Below is a bibliography of articles on values and science, focusing primarily on the philosophy literature.

Adam, A., On the Methods of History, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 1999; 29(2), 315-324

Adler, Jonathan, Reasonableness, Bias, and the Untapped Power of Procedure
Synthese. 1993; 94(1), 105-125

Reasonableness as an ideal involves commitment to impartial procedures to adjudicate disputes. The commitment can be criticized for being too weak, since it does not eliminate disagreements, and too strong, since it enforces uniformity. I argue against these criticisms via an illustration (the hiring procedures of an academic department) meant to show how even those committed to rigorous procedures, rarely meet up to their own standards. One obstacle is an interest in personal understanding at the expense of real understanding. In conclusion, I attempt to resolve the puzzle that, though reasonableness is minimally demanding and universally avowed, it is uncommon.

Baird, Davis, Exploratory Factor Analysis, Instruments and Logic of Discovery, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1987; 38,319-337.

The logic of discovery usually is thought of as a set of rules for the invention or discovery of hypotheses. Factor analysis has been presented as a part of the logic of discovery because it appears to be a partially mechanical method for generating hypotheses from a large number of basic measurements. However, factor analysis also has been criticized on the grounds that there can be no privileged rules for discovery. Such criticisms are based on arguments by philosophers that there can be no logic of discovery--at best, there can be psychologically useful aids for discovery. I argue that both the philosophical arguments on which these criticisms are based and their application in the case of factor analysis misconstrue discovery. These arguments assume that discovery must uncover hypotheses; but scientists can discover many kinds of things, among them, evidence. In particular, many scientific instruments--those i characterize as 'information-transforming instruments'--are specifically used to discover evidence. The logic of discovery should more properly include rules for the discovery of evidence, as well as hypotheses.

Ball, Stephen W., Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction. Biology and Philosophy. 1988; 3, 317-348.

Barnes, Eric, Beyond Verisimilitude: A Linguistically Invariant Theory of Scientific Progress. Synthese. 1991; 309-339

This paper proposes a solution to David Miller's Minnesotan-Arizonan' demonstration of the language dependence of truthlikeness (Miller 1974), along with Miller's first-order demonstration of the same (Miller 1978). It is assumed, with Peter Urbach, that the implication of these demonstrations is that the very notion of truthlikeness' cannot supply a basis for an objective account of scientific progress. I argue that, while Miller is correct in arguing that the number of true atomic sentences of a false theory is language dependent, the number of known sentences (under certain straightforward assumptions) is conserved by translation; degree of knowledge', unlike truthlikeness;, is thus a linguistically invariant notion. It is concluded that the objectivity of scientific progress must be grounded on the fact (noted in Cohen 1980) that knowledge, not mere truth, is the aim of science.

Barnes, Eric, Social Predictivism, Erkenntnis. 1996; 45(1), 69-89.

Predictivism holds that, where evidence "E" confirms theory "T", "E" confirms "T" more strongly when "E" is predicted on the basis of "T" and subsequently confirmed than when "E" is known in advance of "T"'s formulation and used', in some sense, in the formulation of "T". Predictivism has lately enjoyed some strong supporting arguments from Maher (1988, 1990, 1993) and Kahn, Landsberg, and Stockman (1992). The existence of a scientist who predicted "T" prior to the establishment that "E" is true has epistemic import for "T" only in connection with information regarding the social milieu in which the "T"-predictor is located and information regarding how the "T"-predictor was located. The aim of this paper is to show that predictivism is ultimately a social phenomenon that requires a social level of analysis, a thesis I deem social predictivism'.(edited)

Beattie, J.H.M, Objectivity And Social Anthropology, Philosophy. 1984; supp, 1-20

Socio-cultural "facts" are different from other kinds of facts, and as such need different methods of inquiry. These methods will vary according to whether the emphasis is on institutionalized patterns of social behavior (social action), or on the conceptual systems through which people make their words intelligible to themselves (modes of thought). In both cases ethnocentricity (or socio-centricity) may stand in the way of objectivity, but the difficulties involved in this state of affairs are not altogether insuperable.

Bevir, Mark, Objectivity in History, History-and-Theory. 1994; 33(3), 328-344.

Many philosophers have rejected the possibility of objective historical knowledge on the grounds that there is no given past against which to judge rival interpretations. Their reasons for doing so are valid. But this does not demonstrate that we must give up the concept of historical objectivity as such. The purpose of this paper is to define a concept of objectivity based on criteria of comparison, not on a given past. Objective interpretations are those which best meet rational criteria of accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency, progressiveness, fruitfulness, and openness. Finally, the nature of our being in the world is shown to give us a good reason to regard such objective interpretations as moving towards truth understood as a regulative ideal.

Bloor, David, A Sociological Theory Of Objectivity, Philosophy. 1984; Supp,229-246

The aim is to explain and defend the slogan that 'objectivity is social'. The sense of external reference of our common sense classifications and our moral and scientific beliefs derives from their having the character of social institutions. This claim provides a fruitful way of interpreting popper's doctrine of the 'third world' of objective knowledge. The implications of the sociological approach are explored with material drawn from the history of science and religion.

Bordo, Susan, "Selections from "The Flight to Objectivity" in Feminist Interpretations of Rene Descartes, Bordo, Susan (ed)

Brown, Harold I, Observation And Objectivity, Oxford Univ Pr : Oxford, 1987.

This book seeks to advance naturalized epistemology by arguing that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories, and by constructing an epistemological theory of perception. This theory yields an account of the relation between perceived items and the scientific image of the physical world; an analysis of the role of complex instrumentation in scientific observation; and an account of how theory-dependent observation can provide the basis for scientific objectivity.

Brown, James Robert, Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality, Routledge : New York, 1994.

This book begins by giving an unusual "success of science argument" for realism. It then attacks a number of anti- realists and naturalists (Rorty, Latour, Ruse, Putnam). The final part focuses on a platonic account of aspects of science, including the role of abstract objects and a priori knowledge.

Brown, James Robert, Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality, Routledge : New York, 1994.

This book begins by giving an unusual "success of science argument" for realism. It then attacks a number of anti- realists and naturalists (Rorty, Latour, Ruse, Putnam). The final part focuses on a platonic account of aspects of science, including the role of abstract objects and a priori knowledge.

Caneva, Kenneth, Objectivity, Relativism, and the Individual: A Role for a Post-Kuhnian History of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 1998; 29A (3), 327-344.

Scientific knowledge is both the product of individuals and the result of a process of consensus formation among a collectivity of scientists. What happens in that process that transforms the decontextualized and depersonalized scientific knowledge? An answer is sought in an understanding of the epistemological centrality of individual knowers and in a interpretation of relativisms in terms of the interconnectedness of knowledge claims, evidence, and use. This analysis is used to critique Kuhn's plea for the all-importance of the scientific community, and the unimportance of the merely personal, in any explanation of science.

Chalmers, Alan F., Theory Change and Theory Choice, Methodology-and-Science. 1994; 27(3), 161-165.

Many of the problems involved in attempts to understand scientific change stem from the inappropriate identification of theory change with theory choice on the part on individual scientists. Philosophers have sought in vain for a definitive account of the criteria guiding theory choice. What is more, the choices of scientists are typically influenced by a range of personal factors not relevant for an understanding of the growth of science whilst the unintended and unanticipated consequences of those choices are of central importance to that growth.

Christensen, David, What is Relative Confirmation? Nous-. 1997; 31(3), 370-384.

Logical confirmation theory has centered on analyzing a three-part relation of evidence confirming a hypothesis "relative to" background assumptions. Yet the literature contains little discussion of exactly what confirmation relative to background is supposed to mean. This paper argues that assumptions--usually implicit--about what relative confirmation means have played crucial roles in arguments testing formal confirmation theories against cases. It also shows how the interpretation of relative confirmation that serves best to protect confirmation theories from certain counterexamples also serves to limit the philosophical power and interest of the analyzes it protects.

Crease, Robert, What is an Artifact? Philosophy-Today. 1998; 42 (Supp), 160-168

What an artifact is has been hotley contested in the philosophy of science; Franklin treats an artifact as a corrected mistake (Franklin 1986), while Latour treats it as something about which the collective has changed its mind (Latour 1993). This paper uses a discussion of artifacts-in connection with an episode in the history of science that took place at Brookhaven National Laboratory-to highlight these differences in understanding what an artifact is, and to propose an alternative. (edited)

Culp, Sylvia, Objectivity in Experimental Inquiry: Breaking Data-Technique Circles, Philosophy of Science. 1995; 62(3), 438-458.

I respond to H M Collin's claim (1985, 1990, 1993) that experimental inquiry cannot be objective because the only criterium experimentalists have for determining whether a technique is "working" is the production of "correct" (i.e., the expected) data. Collins claims that the "experimenters' regress," the name he gives to this data-technique circle, cannot be broken using the resources of experiment alone. I argue that the data-technique circle, can be broken even though any interpretation of the raw data produced by techniques is theory-dependent. However, it is possible to break this circle by eliminating dependence on even those theoretical presuppositions that are shared by an entire scientific community through the use of multiple independently theory-dependent techniques to produce robust bodies of data. Moreover, I argue, that it is the production of robust bodies of data that convinces experimentalists of the objectivity of their data interpretations.

Cushing, James T, Bohm's Theory: Common Sense Dismissed, Studies-in-History-and-Philosophy-of-Science. 1993; 24(5), 815-842.

It is conventional wisdom that the quantum revolution necessarily required that an objective, causal arena be abandoned for microprocesses. This essay focuses on a little-known, and even less widely accepted, program that "does" represent "all" physical processes -- both in the microrealm as well as in the macrorealm -- as evolving deterministically in a definite and objectively existing arena. I examine how this largely classical, common-sense view came to be rejected and indicate that the contingent context of the philosophical commitments of the major protagonists was an essential element in this. The present consensus was not, and still is not, the "only" logically and empirically adequate description possible for quantum phenomena.

Edel, Abraham, Exploring Fact And Value: Science, Ideology, And Value", V2, Brunswick-Transaction-Books : New, 1980.

The fact value dichotomy in philosophy and social science. Part i explores theoretical arguments, including special studies of relations of science to ethics, and ends with methodological proposals for studying moral change. The dichotomy is found to be contextual, not absolute. Part ii investigates the dichotomy in practice--technology and morality; aspects of responsibility of scientists, engineers, and other professionals; issues of affirmative action, terrorism and environmental ethics. An epilogue traces the social history of the dichotomy from kant through twentieth century positivistic and analytic philosophies to its present dissolution.

Falkenburg, Brigitte, The Analysis of Particle Tracks: A Case for Trust in the Unity of Physics, Studies-in-History-and-Philosophy-of-Modern-Physics. 1996; 27B(3), 337-371.

With a case study concerning the analysis of particle tracks, I want to show how modelling in physics is based on trust in unity. The paper deals with the calculations of particle tracks made around 1930 by Mott and Bethe and with the way in which Bethe's calculations have been used for decades to measure the particle momentum from individual tracks. The measurement method relies on the assumption that classical mechanics and quantum theory of scattering can be combined consistently into a model of the passage of charged particles through matter which applies to individual tracks. The empirical adequacy of the model is demonstrated by independent tests. I shall argue that the analysis of particle tracks is a case for well-justified trust in a unity of physics which may well be hidden in actual model-building. The measurement method reveals the transcendental status of the idea of unity in physics, while the empirical adequacy of the underlying model indicates that the idea has indeed some counterpart in the contingent structure of the phenomena.

Feher, Marta, Epistemology Naturalized Versus Epistemology Socialized in Scientific Knowledge Socialized, Hronszky, IMRE (ED), 75-96.

What the paper argues for is to historicize and to sociologize the goals and, by that, the methodologies of science. The author suggests the separating of the problem of rationality from that of progress. This, she argues, we should not try to derive either scientific rationality form the progrss of science (as Laudan did) or progrss from rationality (as Lakatos and others did). Scientific progress ought rather be linked to that of society.

Feldman, Richard, Subjective And Objective Justification In Ethics And Epistemology, Monist-. 1988; 71,405-419.

A view widely held by epistemologists is that there is a distinction between subjective and objective epistemic justification, analogous to the commonly drawn distinction between subjective and objective justification in ethics. However, when the subjective-objective distinction in epistemology is drawn in the most plausible and natural way, it turns out that subjective justification implies objective justification and that objectively justified beliefs are typically, but not always, subjectively justified as well. Nothing like this near equivalence holds in ethics. Moreover, objective epistemic justification turns on facts about a believer's perspective in a way that objective ethical justification does not. The similarity between ethical and epistemic justification is thus not as great as many philosophers suggest.

Fine, Arthur, The Viewpoint of No-One in Particular, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 1998; 72(2), 9-20.

This is an essay on objectivity. Using Arthur Eddington's conception of a "point of view of no-one in particular" it begins by examining contemporary writings that single out the natural sciences as especially privileged with respect to objectivity, but also as needing to be restrained and limited in their claims. It continues by looking at feminist and other recent critiques of objectivity. The essay concludes with a positive proposal that links objectivity with trust.

Flonta, Mircea, Does the Scientific Paper Accurately Mirror the Very Grounds of Scientific Assessment? Theoria. 1996; 11(27), 19-31.

This paper presents a prevalent representation about the objectivity and impartiality of scientific knowledge that emerges from the structure and style of the standard research paper. This representation is critically examined considering some rather untypical scientific papers reporting controversies between researchers in a certain field of experimental science. The role of personal preconceptions and intellectual prejudices in the assessment of scientific theories is emphasized by reference to Einstein's grounds for his general theory of relativity.

Folse, Jr., Henry, Laudan's Model of Axiological Change and the Bohr-Einstein Debate 77, Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. 1990; 77-88.

According to the naturalistic normative axiology of Laudan's reticulated model of scientific change, empirical discoveries can provide a rational basis for axiological decisions concerning the epistemic goals scientific inquiry out to pursue. The Bohr-Einstein debate over acceptance of quantum theory is analyzed as a case of axiological change. The participants' aims are incompatible due to different formulations of the goal of objective description, but neither doubts the realist commitment to the existence of microsystems or the intention of quantum mechanics to provide knowledge of them. Thus the general aim of realism is not at issue.

Forster, Malcolm R, Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist's Approach to Confirmation, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1995; 46(3), 399-424.

The central problem with Bayesian philosophy of science is that it cannot take account of the relevance of simplicity and unification to confirmation, induction, and scientific inference. The standard Bayesian folklore about factoring simplicity into the priors, and convergence theorems as a way of grounding their objectivity are some of the myths that Earman's book does not address adequately.

Foss, Jeffery, The Logical and Sociological Structure of Science, Protosociology 1998; 12, 66-77.

Twentieth century philosophy of science has been dominated in turn by the logical approach of the positivists and the sociological approach of Kuhn and his followers. These views are briefly presented and their shortcomings detailed. In their place an information-economy view of science is presented, highlighting the role of models, and the flow of information among specific natural sciences. The information-economy view enables us to discern a degree of scientific unity along five dimensions: logical, sociological, ontological, epistemic, and temporal.

Friedman, Marilyn, Going Nowhere: Nagel on Normative Objectivity, Philosophy. 1990: 501-509.

First, I sketch some obstacles to achieving the sort of normative objectivity defended by Thomas Nagel in the View from Nowhere, These obstacles include an inability to determine whether or not one's thinking is genuinely "detached," as Nagel would put it, from her "subjective particulars." Section II follows with the recommendation that we modify Nagel's conception of objectivity so as to take fuller account of the intersubjective social context in which so-called "objective" understanding occurs in practice. By reconstruing objectivity in terms of intersubjectivity, we can negotiate the obstacles to objectivity more wisely.

Fu, Daiwie, Higher Taxonomy and Higher Incommensurability, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 1995; 26(2), 273-294.

This paper critically evaluates Kuhn's recent taxonomy' interpretation of incommensurabitity. It points to an urgent need to extend Kuhn's taxonomy thesis to a higher level of general taxonomy of knowledge, and thus to understand a higher level of incommensurability-bother "highers" are important in history of science, but have been ignored by philosophers of science. I take as the primary example the debate between Boyle and Hobbes about "Air Pump" in light of the differences in higher taxonomies. Recent works of I Hacking and J Buchwald were also discussed and used as the point of departure here.

Grafstein, Robert, The Institutional Resolution Of The Fact-Value Dilemma. Philosophy-Of-The-Social-Sciences. 1981; 11,1-14.

Recent attacks on the fact-value distinction contend that insofar as science is a social enterprise and scientists form a linguistic community, values will be an inextricable feature of scientific theories. This conclusion, however, is portrayed as a culturally neutral truth. This paper reconciles these positions by arguing that science is an institution that inscribes what in effect is an extensional logic on scientific discourse in a way that maintains the fact-value distinction. This sociology of logic, rooted in the work of quine, suggests that while there is no extra-theoretical fact-value distinction, such a distinction is generated within science.

Gruender, David, Values and the Philosophy of Science, Protosociology 1998; 12, 319-332.

As others have remarked, discussion of the values relevant to work in the sciences is almost absent from philosophy of science literature, in spite of the great and growing importance of such issues. Possible reasons for this are briefly explored, the fact-value distinction is revisited, and major ethical theories are examined for their possible bearing on value issues in the sciences. A version of the theory identifying values as existing or potential facts of importance to human beings is sketched showing its application to individuals, social groups, and consequent global implications.

Haman, Krzysztof, On the Objectivity of the Laws of Physics, Philosophy in Science(Tucson). 1986; 77-80.

The perculiar charater of geophysical research throws a new light on the nature of the laws of physics. A geophysicist constructs a map of a domain which reflects only some features of reality on certain scales. These maps strongly depend on the researcher himself. A certain indeterminism seems to be inseparably connected with this method: the better the resolution of the maps, the more unstable modes of evolution appear and the faster the errors grow.

Harding, Sandra, "Strong Objectivity": A Response to the New Objectivity Question, Synthese. 1995; 104(3), 331-349.

Where the old "objectivity question" asked, "Objectivity or relativism: which side are you on?", the new one refuses this choice, seeking instead to bypass widely recognized problems with the conceptual framework that restricts the choices to these two. It asks, "How can the notion of objectivity be updated and made useful for contemporary knowledge-seeking projects?" One response to this question is the "strong objectivity" program that draws on feminist standpoint epistemology to provide a kind of logic of discovery for maximizing our ability to block "might makes right" in the sciences.(edited)

Harding, Sandra, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives., Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1991.

This study continues the projects in the author's "The Science Question in Feminism" of showing how and why the philosophy and social studies of the natural sciences should treat the natural sciences as if they were special cases of social sciences. The first two sections develop and examine further the challenges feminism has raised to conventional views of the natural sciences and epistemology. The third section looks at the insights that post-colonial andother "other" scholarship can bring to both the feminist and pre-feminist controversies in epistemology and the philosophy and social studies of the sciences.

Hartman, Robert S, Value, Fact And Science, Philosophy-of-Science. 1958; 25,97-108.

Hausman, Daniel M, Confirming Mainstream Economic Theory, Theoria. 1998; 13(32), 261-278.

This essay is concerned with the special difficulties that arise in testing and appraising mainstream economic theory. I argue that, like other theories designed to apply to complex open systems, it is very hard to confirm mainstream economics. Parts can be tested and appraised, but the theory is only very weakly supported by evidence.

Hetherington, Norriss, Science and Objectivity: Episodes in the History of Astronomy., Iowa State Univ. Pr. AMES, 1988.

Holcomb, Harmon, Interpreting Kuhn: Paradigm choice as objective value judgment, Metaphilosophy. 1989; 20, 51-67.

The purpose of this essay is to challenge the tradition which assumes the mutual irrelevance of Philosophy of science and ethics. We can fruitfully employ ethical theory as a methodological resource for interpreting Kuhn's view of scientific objectivity. Kuhn's critics cast him as some sort of antiobjectivist, e. g., as a conventionalist, emotivist, subjectivist, or relativist about paradigm-choice. In fact Kuhn's stand undermines each of those positions, his ral approach being one analogous to inttuitionist utilitariamism.

Hookway, Christopher, "Fallibilism and Objectivity: Science and Ethics" in World, Mind, and Ethics, Altham, J E J (ed) Cambridge Univ Pr : New York, 1995

Hutcheson, Peter, Kuhn And The Context Of Justification, Southwest Philosophical Studies. 1980; 5,70-76.

This paper is a defense of the thesis that the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification is a "bona fide" distinction. I argue that thomas kuhn's arguments to the contrary are unsound, and that he has not shown that the attention to the details of the history of science undermines the distinction. I point out how use of the distinction can illuminate the history of science, and show that adoption of the distinction commits one to only the legitimacy of certain problems, rather than specific solutions to them.

Khushf, George, Why Bioethics Needs the Philosophy of Medicine: Some Implications of Reflection on Concepts of Health and Disease, Theoretical-Medicine. 1997; 18(1-2), 145-163.

Germund Hesslow has argued that concepts of health and disease serve no important scientific, clinical, or ethical function. However, this conclusion depends upon the particular concept of disease he espouses; namely, on Boorse's functional notion. The fact/value split embodied in the functional notion of disease leads to a sharp split between the "science" of medicine and bioethics, making the philosophy of medicine irrelevant for both. By placing this disease concept in the broader context of medical history. I shall show self-contradictory notion. By making explicit the value desiderate of medical nosologies, a reconfiguration of the relation between medicine, bioethics, and the philosophy of medicine is initiated. This, in turn, will involve a recovery of the caring dimensions of medicine, and thus a more humane practice.

Kieseppa, I.A., Akaike Information Criterion, Curve-Fitting, and the Philosophical Problem of Simplicity, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1997; 48(1), 21-48.

The philosophical significance of the procedure of applying "Akaike information criterion" (AIC) to curve-fitting problems is evaluated. The theoretical justification for using AIC (the so-called Akaike's theorem) is presented in a rigorous way, and its range of validity is assessed by presenting both instances in which it is valid and counterexamples in which it is invalid. The philosophical relevance of the justification that this result gives for making one particular choice between simple and complicated hypothesis is emphasized. In addition, recent claims that the methods based on Akaike's theorem are relevant to other philosophical problems associated with the notion of simplicity are presented and evaluated.

Kosso, Peter, Science and Objectivity, Journal of Philosophy, 1989; 86, 245-257.

Lipson, Morris, Objective Experience, Nous. 1987; 21,319-343.

Traditionally, the notion of an objective experience has been captured in terms of what such an experience must be of. Here the notion is cast in terms, rather, of a subject's states. The result is a conception of objectivity which does not bear the heavy ontological commitments of the more traditional conception. The objection that the new (or "thin") notion of objectivity is too thin--too close to the subjective--is answered. It is shown that if a subject's experience is thinly objective, then there exist alternative experiential routes through it; from this it is inferred that such an experience contains items which could appear variously to a subject. The arguments are typically transcendental in stroud's sense. The stroud-strawson debate is briefly discussed, as is the bearing of the thin notion on the realism/anti-realism debate.

Lloyd, Elisabeth A, Objectivity and the Double Standard for Feminist Epistemologies, Synthese. 1995; 104(3), 351-381.

The popular sport of baiting feminist philosophers--into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful "objective" methods grounding scientific knowledge--embodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly putting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the fringes, on the run. This strategy can only work if "objectivity" is transparent, simple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In fact, taking 'objectivity' as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evident in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires careless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of 'objectivity' absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic feminist concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest of the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings that "are already considered central" in most current analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish to "reject" the centrality and relevance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality.(edited)

Longino, Helen E, Gender, Politics, and the Theoretical Virtues, Synthese. 1995; 104(3), 383-397.

Traits like simplicity and explanatory power have traditionally been treated as values internal to the sciences, constitutive rather than contextual. As such they are cognitive virtues. This essay contrasts a traditional set of such virtues with a set of alternative virtues drawn from feminist writings about the sciences. In certain theoretical contexts, the only reasons for preferring a traditional or an alternative virtue are socio-political. This undermines the notion that the traditional virtues can be considered purely cognitive.

Lowrance, William W, Modern Science And Human Values, Oxford-Univ-Pr : Ny, 1985.

This book probes the meanings of "values" and "value," and examines fact--value interplay. Throughout, it explores ways science, technology, and medicine influence social philosophies and choices, and vice versa. It construes technical progress as directed tragedy. It critiques aspects of professionalism, freedoms of inquiry and application, and public decisionmaking. Ethical challenges covered include paternalism, obligations to future generations, bioethics, and the public interest. The book concludes with a plea for technical stewardship beyond narrow responsibility.

Margolis, Joseph, Relativism, History And Objectivity In The Human Studies, Journal For The Theory Of Social Behaviour. 1984; 14,1-24.

Fundamental similarities and differences between the natural and the human sciences are examined in terms of realism, objectivity, and relativism. The topics are brought to bear on the general issue of scientific realism, at the same time that the views of a large number of current anglo-american and continental philosophers are assessed.

Matheson, Carl, Rejection With Acceptance, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1991; 167-179.

The claim that theory choice should always be comparative, i.e., that one theory cannot be rejected until a superior one is accepted, is an article of faith among writers in the history and philosophy of science. In this paper we attempt to show that 1) there are no good conceptual reasons for this claim, 2) the historical record does not support the thesis that the acceptance or rejection of a theory is always comparative, and 3) a straightforward reading of the historical record is complicated by sociological factors and a possible ambiguity in the words "accept" and "reject".
Miller, Richard W., "Three Versions of Objectivity: Aesthetic, Moral, and Scientific" in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Levinson, Jerrold (ed) Cambridge-Univ-Pr : New York, 1998.

Muhlholzer, Felix, On Objectivity, Erkenntnis-. 1988; 28,185-230.

The following definition of ""objective"" is proposed: a statement "s" is objective if and only if in "s" all parameters that are relevant to its truth value are made explicit. The objectivity of predicates and relations can be defined in a similar manner. This simple conception of objectivity--which could be called ""explicitness conception of objectivity""--can be found in hermann weyl and plays a central part in the natural sciences. There are grades of objectivity depending on the 'quality' and the number of parameters our predicates are relativized to. A "relativistic ockham principle" has to be recognized: relativization parameters are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The explicitness conception of objectivity is accessible to mathematical specifications, is the core of the idea of invariance, has a lot of philosophical applications, and leads to precise notions of 'subjectivity' and a precise formulation of the problem of the limits of objectivity.

Neiman, Alven; Siegel,, Harvey Objectivity and Rationality in Epistemology and Education: Scheffler's Middle Road, Synthese-. 1993; 94(1), 55-83.

In this paper, we describe and defend Israel Scheffler's treatment ofobjectivity and rationality. We explain how Scheffler's epistemology, developed in works such as "Science and Subjectivity", provides a "middle road" between fixed foundations, certainty and thegiven, on the one hand; and subjectivism, relativism and skepticism on the other. We discuss Scheffler's use of this "middle road" in his work on education and teaching. Our goal here is to suggest thatthis work provides a valuable paradigm for responding to a number of intractable controversies among educational theorists and philosophers, especially those having to do with the state of the university in contemporary culture.

Nelson, Lynn Hankinson, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism, Temple Univ. Pr. Philadelphia, 1990.

Building on Quine's work, I establish a framework for a much-needed dialogue between feminist science critics and other scientists and scholars about the nature of science. Specifically, I make a case for a feminist empiricism, a view of science that can account for its obvious success in explaining and predicting experience and can encompass feminist insights into relationships between gender, politics, and science. I conclude that empiricism can survive the demise of individualism and that the evolving network of our theories does and should incorporate political views, including those shaped by, and shaping in turn, our experiences of gender.

Nersessian, Nancy J, Aether/Or: The Creation Of Scientific Concepts, Studies In History And Philosophy Of Science. 1984; 15,175-212.

This paper addresses the question of the nature of concept formation in science. A case study of some of the factors involved in the formation of the electromagnetic field concept is developed by considering the contributions of faraday, maxwell, lorentz, and einstein. It is argued that concept formation in science is a process in which we see commensurable, but not simply cumulative development. It is proposed that this process can be characterized as dividing into three stages: (a) 'heuristic guide', (b) 'elaborational' and (c) 'philosophical'.

Nickles, Thomas, The Reconstruction Of Scientific Knowledge, Philosophy And Social Action. 1987; 13,91-104.

Historians and sociologists have rightly criticized philosophers of science for formalist "rational reconstructions" which excessively abstract from the process of actual scientific research. However, scientists themselves constantly reconstruct previously accepted work, sometimes transforming it beyond recognition (e.g., planck's and mendel's work). Much innovation typically accompanies this reconstruction process, which is both philosophically and sociologically interesting. The paper outlines a philosophico-sociological program of "social construction by reconstruction."

Nozick, Robert, Invariance and Objectivity, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 1998; 72 (2), 21-48.

Pearce, David; Rantala, Veikko, Continuity And Scientific Discovery, Communication-And-Cognition. 1985; 18,15-23.

Poirier, Maben Walter, Michael Polanyi and the Question of "Objective" knowledge. Philosophy- Today. 1988; 32, 312-326.

There is a widespread belief amongst many philosopher of science that, because of his emphasizing tacit knowing, Michael Polanyi defends a thesis about the nature of the knowing process in general and scientific knowing in particular that is at best midway between objectivism and subjectivism, and at worst, unquestionably subjectivist, hence tainted. We argue that one must not confuse neutralism in knowing, which is possible, and that polanyi was undoubltedly against newtralism, but that he was very much in favour of acquiring objective knowledge.

Potter, Jonathan, Testability, Flexibility: Kuhnian Values In Scientists' Discourse Concerning Theory Choice, Philosophy-Of-The-Social-Sciences. 1984; 14,303-330.

T S Kuhn argues that scientific theory choice is governed by values which provide a rational basis for theory selection. This claim is tested by examining the transcript of a scientific conference where the selection of theories is discussed. A detailed discourse analysis of this transcript reveals fundamental difficulties with the values-as-constraint model. It is suggested that values should be viewed as a flexible repertoire of interpretative resources with scientists' selectively draw upon in warranting their own theory choices and undermining opponents.
Putnam, Ruth Ann, Understanding Lincoln, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1988; 25, 261-267.

This paper defines a relation between descriptions of deeds (paying a bill) and bare facts (writing certain words on a piece of paper). The grounds for deed descriptions and ascriptions are examined using the deeds of Lincoln and others during the civil war as examples. Since Deed descriptions are interest-relative, the question arises whether historiography is intolerably relative. That question rests on a sharp fact-value dichotomy; if that dichotomy is rejected, criteria are available for the evaluation of nonstandard (Feminist, Black, etc.) and of Revisionist History. The paper concludes with some remarks concerning the : "HISTORIKERSTRIET".

Rescher, Nicholas, The Roots Of Objectivity, Proceedings-of-the-American-Catholic-Philosophical-Association. 1985; 59,19-34.

Richmond, Samuel A, A Simplification of the Theory of Simplicity, Synthese. 1996; 107(3), 373-393.

Nelson Goodman has constructed two theories of simplicity: one of predicates; one of hypotheses. I offer a simpler theory by generalization and abstraction from his. Generalization comes by dropping special conditions. Goodman imposes on which unexcluded extensions count as complicating and which excluded extensions count as simplifying. Abstraction is achieved by counting only nonisomorphic models and subinterpretations. The new theory takes into account all the hypotheses of a theory in assessing its complexity, whether they were projected prior to, or result from, projection of a given hypothesis. It assigns simplicity postprojection priority over simplicity preprojection. It better orders compound conditionals than does the theory of simplicity of hypotheses and it does not inherit an anomaly of the theory of simplicity of predicates--its failure to order the ordering relations. Drop Goodman's special conditions, and the problems fall away with them.

Rubinstein, Robert A; Laughlin Jr, Charles D; Mcmanus, John, Science As Cognitive Process: Toward An Empirical Philosophy Of Science. Univ Of Penn Pr: Philadelphia, 1984.

Sade, Robert M, A Theory of Health and Disease: The Objectivist Subjectivist Dichotomy, Journal-of-Medicine-and-Philosophy. 1995; 20(5), 513-525.

Competing contemporary theories of health, the reductionist (purportedly value-free) and the relativist (purportedly value-based theories, both rest upon an understanding of value as grounded in desiring a subjective state. Both can be classified as subjectivist theories. An alternative set of theories, those resting on an understanding of value as grounded in desirability (or goodness) of an objective goal, can be classified as objectivist theories. The ultimate goal of all living things is life, the standard by which states or functions can be measured, and thereby defined as healthy or disease states. While disease can be classified in a taxonomy of biological dysfunctions without remainder, health is a richer concept that includes not only biological values, but also moral values, both leading to the ultimate goal of human flourishing.

Salmon, Wesley, Rationality and Objectivity in Science, or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes in Scientific Theories. Univ. of Minn Pr: Minneapolis, 1990.

Sarkar, Husain, The Task of Group Rationality: The Subjectivist's View--Part II, Studies-in-History-and-Philosophy-of-Science. 1997; 28(3), 497-520.

In this part, Thomas Kuhn's theory is treated. The role of values in scientific decision making and their impact on a scientific group are examined; the transitions to various stages which are epistemically interesting are delineated; Kuhn's arguments about representative groups, value, and history are discussed and it is claimed that either Kuhn's view presupposes time-independent methods or he has failed to justify the study of history, at least for the normative problem of group rationality; finally, it is argued that a kind of society of scientists is entailed, on Kitcher's and Kuhn's views, which is fairly unappealing.

Savage, C. Wade, Scientific Theories, Univ. of Minn Pr: Minneapolis, 1990.

A first group of essays in Scientific Theories treats issues arising in biomedicine, economics, neuropsychology, psychoanalysis, and physics: nonepistemic factors in theory development, the nature of experimental science, realist and natural theorizing, the semantic conception of theories, and epistemic foundationalism. Holistic methods, theory choice, the use of old evidence, and the nature of ad hoc theories are considered in a second group, informed by a probabilistic viewpoint. The final selections treat issues centered around reason, revolution, and realism: semantic incommensurability of theories, underdetermination, rationality of theory acceptance, historical arguments for realism, and improvements in empiricism.

Scott, Brian M, Technical Notes on a Theory of Simplicity, Synthese. 1996; 109(2), 281-289.

Recently Samuel Richmond, generalizing Nelson Goodman, has proposed a measure of the simplicity of a theory that takes into account not only the polymorphicity of its models but also their internal homogeneity. By this measure a theory is simple if small subsets of its models exhibit only a few distinct (i.e., nonisomorphic) structures. Richmond shows that his measure, unlike that given by Goodman's theory of simplicity of predicates, orders the order relations in an intuitively satisfactory manner. In this note I formalize his presentation and suggest an improvement designed to overcome certain technical difficulties.

Seabright,Paul, Objectivity, Disagreement, And Projectibility, Inquiry. 1988; 31,25-51.

This paper seeks to refute one variant of a view that scientific disciplines are intrinsically more objective than nonscientific ones, and that this greater objectivity explains increasing social agreement about the findings of science, by contrast with increasing disagreement about the findings of, e.g., ethics. Such a view rests on the implicit assumption that all forms of discourse aim equally at the generation of consensus; instead, differing degrees of consensus in different disciplines are often explicable by sociological, not metaphysical, differences in the disciplines concerned. A detailed example is presented of a discipline (indian folk dietary medicine) in which considerable lack of consensus is observed, for sociologically explicable reasons, in spite of its claims to scientific objectivity. It is concluded that disciplines may differ in the degree of truth of the claims advanced in them, and in the importance of consensus among their social aims. But neither of these is to be explained by differences in respect of some independent property of objectivity.

Shelton, Jim, The Role of Observation and Simplicity in Einstein's Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 1988; 19, 103-118.

This paper criticizes recent interpretations of Einstein's Epistemology that have downplayed the centrality of observation in their emphasis on "non-rational" factors. Taking the 1905 relativity paper, this article shows that obsevation was, in fact, of primary importance in einstein's view. It is argued (using ideas of Schlick) that even the notion of simplicity (unity) that so motivated einstein does not support the claim that in einstein's view observation was not the basis for theory acceptance.

Shiimony, Abner, On Martin Eger's "A Tale of Two Controversies", Zygon. 1988; 23, 333-340.

Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "New" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms.

Skillen, A J, The Ethical Neutrality Of Science And The Method Of Abstraction, Philosophical-Forum-(Boston). 1980; 11,215-233.

Whereas most accounts of 'ethical neutrality' in science ground it in the 'fact-value dichotomy', we argue, with extensive illustration from the history of english political economy, that scientific 'abstraction', and the consequent focus on an isolated 'part' of human life, was seen by its practitioners as entailing the avoidance of wholesale moral claims. We show, with reference to max weber and lionel robbins, that this perspective helps in the contrastive understanding of much modern confusion.

Sklar, Lawrence, The Content of Science, the Methodology of Science and Hempel's Models of Explanation and Confirmation, Philosophical Studies. 1999; 94 (1-2), 21-34.

The deductive-nomological model of explanation of Hempel and Oppenheim looks for the criteria for something being an explanation that are independent of any of the specific content of a scientific of a scientific theory. Some historical reasons for the desire for a purely "formal" notion of explanation are surveyed. It is then suggested that some of the alleged inability of the account to properly delimit what can be counted as explanatory rests upon intuitions about what is explanatory that come out of a notion of the criteria for something being an explanation that continue to rest upon implicit assumptions that are based upon our current understanding of what the actual scientific contents are of our fundamental theories.

Slezak, Peter, The Social Construction of Social Constructionism, Inquiry. 1994; 37(2), 139-157.
The republication of Bloor's "Knowledge and Social Imagery" is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work but also provides the clearest evidence of the shortcomings of the enterprise. The new Afterword addresses criticisms of the Strong Programme, but the theses which Bloor now defends are substantially weaker claims than the iconoclastic tenets of the original. Bloor asserts that criticisms made since 1975 have given him no reason to modify the original text, but there are judicious alterations which are revealing. These unacknowledged alterations are documented here. Bloor's Strong Programme was founded on the diametrical opposition between his causal sociological approach and the allegedly a- causal rationalist, psychologist or teleological' approach. However, once it was shown that the teleological position is not the straw- man he represented it to be, Bloor's diametrical opposition left him no retreat. Just as Bloor weakens the original claims of the Strong programme to make them appear compatible with cognitive science, so he eradicates the suggestion that the opposing teleological position was ever as absurd as he had portrayed it. (edited)

Slote, Michael A, Confirmation And Conservatism, American Philosophical Quarterly. 1981; 18,79-84.

Soble, Alan, Gender, Objectivity, and Realism, Monist-. 1994; 77(4), 509-530.

This essay examines the significance of the thought of Evelyn Fox Keller (author of "Reflections on Gender and Science" and "Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death") for the feminist epistemology project. Three topics are addressed: 1) the existence and nature of gender differences in cognitive ability and style; 2) the impact of these differences on both objectivity and the concept of objectivity; and 3) the upshot in the philosophy of science (the relativism vs. realism debate) of the purported gendered nature of science. I argue, "in media res", that Keller's dichotomy (bad men's science, potentially good women's science) is overblown, and that gender considerations do not entail we should radically overhaul science.

Stofber, J. A., Objectivity and the Sociology of Science, South African Journal of Philosophy, 1988; 7, 213-225.

One of the most serious challenges to the idea of objectivity in contemporary thinking comes from the sociologists of science. In this paper an attempt is made to counter this attack by critically evaluation some of the most important themes in sociology of science. It is argued that a proper notion of objectivity, which escapes both naïve realism and collective subjectiviism or ralativism, can do justice to the important contribution made by sociologists of science to our understanding of natural and social science, without our having to accept the realtivistic or 'Localistic' tendencies in this important discipline.

Tiles, Mary, Bachelard: Science And Objectivity, Cambridge-Univ-Pr : Ny, 1985.

This book is designed to provide an introduction to the main ideas behind bachelard's works on the epistemology of science for those working within the analytic traditions in philosophy. It makes no pretense to definitive exegesis, but attempts to confront the problem of 'incommensurability of scientific theories', (1) by examining bachelard's account of conceptual change, (2) by reflecting on the apparent incommensurability between bachelard's approach to the philosophy of science and that characteristic of analytic philosophers.

Treitel, Jonathan, Confirmation As Competition: The Necessity For Dummy Rival Hypotheses, Studies-In-History-And-Philosophy-Of-Science. 1987; 18,517-525.

Turner, Stephen, Relativism Hot and Cold, History-of-the-Human-Sciences. 1994; 7(1), 109-115.

Two forms of relativism are distinguished from social constructionism. "Cold" relativism appeals to background objects, such as cultures or world- views that have a high degree of stability; hot relativism involves objects such as paradigms that are replaced more frequently. Each object is used in the explanation of belief; neither object is easily reconciled with change in belief. Social constructionism purports to provide an internal account of belief change, based on the concept of practices: practices enable new facts to become accepted, and, through being used in a standard way, become taken for granted. Thus new practices are created through use.

Van-Fraassen, Bas C., From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again
Proceedings-of-the-Biennial-Meetings-of-the-Philosophy-of-Science-Association. 1993; 2, 6-29.

The attempt to formulate a viable empiricist and non-foundationalist epistemology of science faces four problems here confronted. The first is an apparent loss of objectivity in science, in the conditions of use of models in applied science. The second derives from the theory-infection of scientific language, with an apparent loss of objective conditions of truth and reference. The third, often cited as objection to "The Scientific Image", is the apparent theory-dependence of the distinction between what is and is not observable. The fourth and last is the loss of the possibility of objective evaluation of rationality in scientific methodology. It is argued that each of these problems is illusory.

Wilkerson, Terence E, Kant On Objectivity, Midwest-Studies-In-Philosophy. 1983; 8,373-386.

Williams, Michael, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, Blackwell : Cambridge, 1992.

Williams, Michael, Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism., Mind. 1988; 97, 415-439.

Winnie, John A, "Invariants And Objectivity" In "From Quarks To Quasars", Colodny, Robert G (Ed), 71-180, Au: Pb: Univ-Pittsburgh-Pr : Pittsburgh, 1986.

Witmer, Jeffrey A; Clayton, Murray K, On Objectivity And Subjectivity In Statistical Inference: A Response To Mayo, Synthese. 1986; 67,369-379.

In This Paper We Respond To The Article 'An Objective Theory Of Statistical Testing' By D G Mayo (1983). We Argue That The Theory Of Testing Developed By Mayo, Npt, Is Neither Novel Nor Objective. We Also Respond To The Claims Made By Mayo Against Bayesian Theory.

Worley, Sara, Feminism, Objectivity, and Analytic Philosophy, Hypatia-. 1995; 10(3), 138-156.

Evelyn Fox Keller and Susan Bordo are often cited as sources for the claim that the notion of objectivity found in Western science and analytic philosophy is male-biased. I argue that even if their arguments that objectivity is male-biased are successful, the bias they establish is not a sort which should worry any feminist analytic philosophers (or scientists). I also examine their suggestions for reconceiving objectivity and find them inadequately motivated.