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Inquiro Volume 11

The Legality of Lustration within Transitional Justice: Does Political Exclusion Possess Legal Rationalizations that Preserve Effective Transitions to Democracy?

Author: Christian D. Brown

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

ABSTRACT: Lustration is the method of using laws to restrict members of bygone repressive regimes from holding political positions. Lustration is put into place so that those who committed past human rights violations do not have the access or authority to cause more human rights abuses and place the state back under an abusive government. Opposers of lustration claim that such practices are incompatible with democratization by arguing that they deprive citizens of democratic rights, such as the right to pursue public office positions and other employment opportunities. Lustration is implemented to ensure past abuses are not repeated. Therefore, it is essential to understand whether political exclusion and regulation of certain rights violate one's rights. In this article, I investigate the legal, legislative, and judicial remedies for lustration (specifically political exclusion) that are put in place, discuss the implications of the arguments for lustration, and provide a framework that synthesizes prior legal arguments that justify lustration as a democratic way to prevent past human rights abusers from reentering official public positions.

Introduction

This article addresses the use of lustration, a mechanism in transitional justice to protect and stabilize structures of public offices, administrations, and institutions to prevent a relapse of authoritarian rule.1 Lustration is an effort to ingrain democratic norms and values within countries suffering at the hands of abusive authoritarian governments. Transitional justice is a process of implementing legal, political, judicial, and cultural mechanisms to weaken the authority of unstable regimes as a means to reform and consolidate towards a stable, ideally democratic form of government.2 Some instruments or mechanisms implemented within transitional justice include truth and reconciliation commissions, trials, reparations, providing amnesty, vetting, and the topic of this article, lustration.3 Commonly, formerly authoritarian regimes are encouraged to use transitional justice practices, as they have taken part in or are complicit in gross human rights violations. Despite the efforts of lustration practices, some views do not support this transitional justice mechanism due to claims that it violates fundamental constitutional and political rights granted under the democratic process, such as the right to run for public office.4 In this article, I argue that lustration practices do not violate constitutional or political rights, and I will show the legal legitimacy of lustration.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I define lustration and explain the rationale and purpose for implementing these measures. Second, I present the dominant arguments that portray banning, dismissing, and demoting someone from holding public or political office as a violation of one’s fundamental political and human rights. Third, I offer my counterarguments against these viewpoints and explain why it is acceptable for prospective democracies to exclude past perpetrators from holding public office and other public positions. Next, I will present how existing democracies enforce the rule of law during punishment and the consequences of those punishments to keep their democratic status intact. Then, I present a case study from the post-communist transitional period in Poland, where lustration was implemented and discuss its successes and failures. Lastly, I offer my recommendations to further protect and preserve the use of lustration to fulfill administrative and transitional justice.

Lustration and its Logic

Lustration is a legal approach to prevent participants of past regimes from being involved in public administrative roles and other employment positions.5 Vetting6 is a type of lustration, and while it is often accompanied by lustration, for reasons of space, I will focus on the implementation of lustration within this article. It is accomplished through investigations, screenings, and confessions of guilt to discover if such individuals took part in any gross human rights abuses under previous authoritarian or tyrannical regimes.7 Implicated individuals are then restricted from pursuing specific jobs, such as elected positions, university employment opportunities, legal and judicial positions, and other public and administrative roles capable of enhancing or diminishing government structures.8 This form of oversight was especially done through extensive background checks by employers for potential employment opportunities.9 The overall goals of these lustration practices are to aid in democratization by re-establishing public trust and legitimacy in public administrations through rebuilding and reconciliation, enforcing accountability to improve governmental performance, and providing justice through political exclusion instead of through criminal prosecutions.10 The goals of lustration are accomplished by truth commissions, trials, victim compensation, and public opinion to introduce democratic values during transitional periods.11

Considering the goal of transitional justice is to reform a nation and its public institutions, ultimately steering the country toward becoming a peaceful democracy, supporters argue that the action to exclude abusive leaders and their enforcers from running and holding public and political positions is rightfully justified and not a violation of one’s rights. A goal of lustration within transitional justice is to reform the state. In that case, holding those in power accountable, removing them from office, and restricting them from future official capacity is compatible with those goals.12

Regarding accountability, lustration operates under the assumption that holding those responsible for certain crimes ideally results in a punishment proportional to the offense committed.13 The application of proportionality is rooted in common law, the foundation of the American legal framework,14 and further established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Solem v. Helm.15 The European Court of Human Rights affirmed the concept of proportionality in Samsin v. Ukraine.16 These notable judiciaries setting a precedent on the application of proportionality shows the importance of lustration to be proportional in practice. Relative to transitional periods, by applying the ‘principle of proportionality,’ punishment by depriving power after abuse of that power is just and reasonably proportional.17 Proper implementation of proportionality grants a level of authority to be taken away once that power is abused. The idea of proportionality is democratic, so as long as lustration is proportional, it is democratic.

Lustration advocates also note that in many consolidated democratic societies, punishments for wrongdoings can result in the inability to run for public office or hold government positions,18 of which has been deemed acceptable by the U.S. Constitution.19, 20 Essentially, present-day democracies have set a precedent to protect democratic values. This same application of punishment is enforced by way of lustration when former members of abusive authoritarian regimes engage in violence and commit gross human rights abuses that destabilize political and public institutions. Lustration is democratic as consolidated democracies and transitioning states implement similar applications restricting public officials from retaining official capacity after exploiting their positions.21

Finally, a democratic government must preserve a democratic state for the future. By lustrating people who have shown that they do not support democracy, the state is engaging in a legitimate self-protective measure. If allowed to return to the state apparatus, the conduct of those who upheld the authoritarian regime may corrupt the new democratic institutions, and this risk makes it both democratic and acceptable to use lustration upon individuals within political and public institutions.22 Furthermore, it is imperative that there are measures put in place so that perpetrators are not put in positions to abuse their access to power and influence again.23 This is where lustration takes the course as a legal safeguard to avoid a repetition of authoritarian rule. The proactive use of lustration will ensure that public institutions are also not abused.

The Common Controversies of Lustration Practices

Despite the logic discussed above, there are several objections to lustration. While lustration is a transitional justice mechanism used to achieve democratization, it is claimed that the denial of citizens to run or attain political and public positions undermines the democratic process.24 It is presumed to violate one’s fundamental political right to run and hold public office.25 Additionally, lustration laws have received input from international bodies questioning its constitutionality in respective transitioning countries.26 They allege infringements on the right to political opinion, right to association, and freedom of expression.27 Critics further claim there are infringements of certain rights and constitutional protections by implementing lustration laws. A major concern is that lustration laws would only cause citizens to distrust public institutions, which strays away from the long-term goal of lustration practices.28

One other common criticism of lustration is related to retroactive justice. As lustration is typically implemented after the end of a repressive regime and during the transitioning period of a nation, lustrating states may be implementing retroactive justice, which is when someone is charged for a crime when the criminal act was not a crime when the action was conducted.29 Critics refer to this as a legal irregularity that neglects criminal procedures.30 Under common law and criminal law, retroactive justice reflects the concepts of nullum crimen sine lege, when there is no crime if there is no law establishing a crime, and nulla poena sine lege, when punishment cannot be enforced if there is not a law making the conduct unlawful.31 Using retroactive laws to punish offenders raises a concern that legal certainty and the process of democratic consolidation are neglected, and an abuse of criminal procedure is encouraged.32

The Justification for Lustration

In this section, I offer rebuttals to these arguments within the previous section, which not only ignore the logic of lustration but also the following legal justifications that I provide. When it comes to addressing the claims that lustration laws violate one’s political, civil, and human rights as well as protections under employment law, it is important to acknowledge and remember that those deprived of or limited of certain political rights, civil duties, and employment law protections have dedicated loyalty to regimes involved in gross human rights violations.33 Essentially, past human rights violators have abused their privileges and deprived their victims of their rights and sense of security. When past perpetrators are not able to abuse citizens and public institutions, countries can restore their communities and institutions and gain public trust in the government.34 Regarding potential employment discriminatory practices and policies, this form of ‘discrimination’ is a legal exception in employment law to prevent those responsible for causing political instability and repression from an authoritarian regime. In American employment law, barring someone from applying for or holding a position is not discriminatory if hiring that person would place an undue hardship upon employers and their business.35 By welcoming past violators in workspaces that may disrupt the nature and operation of their business, an undue hardship is present, thereby making employment discrimination of those that would affect the nature and operation of the business legally justifiable. This is analogous to barring undemocratic human rights abusers from holding key positions in a new democracy. As it pertains to justified employment restrictions under lustration laws, even the United Nations has referred to employment vetting practices, a form of lustration, as “rule of law tools” meant to build trust from citizens and legitimize public institutions.36

As for retroactive justice, lustration has opened avenues for retrospective laws, which can be used to protect individuals that experience gross human rights violations in the future. Enforcing retroactivity operates as a remedy for past survivors of human rights violations who were subjected to crimes that could not be prosecuted when the offenses were committed due to unstable institutions.37 Retrospectivity provides remedies for future abuses, so that enforcing retroactive laws is a minimized concern.38 Retrospective laws can also go as far as to ensure abusers of powers are held liable for committing future human rights violations. Retrospective laws and legislation conflict with legal certainty because such rules are a response to past abuses. However, the legal justifications for this course of action are that such laws provide a sense of justice for victims of human rights violations from a former authoritarian government.39 Retroactive justice encourages transitioning governments to provide legal remedies for victims and punish human rights violators influenced by previous authoritarian regimes.40 Any legal process is bound to have supporters and detractors. Still, the opponents of lustration neglect to acknowledge that punishing perpetrators by depriving them of the privileges that gave them the capacity to abuse others helps nations shift away from unstable positions and reestablishes legitimate institutions by way of a transitional period. This serves democracy because it protects those that may be harmed by the government and holds the abusers accountable.

How are Current Democracies Successfully Implementing Political Exclusion?

Because lustration is a legal mechanism used to help transition authoritarian governments to democratic ones, lustration is not a common practice in countries that are already democratic. Although, in the context of comparative law, non-transitional contexts can still offer valuable examples of how to implement lustration, in principle, appropriately and democratically. Specifically, in the United States, there are procedures and laws put in place when political exclusion, a common component of lustration, may need to be implemented. Political exclusion in democracies like the U.S. is enforced when everyday citizens, public servants, and political figures abuse the law, their fundamental rights/privileges, or their authority after committing certain crimes against the Constitution and state and federal law. This ensures that government institutions within the United States remain legitimate and preserve a democratic state. The U.S. Supreme Court has expanded this by responding to the issues where people affiliated with antidemocratic groups can be barred from certain activities.41, 42, 43 This same issue is questioned in transitioning countries where undemocratic conduct and affiliation to such conduct restricts one’s ability to participate in political and employment opportunities.44 As it relates to American law where the right to association is claimed to be infringed, I go through significant Supreme Court cases in turn: Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York,45 Keyishian v. Board of Regents,46 and United States v. Robel,47 which addresses the issue of restrictions from political and employment opportunities due to an affiliation of undemocratic entities.

Under United States federal and state employment law, the right to certain civil duties and privileges is limited when offenses are committed.48 Some limitations are disenfranchisement, the inability to be placed on a voting ballot, and revoking one’s access to public services.49, 50 Regarding employment opportunities, under American federal law, in Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York,51 people can be restricted from working for schools due to an affiliation to an unconstitutional political organization that intends to physically overthrow the government.52 This case emphasizes the measures the U.S. government takes to keep threatening individuals and groups away from valuable democratic institutions, like education systems, to prevent these people from diminishing such vital pillars of democracy. In regard to the judiciary of a consolidated democracy like the U.S., the Supreme Court has successfully addressed and clarified measures to maintain its democratic state. These measures can be replicated similarly in transitioning countries pursuing democratization in efforts to refurbish public institutions and government entities.

The U.S. has placed limits on lustration. However, in light of the post-Cold War and the threat of communist organizations in the U.S., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of one’s affiliation with communist organizations. An extension to the Adler case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents,53 addressed legislation that punished individuals with an affiliation to an unconstitutional organization, despite not having aligned views nor endorsing the illegal intentions of the organization – this was declared a violation of constitutional limitations,54 and in United States v. Robel,55 further guidelines were set to protect those that had no active involvement nor agreed with the intentions and views of the organization, furthermore not imposing limitations on these individuals.56 A common concern under the practice of lustration is the potential due process violations by acting on collective guilt or selectivity biases,57 rather than considering and exercising individual guilt,58 but in the cases of Adler,59 Keyishian,60 and Robel,61 the U.S. asserts due process considerations in the presence of vague associations to antidemocratic groups62 which have been implemented in countries pursuing transitional justice. These cases also establish that lustration laws and its counterparts cannot be excessive and that it does more harm than good. Furthermore, these cases show that for lustration to be compatible with democracy, lustration laws must abide by set principles and regulations.

As lustration focuses on politically limiting active participants of repressive authoritarian regimes that commit gross human rights violations, it also acts to dismiss, demote, or exclude public officials who abuse their power and contribute to these violations.63 Again, lustration is not commonly used in democratic societies. Still, there are procedures put in place when U.S. public officials abuse their power or commit acts that do not reflect the confinements of the law and Constitution.64 In the U.S. Constitution, the President, Vice President, and other political figures like judicial officials can be removed from their positions through impeachment and the conviction of high crimes.65 In matters of impeachment, tried by the U.S. Senate, judgment can consist of removal from official capacity and the ineligibility to hold office in future terms.66 To preserve and protect the integrity of democracy, this is a legally just process to hold public officials accountable and maintain a stable and democratic government.67 In the case of countries during transitional periods, lustration is designed to do the same thing: protect victims and the community, hold offenders accountable, and democratize.68

Lustration from the Perspective of a Transitioning Country

Although lustration fits within democratic norms, these laws can be used undemocratically. In Poland, implementing lustration laws led to a legal dispute challenging the appropriate application of these practices. In the case of Matyjek v. Poland,69 the Lustration Court acknowledges the 1997 Polish Lustration Act,70 which gives the Court the authority to review declarations of collaboration with the secret police. The punishment for this offense could result in removal from public office and yearslong restrictions from other public positions.71 In this case, the applicant, a parliamentarian of the Polish government, was accused of collaborating with the secret police despite having proof otherwise. The Lustration Court denied the applicant’s ability to obtain their case file.72 This put the applicant at a disadvantage, and they were later tried in court for collaborating with the secret police, resulting in removal from the applicant’s official seat as parliamentarian.73 The matter from the Matyjek case sets a harmful precedent for implementing lustration laws.

The efforts by the Lustration Court were meant to protect the integrity of Polish institutions from collaborators. However, the applicant within the Matyjek case was not given adequate time or resources to prepare and build a defense since they were denied access to their case file. The European Court of Human Rights later reviewed and heard the Matyjek case. This Court unanimously agreed that this burden placed on the applicant violated Art. 6, §1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland,74 stating that the Republic shall provide conditions for the people’s equal access to cultural goods that consist of sources of identity and Art. 41,75 a protection from personal inviolability or infringement of liberties. The parliamentarian was restricted from accessing personal cultural goods that would provide an opportunity to build a defense before the Lustration Court. The ruling from the Matyjek76 case reflects the limits that need to be placed on lustration laws. Comparative to U.S. court cases, lustration laws must be enacted to protect its institutions alongside individuals. If lustration laws had infinite authority, then these laws would contradict the behavior lustration is designed to regulate. Thus, like all policies, lustration can be used in undemocratic ways. From a transitional justice standpoint, the undemocratic implementation of lustration would contradict the goals of governmental transitions. If countries and their public officials enforce lustration as intended within transitional justice, these government entities will complement the democratization process.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Political exclusion under lustration laws effectively restricts violators and rebuilds institutions affected by their purview.77 While it is important for nations and their institutions to reform, laws are the driving force that allows nations to do so. Lustration laws provide remedies to gross human rights abuses administered by their perpetrators and hold perpetrators accountable for their wrongdoings as a means to discredit their authority.78 By excluding political actors that diminished their role from regaining any official capacity, they are barred from committing further human rights violations that may alter the transition of government.

However, lustration is not meant to permanently exclude past human rights abusers from participating in civic life. Laws can be designed in ways that allow certain privileges. A significant consideration during lustration enforcement is the duration of punishment imposed on those responsible for abusing their political authority. This would allow past violators a chance of reentry into society with minimal civic duties and minimal employment opportunities to provide some contributions to society. Despite successful rehabilitation, past violators will not be given reconsiderations for public, administrative, and political positions because putting former human rights violators back in positions of power builds resentment from civil society and harms civic trust.79 The implementation of monitoring past violators in this way would be designed to further prevent them from repeating human rights offenses when reentering society.

Several measures can be taken to ensure that lustration laws are not abused. To ensure lustration laws do not default to a ‘tough on crime’ practice, the ‘principle of proportionality’ should be further enforced within lustration laws by assigning punishments proportional to certain abuses of power during human rights violations.80 Incentives, such as relief from employment exclusion, should be implemented after making confessions of guilt and collaboration with a repressive authoritarian regime.81 The Lustration Courts should administer a record system consisting of constitutional violations and confessions of guilt that is easily accessible to the public and private sectors: the public sector to review your records for personal or legal matters and the private sector, specifically for employers that wish to be aware of who they may be welcoming into their place of business.82 The creation of this resource and cultural good would prevent constitutional violations similar to those in Matyjek v. Poland,83 and promote interpersonal trust in a post-authoritarian transition.84 Establishing legal protections and trust between the government and its citizens are essential components in democracies and a goal of lustration laws. Therefore, implementing these democratic safeguards makes lustration practices legally valid for democratization. By implementing these benefits accompanied by lustration laws, lustration can be pushed further to facilitate democratic practices and values within the general public.

In light of building a new future, lustration is an investment for guaranteed accountability, reconciliation, institutional growth and stability, and civic trust.85 Considering how decisive this is for transitional periods, lustration is a democratic tool for administrative and transitional justice. Implementing lustration laws deter future abuses from the government sector onto civic society, punish those that abuse their power and authority, and provide protections for victims from further abuse. This democratizing tool helps preserve countries’ progression in political and governmental turmoil in efforts to protect public institutions, government entities, and the community.

  1. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  2. Ibid
  3. Ramji-Nogales, Jaya. “Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process Approach,” 2010, Nexis Uni.
  4. David, Roman. "Transitional injustice? Criteria for conformity of lustration to the right to political expression." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789-812.
  5. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  6. Ibid, Vetting includes a set of processes used to evaluate the integrity of individuals to determine their ability to continue their official employment. While vetting is a form of lustration, vetting is distinctly different from lustration. A companion to lustration, vetting explores the righteousness and “adherence to relevant standards of human rights and professional conduct” of individuals to determine their qualifications for potential employment opportunities. Through background checks, the discovery of any past conduct that displays a disregard for human rights will then deter a candidate from various public employment opportunities.
  7. Ibid
  8. Ibid
  9. Meierhenrich, Jens. “The Ethics of Lustration.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2006): 99–120. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00005.x.
  10. Horne, Cynthia. "Lustration and trust in Central and East Europe: Assessing the impact of lustration on trust in public institutions and national government." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012).
  11. Nalepa, Monika. “Lustration as a Trust-Building Mechanism? Transitional Justice in Poland.” Essay. In After Oppression Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 333–62. United Nations, 2013.
  12. “'Government Should Establish Peace, Reconciliation Commission With Clear Mandate to Promote Peace, Reconciliation',” Foroyaa (2022), Nexis Uni.
  13. Meierhenrich, Jens. “The Ethics of Lustration.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2006): 99–120. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00005.x.
  14. Lippman, Matthew Ross. Contemporary Criminal Law: Concepts, Cases, and Controversies. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2023.
  15. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
  16. Samsin v. Ukraine, Application No. 38977/19 (European Court of Human Rights, 28 February 2022)
  17. Meierhenrich, Jens. “The Ethics of Lustration.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2006): 99–120. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00005.x.
  18. Wheelock, Darren. "Collateral consequences and racial inequality: Felon status restrictions as a system of disadvantage." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 21, no. 1 (2005): 82-90.
  19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3
  20. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4
  21. Ellis, Mark S. “Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc.” Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (1996): 181–96.
  22. Horne, Cynthia. "Lustration and trust in Central and East Europe: Assessing the impact of lustration on trust in public institutions and national government." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012).
  23. Horne, Cynthia. "Trust and Transitional Justice." Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, edited by Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky (2012): 1-13.
  24. Horne, Cynthia M. “International Legal Rulings on Lustration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: Rule of Law in Historical Context.” Law & Social Inquiry, 713-744, Vol. 34, no. No. 3 (2009), Jstor.
  25. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  26. David, Roman. "Transitional injustice? Criteria for conformity of lustration to the right to political expression." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789-812.
  27. Ibid
  28. Horne, Cynthia M. “International Legal Rulings on Lustration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: Rule of Law in Historical Context.” Law & Social Inquiry, 713-744, Vol. 34, no. No. 3 (2009), Jstor.
  29. Horne, Cynthia. "Lustration and trust in Central and East Europe: Assessing the impact of lustration on trust in public institutions and national government." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012).
  30. Ibid
  31. Van Schaack, Beth. “Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals,” Georgetown Law Journal 97, no. 1 (November 2008): 119-192.
  32. Priban, Jiri. "Oppressors and their victims: The Czech lustration law and the rule of law." Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies. New York: Social Science Research Council (2007): 308-47.
  33. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  34. Priban, Jiri. "Oppressors and their victims: The Czech lustration law and the rule of law." Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies. New York: Social Science Research Council (2007): 308-47.
  35. Miller, Roger LeRoy. “The Employment and Business Environment.” In Legal Environment Today, 438–51. Cengage Learning Custom P, 2021.
  36. Horne, Cynthia M. “International Legal Rulings on Lustration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: Rule of Law in Historical Context.” Law & Social Inquiry, 713-744, Vol. 34, no. No. 3 (2009), Jstor.
  37. Priban, Jiri. "Oppressors and their victims: The Czech lustration law and the rule of law." Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies. New York: Social Science Research Council (2007): 308-47.
  38. Ibid
  39. Ibid
  40. Ibid
  41. Vile, John R. Adler v. Board of Education. The First Amendment Encyclopedia, 2009.
  42. Vile, John R. United States v. Robel. The First Amendment Encyclopedia, 2009.
  43. Wermiel, Stephen. Keyishian v. Board of Regents. The First Amendment Encyclopedia, 2009.
  44. Bertschi, C. Charles. “Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria.” East European Quarterly 28, no. 4 (1994).
  45. Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
  46. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
  47. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
  48. David, Roman. "Transitional injustice? Criteria for conformity of lustration to the right to political expression." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789-812.
  49. Ibid
  50. Wheelock, Darren. "Collateral consequences and racial inequality: Felon status restrictions as a system of disadvantage." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 21, no. 1 (2005): 82-90.
  51. Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
  52. Vile, John R. Adler v. Board of Education. The First Amendment Encyclopedia, 2009.
  53. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
  54. Wermiel, Stephen. Keyishian v. Board of Regents. The First Amendment Encyclopedia, 2009.
  55. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
  56. Vile, John R. United States v. Robel. The First Amendment Encyclopedia, 2009.
  57. Horne, Cynthia. "Lustration and trust in Central and East Europe: Assessing the impact of lustration on trust in public institutions and national government." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012).
  58. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  59. Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
  60. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
  61. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
  62. David, Roman. "Transitional injustice? Criteria for conformity of lustration to the right to political expression." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789-812.
  63. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  64. U.S. Senate. “Impeachment.” Powers & Procedures, 2021.
  65. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4
  66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3
  67. Thomas, David Y. "The Law of Impeachment in the United States." American Political Science Review 2, no. 3 (1908): 378-395.
  68. Simić Olivera, and Lavinia Stan. “Lustration and Vetting.” In An Introduction to Transitional Justice, 149–167. London: Routledge, 2021.
  69. Matyjek v. Poland, Application No. 38184/03 (European Court of Human Rights April 24, 2007).
  70. Ibid
  71. Ibid
  72. Horne, Cynthia. "Lustration and trust in Central and East Europe: Assessing the impact of lustration on trust in public institutions and national government." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012).
  73. Matyjek v. Poland, Application No. 38184/03 (European Court of Human Rights April 24, 2007).
  74. Const. of the Republic of Poland, art. 6, § 1
  75. Const. of the Republic of Poland, art. 41
  76. Matyjek v. Poland, Application No. 38184/03 (European Court of Human Rights April 24, 2007).
  77. Safjan, Marek. “Transitional Justice: The Polish Example, The Case of Lustration,” European Journal of Legal Studies 1, no. 2 (2008): 235-253.
  78. Zięba, Marta. “To What Extent Is Lustration an Effective Mechanism of Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation - The Case of Polish Lustration Law,” Security and Human Rights 23, no. 2 (2012): 147-158.
  79. Priban, Jiri. "Oppressors and their victims: The Czech lustration law and the rule of law." Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies. New York: Social Science Research Council (2007): 308-47.
  80. Meierhenrich, Jens. “The Ethics of Lustration.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2006): 99–120. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00005.x.
  81. Horne, Cynthia M. “International Legal Rulings on Lustration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: Rule of Law in Historical Context.” Law & Social Inquiry, 713-744, Vol. 34, no. No. 3 (2009), Jstor.
  82. Priban, Jiri. "Oppressors and their victims: The Czech lustration law and the rule of law." Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies. New York: Social Science Research Council (2007): 308-47.
  83. Matyjek v. Poland, Application No. 38184/03 (European Court of Human Rights April 24, 2007).
  84. Horne, Cynthia. "Lustration and trust in Central and East Europe: Assessing the impact of lustration on trust in public institutions and national government." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012).
  85. Horne, Cynthia. "Trust and Transitional Justice." Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, edited by Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky (2012): 1-13.

Works Cited

  • Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
  • Bertschi, C. Charles. “Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria.” East European Quarterly 28, no. 4 (1994).
  • Const. of the Republic of Poland, art. 6, § 1
  • Const. of the Republic of Poland, art. 41
  • David, Roman. "Transitional injustice? Criteria for conformity of lustration to the right to political expression." Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789-812.
  • Ellis, Mark S. “Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc.” Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (1996): 181–96.
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