiency Virus type 1 (HIV), Equine infectious anemia Virus (EIAV), Simian Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV), and Feline Immunodeficiency Virus (FIV) based lentiviral vectors encoding genes related to human or ferret CFTR, fluorescent reporters, therapeutic transgenes, or therapeutic proteins, • Administration of Adeno-associated viral vectors (AAV), rAAV-Bocavirus chimeric vector (rAAV/HBoV1), helper-dependent Adenovirus (HDAd), and mRNA, encoding genes related to the treatment of CF to animals, • Administration of recombinant Influenza A Virus (IAV), a Risk Group 2 organism, to ferrets, including transgenic animals, • Breeding, possession, and experiments with transgenic ferrets. <p><u>Containment conditions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, must be used for all in vitro work with HIV, EIAV, SIV, FIV, and IAV. • BSL2 waste disposal for must be used for all recombinant material. • ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of a BSC and the posting of an AUSI, is required for work with influenza infected ferrets, for the duration of the work. • The Animal Resources Program must be notified, via the posting of an AUSI, of HIV, EIAV, SIV, FIV, AAV, rAAV/HBoV1 vectors in animals. The AUSI must be posted for 4 days after the last vector administration; then ABSL1 practices and procedures may be used. • An N-95 or equivalent respiratory protection, along with disposable gown and gloves must be used for entry into the animal room whenever an AUSI is posted. • An annually certified BSC must be used for administration of ASO via nebulization or any rsNA material with the potential to create aerosols. • ABSL1 practices and procedures may be used for handling of naïve transgenic ferrets. • The UAB HIV/Lentivirus Exposure Response Plan must be made available and reviewed by all working with lentiviral vectors. • Working with two different influenza strains concurrently is not allowed; however, 	

				<p>working with a recombinant and wild type of the same strain may be done concurrently.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cages/bedding from influenza infected ferrets must be autoclaved. If an autoclave is not available where the ferrets are housed, an EHS approved plan/SOP must be in place for proper disinfection and/or transportation of caging to an autoclave in another facility prior to transfer of caging/bedding. For ferrets administered viral vectors, caging (including pans) should be sprayed with appropriate disinfectant prior to removal from lab. • Infected animals must be transported to the imaging facility in their isolation cages inside a secondary sealed container by ARP, and a copy of the AUSI must accompany the animals. • During imaging, the room must be locked, the AUSI posted, and all individuals working with animals must wear fitted N-95s, gloves, and disposable gowns. • For the imaging location, the PI must have an approved disinfection SOP on file that includes appropriate disinfectant, contact time, disposal of contaminated and/or cleaning materials, and holding time prior to the room being released after removal of ferrets.
16	--		23-170	<p>Angela Wahl ; Study of Clinically Relevant Human Pathogens Targeting Non-Hematopoietic Cells - BSL2 (III.D.1.a; III.D.4.b)</p> <p><u>Reason for IBC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administration of the following replication-competent Risk Group 2 viruses, expressing various reporter genes, to animals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Human Adenovirus: Type5 ○ Human Cytomegalovirus (HCMV): TB40E, AD169, ADrUL131, Towne, Toledo, Merlin ○ Human Dengue Virus (DENV): serotype 2, strain 16681 ○ Human Enterovirus: D68 ○ Epstein-Barr Virus (EBV): B95.8 ○ Human Influenza A Virus: A/H3N2/Wyoming/3/2003, A/H1N1/Puerto Rico/8/1934, A/H1N1/Michigan/45/2015, A/H3N2/HongKong/4801/2014 ○ Human Metapneumovirus (hMPV): Jpn03-1 ○ Human Parainfluenza Virus Type 3 (PIV3): JS ○ Human Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV): A2 ○ Human Rhinovirus (hRV): A16 • Administration of replication-defective lentiviral vector expressing the SARSCoV-2 accessory protein Orf3a to animals <p><u>Containment conditions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, shall be used for all in vitro work with viruses and virus-infected or -contaminated materials.

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For lentiviral vectors, ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the posting of an AUSI, shall be used for 14 days after the last administration, then ABSL1 should suffice. • For replication-competent viruses, ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, along with the posting of an AUSI, must be used for the duration of all in vivo work with virus-infected animals, and room-level decontamination is required before removing the AUSI • Agent-specific safety and data plans shall be made available and reviewed by all personnel working with replication-competent viruses. • The updated UAB HIV/lentivirus Exposure Response Plan must be made available and reviewed by all working with lentiviral vectors. • The use of sharps should be minimized. • It is the PI's responsibility to ensure all individuals listed on the project are enrolled in and compliant with the requirements of UAB Employee Health prior to and for the duration of the work.
16	--		22-028	<p>Casey Weaver; <i>Coordination of Innate and Adaptive Immunity in Intestinal Barrier Defense (III.D.1; III.D.4)</i></p> <p><u>Reason for IBC:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administration of recombinant (LCMV glycoprotein gp66 epitope expressing) and wild type Salmonella typhimurium and recombinant Citrobacter rodentium (fluorescent marker gene or LCMV glycoprotein gp66 epitope expressing) to animals. <p><u>Containment conditions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, will be used for all in vitro work with S. typhimurium and C. rodentium. • ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, will be used for all in vivo work with S. typhimurium and C. rodentium. • The Animal Resources Program will be notified, via the posting of an AUSI, of S. typhimurium and C. rodentium in animals. • Agent-specific safety and data plans must be made available and reviewed by all personnel working with S. typhimurium and C. rodentium.