The UAB Institutional Biosafety Committee Meeting Minutes
Research Involving Recombinant and Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules
April 09, 2026 9:00 am

Members	Present (Y/N)	Vote (Y/N)
1. Joel N. Glasgow, PhD, Chair [JNG]	Y	Y
2. Megan Kiedrowski, PhD, Vice-Chair [MRK]	Y	Y
3. Donna Williamson, MS, RSS [DSW]	Y	Y
4. Amanda F. Smith, BS, RSS, Voting Contact [AFS]	N	N
5. Cameron Crosby, MD, OM [JCC]	N	N
6. Julie Allen, DNP, OM [JSA]	Y	Y
7. Lillie Flood, RN-BSN, JCDH [LF]	Y	Y
8. Qiang (John) Ding, PhD, VA [QJD]	Y	Y
9. Andrea Osborne, DVM, ARP [AJO]	Y	Y
10. Justin Roth, PhD, EHS [JCR]	Y	N
11. Brian Lagory, BS, BSO-EHS [BEL]	Y	Y
12. Vineel Reddy, PhD, BSO-EHS [VPR]	Y	Y
13. Julie Gray, BS, EHS [JDG]	Y	N
14. Tyler Uzzell, MA, IRB [TWU]	N	N
15. Amanda J. Watts, MS, IACUC [AJW]	Y	Y
16. Chad Dunaway, IACUC [CD]	N	N
17. Masakazu Kamata, PhD, Lab Rep [MK]	Y	N
18. Kevin Harrod, PhD, Lab Rep [KH]	N	N
19. Christine M. Wright, PhD, Lab Rep [CMW]	Y	Y
20. Larisa Pereboeva, PhD, Lab Rep [LP]	Y	Y
21. Theresa Strong, PhD, Lab Rep [TVS]	Y	Y
22. Aftab Ahmad, PhD, Lab Rep [AA]	Y	Y
23. Adam McClintock, MBA, HSR [AM]	N	N
24. Wesley Willeford, MD, JCDH [WW]	Y	Y
25. Rebecca Johnstone, RSS, Recording Secretary [RMJ]	Y	N
Total	19	15

Guests Present

Laura Caltrider, EHS [LPC]
Dale Payton, ARP [DP]
Joseph Palmer, SEBLAB [JP]
Ian Doty, EHS [ID]
Caitlyn Sebastian, Biomed Sciences [CS]
Douglas Fox, SEBLAB [DMF]
Earle Durboraw, ARP [ED]

The April 09, 2026, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) meeting for research involving recombinant of synthetic nucleic acid molecules was called to order at 9:03 am via web-based video conferencing tool by the Chair. A quorum was present.

Welcome and Introduction of Guests

The Chair welcomed all in attendance.

Approval of the March 12, 2026, Minutes

The March 2026, meeting minutes were distributed in the Committee member packet via email and/or secure cloud storage prior to the meeting. A motion was made to approve the minutes. The motion was seconded. There were two abstentions. The minutes were approved.

Standing Reports

- In the News/Regulatory Visits – There were no updates.
- Faculty Senate – There were no updates.
- Veterans Administration – There were no updates.
- Employee Health – There were no updates.
- ARP/Facilities Operations – An update was provided about ARP autoclave maintenance schedule. Discussion about animal room locations and best practices for placement was had.
- JCDH – There were no updates.
- IRAP and EHSA – BSO updated the committee about the bioform questions that go to the researchers.
- Research Safety Updates:
    - PI Arrivals/Departures/UAB Lab Relocations –
    - Moving: Gregory Payne, PhD
    - Safety Visits – The main corrective actions that were addressed in lab audits were enrollment with Employee Health, reconciliation of chemical inventories, peroxide-former storage and testing, mislabeling/expiration dates, and improper chemical storage

Old Business

- The working group discussed the AUSI draft developed to introduce recombinant icon, and the ARP Safety Program was discussed to increase awareness of changes to form and safer practices.
- There was a discussion about the poliovirus work and how the WHO Global Action Plan for Poliovirus Containment, 4th edition (GAPIV) containment needed to be implemented at the end of June.
- The committee discussed NIH Guidelines compliance and ways to raise awareness for compliance requirements.
- The Gain of Function Matrix was discussed further and will go out to the committee for further review.

Project Review - The review and discussion of projects included: agent characteristics; types of manipulations planned; verification that the PI and laboratory staff performing the research have been appropriately trained in the safe conduct of the research; and containment control measures to be implemented (biosafety level and any special provisions). Please refer to the attached summary of the Committee review outcome for each project.

Transgenic Projects - No transgenic projects were discussed at this meeting.

Adjournment - The Chair asked if there were any further questions or comments. Being none, the meeting was adjourned at 10:18 am. The next meeting date is Thursday May 14, 2026, 9:00 am.

Respectfully submitted by:

Rebecca Johnstone, Recording Secretary
Research Safety Committees

Project registration documents submitted by the PI indicate UAB Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) review and approval is required for the following research activities involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid (r/sNA) molecules and/or biohazardous agents. If the nature of the work changes or the listed conditions cannot be met, it is the PI's responsibility to consult with the IBC for additional guidance. It is the PI's responsibility to ensure all individuals listed on the project are enrolled in and compliant with the requirements of UAB Employee Health prior to and for the duration of the work:

Approve	Not Approve	Abstain or Recuse	RSC #	Evaluation
14	--	1	15-189	**(III.D.4.a) Qlang Ding:** ***The Control of Post-Transcriptional Regulation in COPD*** Reason for IBC: • Administration of Adeno-associated viral vectors to animals. Containment Requirements: • BSL-2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, must be used for all work with AAV and human cells. • ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the posting of an AUSI, must be used for 14 days post-administration of AAV vectors, then ABSL1 may be used.
15	--	--	19-305	**(III.D.1.a) Kevin Harrod:** ***Influenza Regulation of Epithelial Pneumococcal Host Defense*** Reason for IBC: • In vitro experiments with addition of Cre recombinant RG2 Influenza A and B viruses. Containment Requirements: • BSL-2 practices and procedures must be used for all work; and any work conducted in SEBLAB should be conducted at BSL-3. • An annually certified BSC must be used for all manipulations of recombinant influenza. • Any individuals conducting work in SEBLAB need all applicable SEBLAB training and clearances. • Research may not be conducted concurrently with two different influenza strains. • Research may be conducted concurrently with recombinant and wild type versions of the same strain. • Spatial and/or temporal separation must be used for different strains.
15	--	--	24-131	**(III.D.1.a) Kevin Harrod:** ***Influenza Mediated ER Stress and Secondary Bacterial Infections - SEBLAB*** Reason for IBC: • In vitro experiments with addition of Cre recombinant RG2 Influenza A and B viruses. Containment Requirements: • BSL-2 practices and procedures must be used for all work; and any work conducted in SEBLAB should be conducted at BSL-3.

				• An annually certified BSC must be used for all manipulations of recombinant influenza. • Any individuals conducting work in SEBLAB need all applicable SEBLAB training and clearances. • Research may not be conducted concurrently with two different influenza strains. • Research may be conducted concurrently with recombinant and wild type versions of the same strain. • Spatial and/or temporal separation must be used for different strains.
15	--	--	24-133	**(III.D.1.a) Kevin Harrod:** ***Influenza Mediated ER Stress and Secondary Bacterial Infections – BSL2*** Reason for IBC: • In vitro experiments with addition of Cre recombinant RG2 Influenza A and B viruses. Containment Requirements: • BSL-2 practices and procedures must be used for all work; and any work conducted in SEBLAB should be conducted at BSL-3. • An annually certified BSC must be used for all manipulations of recombinant influenza. • Any individuals conducting work in SEBLAB need all applicable SEBLAB training and clearances. • Research may not be conducted concurrently with two different influenza strains. • Research may be conducted concurrently with recombinant and wild type versions of the same strain. • Spatial and/or temporal separation must be used for different strains.
15	--	--	25-162	**(III.D.1.a) Kevin Harrod:** ***SEBLAB- Single Cell RNA Sequencing Analysis of Respiratory Viral Infections in Lung Organoids*** Reason for IBC: • In vitro experiments with addition of Cre recombinant RG2 Influenza A and B viruses. Containment Requirements: • BSL-2 practices and procedures must be used for all work; and any work conducted in SEBLAB should be conducted at BSL-3. • An annually certified BSC must be used for all manipulations of recombinant influenza. • Any individuals conducting work in SEBLAB need all applicable SEBLAB training and clearances. • Research may not be conducted concurrently with two different influenza strains. • Research may be conducted concurrently with recombinant and wild type versions of the same strain. • Spatial and/or temporal separation must be used for different strains.
15	--	--	24-197	**(III.D.4.b) Leal Sixto:** ***UAB SEBLAB ABSL-3 Research Preclinical Animal Imaging*** Reason for IBC: • Use of recombinant Citrobacter rodentium strain ICC180 in animals. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, will be used for all in vitro work with C. rodentium. • ABSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, shall be used for all handling or manipulations of animals administered C. rodentium.
15	--	--	26-015	**(III.D.1.a, III.D.4.b) Andrew Ulijasz:** ***A Novel Family of Conserved Glyoxal Toxicity Response Proteins***

				Reason for IBC: • Experiments with wild-type and mutants of Pseudomonas aeruginosa, A Risk Group 2 microorganism, including administration to animals. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 practices and procedures must be used for all in vitro work. • ABSL2 practices and procedures must be used for all in vivo work. • An annually certified BSC must be used for all work with P. aeruginosa (animals, containers, infected tissues, etc.). • Agent-specific safety and data plans must be prepared and made available for all personnel working with P. aeruginosa. • The Animal Resources Program will be notified, via the posting of an AUSI, of all strains and derivatives of P. aeruginosa in animals.
15	--	--	26-016	**(III.D.1.a, III.D.4.b) Andrew Ulijasz: *A regulatory cascade that controls pneumococcal capsule biosynthesis*** Reason for IBC: • Experiments with wild-type and mutants of Pseudomonas aeruginosa, A Risk Group 2 microorganism, including administration to animals. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 practices and procedures must be used for all in vitro work. • ABSL2 practices and procedures must be used for all in vivo work. • An annually certified BSC must be used for all work with P. aeruginosa (animals, containers, infected tissues, etc.). • Agent-specific safety and data plans must be prepared and made available for all personnel working with P. aeruginosa. • The Animal Resources Program will be notified, via the posting of an AUSI, of all strains and derivatives of P. aeruginosa in animals.
15	--	--	26-031	**(III.D.4) DoYeon Cho: *Impact of CF carrier status on development of chronic rhinosinusistis (CRS)*** Reason for IBC: • Infection of transgenic rabbits with RG2 Pseudomonas aeruginosa or Staphylococcus aureus. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 and ABSL-2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified BSC will be used for all handling of bacterial cultures and contaminated tissues that may produce aerosols • Agent-specific safety and data plans will be made available and reviewed by all personnel working with Pseudomonas aeruginosa or Staphylococcus aureus. • Caging and pans must be sprayed or wiped with appropriate disinfectant prior to transport or washing. • Transport of bacterial cultures must be done per UAB Biosafety Manual, Section 10.1. • Transport of infected rabbits within animal room – by lab staff is allowed. • Transport of infected rabbits to and from the imaging core must be scheduled and conducted by ARP. • Previously approved containment precautions for Dr. Cho's rabbits (AUSI, PPE, contact surface disinfection) must be observed for work on this project.
15	--	--	26-032	**(III.D.4) DoYeon Cho: *Development rhinosinusitis in ΔF508 cystic fibrosis rabbit model*** Reason for IBC:

				• Infection of transgenic rabbits with RG2 Pseudomonas aeruginosa or Staphylococcus aureus. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 and ABSL-2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified BSC will be used for all handling of bacterial cultures and contaminated tissues that may produce aerosols • Agent-specific safety and data plans will be made available and reviewed by all personnel working with Pseudomonas aeruginosa or Staphylococcus aureus. • Caging and pans must be sprayed or wiped with appropriate disinfectant prior to transport or washing. • Transport of bacterial cultures must be done per UAB Biosafety Manual, Section 10.1. • Transport of infected rabbits within animal room – by lab staff is allowed. • Transport of infected rabbits to and from the imaging core must be scheduled and conducted by ARP. • Previously approved containment precautions for Dr. Cho's rabbits (AUSI, PPE, contact surface disinfection) must be observed for work on this project.
15	--	--	26-034	**(III.D.1.a, III.D.2.a) Carlos Orihuela:** ***Pathogenic mechanisms underlying Pseudomonas aeruginosa pathogenesis*** Reason for IBC: • Experiments with isogenic deletion mutants of Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain PAO1, a Risk Group 2 microorganism, including administration to animals. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 practices and procedures must be used for all in vitro work. • ABSL2-enhanced practices and procedures must be used for all in vivo work. • An annually certified BSC must be used for all work with P. aeruginosa (animals, containers, infected tissues, etc.). • Agent-specific safety and data plans must be prepared and made available for all personnel working with P. aeruginosa. • The Animal Resources Program will be notified, via the posting of an AUSI, of all strains and derivatives of P. aeruginosa in animals.
15	--	--	26-036	**(III.C.1) Kyle Wood:** ***A Randomized, Double-blind, Placebo-controlled Study followed by a Treatment Extension to Evaluate the Efficacy and Safety of YOLT-203 in Children and Adults with Primary Hyperoxaluria Type 1*** Reason for IBC: • Administration of a lipid nanoparticle encapsulating a Cas12 high fidelity mRNA molecule and a guide RNA to one or more human subjects. Containment Requirements: • Universal precautions should be used for storage, preparation, and administration. • An annually certified biosafety cabinet should be used for thawing investigational product. • Any unused IP and any potentially contaminated materials should be disposed as medical waste or per the sponsor's instructions.
15	--	--	26-037	**(III.E) Jie Yang:** ***Development of protein based MRI contrast agents for pre-clinical MRI studies*** Reason for IBC: • In vitro use of DE3 (BL21) E. coli. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, will be used for all in vitro work with human cell work.

				• ABSL-1 practices and procedures may be used for all animal work. • All recombinant E. coli waste shall be disposed into the biohazard waste stream.
15	--	--	26-039	**(III.E) Shu Chen:** ***Peripheral Biomarkers for Early Diagnosis of Mixed Pathologies in AD/ADRD*** Reason for IBC: • Creation of and in vitro experiments of lentiviral vectors using human cells. Containment Requirements: • BSL2 practices and procedures, including the use of an annually certified biosafety cabinet, will be used for all in vitro work with lentivirus and human cells. • The UAB HIV/Lentivirus Exposure Response Plan will be made available and reviewed by all working with HIV, lentiviral vectors, or retroviral vectors.