Reconstructing People

The sociological study of social problems, problems like juvenile delinquency, mental illness, alcoholism, child abuse, divorce, illegitimacy, poverty and homelessness, came to prominence in the 50s with the founding of the Society for the Study of Social Problems and the publication of the journal Social Problems. Before 1950, applied or practical studies were thought to be insufficiently scientific and the study of social problems more the business of social work than sociology. Many sociologists believed that, properly pursued, sociology was a pure and not an applied science and that the goal should be to describe or explain social facts and not diagnose or cure social ills.

In 1950, Robert K. Merton tried to bring the study of social problems into line with this conception of sociology; a study of juvenile delinquency or alcoholism, he argued, should aim to explain rather than reform the practice. Between 1950 and 1970, Merton and his students published many papers describing the effects of juvenile delinquency, prostitution, addiction, and illegitimacy on family life. They believed that their studies offered a descriptive rather than a normative account of some of America’s central problems.

In 1971 Herbert Blumer published a paper that moved the field in a different direction. Social problems, he argued, are talked into being; whether a condition like alcoholism or illegitimacy is a social problem in the United States is a matter of the claims the public makes --how they evaluate or respond to heavy drinking or out-of-wedlock birth. The task of the sociologist, on this view, is not to describe the causes or effects of alcoholism but to explain how or why Americans have put that condition in the problem category, why they have grown concerned about heavy drinking and made alcoholism an issue. Blumer also believed that his studies offered a descriptive rather than a normative account of some of America’s central problems.

Merton and Blumer thus pushed the study of social problems in different directions, but they shared an ideal; the field, they both said, should be value-free. Statements about alcoholism or illegitimacy should express not the sociologist’s values but only those of her subjects; she should say what is, but not what ought to be; she should mention her subjects’ disapproval of heavy drinking but not express her own.

Though Merton and Blumer spoke of social problems in entirely different terms, they were consumed by the same two ideas: (1) that the sociological study of problems should be a science and (2) that the study should be free of values. Moreover, their reason for (2) was (1); they believed that only if sociology were free of values, could sociology be a science, and they assumed that their own studies of social problems were value-free --that though they mentioned terms like ‘good’ and ‘bad’, they did not use them.

My aim, in this paper, is to show that both assumptions, (1) and (2), are mistaken and that a sociologist in studying social problems must use ethical terms (express values of her own) and that she can do so without stepping outside her science. The first section of the paper compares Blumer’s to Merton’s approach to social problems and shows how they differ. The second explains how the differences bear on the claim that statements in the social sciences should be free of values. The third shows that to adequately study a social problem a sociologist must rely on her own ethical terms, and the fourth section explains how she can dispute her subject’s’ standards of right and wrong within the limits of science.

I

Some parents strike their children. The question for the sociologist is whether the practice is a social problem. On Merton’s view, the answer depends on the effects of the practice and, in particular, on whether those effects strain the norms of parenting and weaken the relationship between parent and child. "Norms," according to Merton, "may prescribe behavior or proscribe it; or they may merely indicate what forms of behavior are preferred or simply permitted." Moreover, norms are relative to a group and a time; what is preferred or permitted in one society might not be in another or at another time. As a result, the practice of striking children might be a problem in the

U. S. today but might not have been many years ago, for the norms of parenting might have been different then.

Some problems are manifest, according to Merton; members understand the consequences of the practice, recognize that the effects are dysfunctional (strain or undermine society’s norms) and express their concern or displeasure. But other problems are latent; they strain the fabric of society, but the members do not understand that and, as a result, show little or no concern. Americans might have been less concerned about child beating seventy years ago than they are today even if their values were the same, because in 1930 they did not recognize the dysfunctional effects of the practice on the family, but they do now. Nevertheless, the earlier lack of concern does not show that child beating was not a problem in America in 1930 but only that many of the effects of the practice were not noticed, and the problem was hidden from the public’s view.

Merton shaped the sociological study of social problems until 1971. In 1971 Blumer published a paper opposing his work; he argued that there is no objective way to judge whether a condition is functional or dysfunctional and that when a sociologist says that alcoholism or prostitution weakens the family or strains the social fabric, she is not describing a fact but rather expressing her own values. According to Blumer, when Merton says that alcoholism or prostitution is dysfunctional or deviant, he is not saying what is but simply showing his own disapproval of heavy drinking or the sale of sex. He is not describing the effects of the practice but essentially imposing his own values on his subjects’ behavior.

A social problem, according to Blumer, is not an objective feature of society, for a condition is not a problem unless the public thinks so. According to Blumer, a condition or practice becomes a problem in the process of being contested and labeled. Alcoholism is a problem because the public disapproves of heavy drinking; they do not disapprove of heavy drinking because the practice is a problem. Social problems, Blumer writes, are "products of a process of collective definition instead of existing independently as a set of objective social arrangements with an institutional makeup." They become problems when they enter the public’s consciousness and come to be talked about in a particular way.

Blumer’s paper was followed by a series of studies employing his "‘constructionist" approach. A few examples. In a paper entitled "The "Discovery" of Child Abuse," Stephen Pfohl argued that though child beating has a long history, the term ‘child abuse’ and the widespread opposition to the practice are recent. Child beating has only recently become a matter of public concern, and the task of the sociologist is to explain how the concern arose and what social activities are helping to sustain it. According to Pfohl, child abuse became a problem because public concern served the interests of organized medicine. At mid-century medical groups began campaigns to have the beatings labeled ‘abusive’. At first the public was not moved, but in 1960 pediatricians and psychiatrists joined forces to promote the label ‘battered child syndrome’, and the new label won the public’s attention. The doctors in Pfohl’s account did not discover that child abuse was a problem but rather made the practice a problem by inventing the label and changing the public’s attitudes.

Another example. Stalking became a national concern in the 1990’s, and by 1993 forty-eight states had passed anti-stalking laws, but before these laws few talked about stalking at all. In 1995, Kathleen Lowney and Joel Best published a paper entitled "Stalking Strangers and Lovers: Changing Media Typifications of a New Crime Problem." Their interest was not why people stalk but how a single label, ‘stalking’, came to be applied to a list of very different incidents and how the incidents became a topic of public policy. The cause, they explained, was the media. The media did not cause people to stalk, but they packaged their behavior and made stalking into a kind, a series of incidents with a shared nature, and they presented the stories of victims and perpetrators as if they shared a theme. People came to see stalking where stalking would never have been seen before.The media, on this view, did not discover stalking or that stalking was a social problem but invented stalking by applying a single label to a series of otherwise unrelated incidents and by encouraging the public to see them as the same.

Last example. One third of all births in the Unites States are to unmarried mothers --a ratio that has been nearly constant since 1994 but that increased rapidly from the 60s through the1980’s. According to the National Center of Health Statistics, out-of-wedlock births accounted for 5.3% of the nation’s newborns in 1960, 10.7% in 1970, 18.4% in 1980 and 28% in 1990. To say that these births were becoming more of a problem means, on Blumer’s view, that Americans changed the way they talked about them. What makes them a greater problem in 1990 than in 1960 is not the increase in incidence but the increase in public concern. On Merton’s view, by contrast, the greater incidence increased the problem, since the additional births strained the social fabric further.

In 1996, the illegitimacy rate was declining, but the debate over "family values" and welfare dependency had reached a peak, and Congress funded a $400 million "illegitimacy bonus" program. The program offered cash awards to states that showed the largest decrease in out-of-wedlock births with no increase in abortion rates. By Blumer’s standards, illegitimacy was a much greater problem in 1996 than before (despite the drop in rate), since, as the bonus shows, the concern of Congress had become greater. By Merton’s standards, on the other hand, the problem of out-of-wedlock births increased as the incidence did, and since the incidence fell in 1996, out-of-wedlock births were not more but less of a problem in 1996.

The public, on Blumer’s view, cannot be mistaken about whether alcoholism or illegitimacy is a problem; a condition is a problem in S if and only if the members of S say so. Merton, on the other hand, maintains that problems can be hidden from the members’ view; a problem can be latent; members of S can be unaware that a condition is dysfunctional -- unaware of many of the effects of alcoholism or illegitimacy and so unaware of a conflict between the condition and the public’s values. For Merton, the connection between a problem and the public’s disapproval is contingent on a public understanding of the consequences of the practice. If x is a problem in S, then members of S would disapprove of x if they knew that x is dysfunctional (that the effects of oppose the norms of S). When a sociologist says in 1970 that illegitimacy is a problem in the United States, she is not describing how Americans are responding to out-of-wedlock births but how they would respond if they understood how these births threatened the American family.

Blumer disagrees. The sociologist, he argues, can observe her subjects’ actual but not their possible disapproval; her only way of discovering their problems is by seeing what they do and listening to what they say. As a result, when Merton says that alcoholism is a latent problem, on Blumer’s view, he is expressing his own unease with heavy drinking; he is not describing the unease his subjects would feel in a world other than this one, for he has no (scientific) access to any world but this one. As a result, the sociologist can only chronicle the public’s claims or explain how they arise or what sustains them.

Blumer and Merton give the term ‘social problem’ a technical meaning. In ordinary language, when a speaker says that divorce is a social problem, she expresses her disapproval, but Merton and Blumer want to remove the ordinary meaning and free the term of value, for they want their studies to be value-free. When Merton says that alcoholism is a social problem in S, he does not mean to express his own disapproval of heavy drinking but only report the (manifest or latent) disapproval of others. When Merton uses words like ‘deviant’ or ‘dysfunctional’, he does not mean to say what ought to be but only what is true in S. "As used by the sociologist, the term deviant," Merton writes, "is a technical rather than moral one. It does not signify moral disapproval by the sociologist."

On Merton’s view, whether a dysfunctional condition is morally good or bad depends on a further and entirely independent judgment of the moral worth of the system. Within a caste system, for example, enlarged opportunities for higher education are dysfunctional and thus a problem for the persistence of the castes. But that implies that the enlargement of these opportunities is undesirable or wrong only if you approve of the caste system. On Merton’s view, the further judgment, that the system is right or wrong, unlike the judgment that equal educational opportunities (within a caste system) are dysfunctional, is not scientific (objective), and, since sociologists should only make scientific (objective) judgments, they should not judge the moral worth of a norm or a social system in their capacity as sociologists.

Blumer and Merton attempt to make sociology a science and agree that a science must exclude judgments of value. They share Max Weber’s view that "there are no (rational or empirical) scientific procedures of any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision [about what we should desire]." According to Weber: "it is simply naive to believe . . . that it is possible to establish and to demonstrate as scientifically valid "a principle" for practical social science from which the norms for the solution of practical problems can be unambiguously derived." Blumer and Merton agree, and both attempt to steer clear of what the norms of S should be and limit themselves to descriptions of what they are.

The issue between Blumer and Merton is how sociologists can best study social problems within Weber’s call for value-freedom. Blumer believes that his approach better assures that the sociologist will not replace members’ norms with her own. By simply describing the public’s concerns --their complaints and demands, the lawsuits, the press conferences, the letters of protest, the pickets or boycotts, the resolutions and the media attention-- and describing the forces behind them, the sociologist will be sure to describe what is rather than what should be; she will be describing what the public disapproves of rather than expressing her own disapproval. She will mention her subjects’ moral terms rather than use her own.

III

In 1985, Steve Woolgar published a paper critical of Blumer, and, in particular, of his claim that social problems are "the result of a process of definition in which a given condition is picked out and identified as a social problem." Blumer’s claim that social problems are invented rather than discovered by the public, sounded fine to Woolgar, but the phrase "a given condition is picked out and identified as a social problem" suggested that conditions like alcoholism and divorce are given. In calling alcoholism or divorce ‘a condition’, in drawing a contrast between conditions and problems, Blumer seemed to imply that, as conditions, alcoholism and divorce, unlike social problems, are not talked into being but are "real". But the public, according to Woolgar, does not discover alcoholism and divorce, they invent them; alcoholism is a "socio-historical accomplishment", a subjective rather than an ontologically objective category. The public invents alcoholism by drawing a boundary around episodes of heavy drinking and making them into a thing ( a single kind of action).

Blumer died in 1986, but, in response to Woolgar’s criticism, his supporters dropped the word ‘condition’. Instead, they called alcoholism a ‘putative condition’ and spoke of the claims-making activities of individuals or groups about "putative" rather than "real" conditions. Alcoholism, only becomes a condition in S, they conceded, through the claims-making or labeling activities of individuals or groups in S. Before members treated episodes of heavy drinking as tokens of a single type, as a kind, there was no alcoholism and no alcoholics in S for a sociologist to study or the public to grow concerned about. There might have been episodes of heavy drinking, but members of S drew no boundary around the episodes or bound them together with a label.

Blumer and Merton ask whether x is a social problem in S, but they do not use just any term to pick out x; they usually use a term of their own language that is typically used to express disapproval. They ask whether alcoholism or illegitimacy and not whether moderate drinking or childbearing is a problem; Merton asks whether divorce and not whether marriage is dysfunctional. Terms like ‘illegitimacy’ and ‘alcoholism’ are not value-free; they are thick ethical terms. They describe what is being done but disapprove of it as well; terms like ‘delinquent,’ ‘victim,’ ‘gang,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘child abuse’ or ‘harassment’ express what is but also what ought to be. They differ in meaning but have a similar valuational force; they differ in their descriptive content but are the same in indicating disapproval. As a result, our moral language contains not only thin ethical terms, terms like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, but thick ones as well.

The fact that our language contains many different moral terms and the many cannot be reduced to a few (to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’) raises the stakes for value-freedom. To free her language of values, the sociologist must refrain from using not only thin but also thick ethical words. In studying social problems, she cannot say that what her subjects do is bad or wrong, but she equally cannot say that they engage in child abuse or juvenile delinquency either. She cannot use a thick ethical term to pick out an x and ask whether x is a problem while keeping her study value-free.

The sociologist uses rather than mentions a value-term whenever she describes her subjects’ behavior using a word like ‘illegitimacy’ or a phrase like ‘juvenile delinquency’. When she asks whether illegitimacy is a social problem in the United States, she not only describes out-of-wedlock births, she also evaluates them. Consider:

(2) Illegitimate births increased in the U.S. between 1970 and 80.

In saying (1) the sociologist mentions the term ‘illegitimate’; in mentioning the term, she does not indicate her own disapproval but reports the disapproval of her subjects, viz. Americans. In saying (2) she uses the term, and the disapproval is her own.

Both Merton and Blumer use sentences like (2). They use thick ethical terms to pick out and ask about a variety of behavior. Their questions, on their face, are value-laden, for their terms not only describe but evaluate the behavior. Blumer and Merton seem to be speaking in their own voice when they describe a practice using terms like ‘abuse’ and delinquency’, but since these are thick ethical terms, they seem to be condemning as well as describing the practice.

A reply. Perhaps when Merton and Blumer say (2), they mean (1); maybe for them (2) is shorthand for (1). That is, though Merton appears to disapprove of out-of-wedlock births when he uses (2), he is only mentioning his subjects’ disapproval. Rejoinder. In many cases such a reply is not available, for (2) can be shorthand for (1) only if the subjects use the word, e.g., ‘illegitimate’ or ‘child abuse’, to label their own behavior. In some societies, members don’t; they don’t pick x out with any term in their own language or at least with any term of disapproval. In studying them, when Merton uses a term like ‘child-abuse’, there is no term (in their language) he can be mentioning, and if, like ‘child-abuse’, the term is ethically thick, he must be expressing his own disapproval rather than simply reporting the members’ disapproval of the practice.

An example. In 1976 some sociologists studied family violence in Cologne, Germany and, in particular, violence against women. The behavior they wished to pick out and talk about was not at the time recognized by the residents as a condition, as a kind of conduct (what Woolgar calls an entity). That is, ‘wife-battering’ and ‘spousal abuse’ were the sociologists’ and not their subjects’ categories. As a result, when the sociologists asked whether wife-battering was a social problem in Cologne in 1976, they could not have been citing or mentioning their subjects’ categories rather than using their own, and since words like ‘wife-battering’ and ‘spousal abuse’ are value-laden, the value judgments the sociologists were expressing in asking their question had to be their own.

A second example. In the United States, for a long time, people have been followed, harassed and threatened, but, according to Lowney and Best, until fifteen years ago, no term was used to pick out and label the behavior. Once the behavior was called ‘stalking’, stalking came to be seen as a large and growing problem, and by 1993 many states had passed anti-stalking laws. So, in 1995, when Lowney and Best use the term ‘stalking’, they can be using the term to report their subjects’ attitudes towards the behavior rather than their own. They say that their subjects’ disapprove but do not say that they do. However, suppose that in Finland there are no anti-stalking laws and no label for behavior that Lowney and Best call ‘stalking’. Should they ask whether stalking is a problem in Finland, Lowney and Best must be employing their own category rather than the Finn’s and since ‘stalking’ is laden with value, they must be expressing their own disapproval.

Third example. Even though many Americans do call out-of-wedlock birth ‘illegitimate’, not all do. As a result, in mentioning her subjects’ words or employing their categories, the sociologist has to decide which of her subjects to listen to. Some disapprove of out-of-wedlock births and others do not, and the sociologist, in deciding whether to mention the term ‘illegitimate’, must decide which of them to cite. To make her decision, she will have to rely on her own attitudes, on whether she would draw a boundary around out-of-wedlock births or whether she would disapprove of them. In choosing whose terms to mention, she will have to rely on her terms and some of them will express a moral attitude.

Fourth example. Merton’s anthology includes an essay by Kingsley Davis on sexual behavior. Homosexuality is dysfunctional In American society, according to Davis. He says not that the practice offends his norms but that the practice offends the public’s norms. He does not disapprove of homosexuality but reports that the public does. But, of course, Americans are not committed to a single set of sexual norms but to many. Barney Frank and Ted Kennedy are not offended by gay men and women, even if Henry Hyde and Orrin Hatch are. As a result, in writing that homosexuality is a social problem, Davis is mentioning the attitudes of some but not all of us. How has he chosen Hatch and Hyde? Maybe he counts noses; he chooses the majority. But why the majority? Maybe Davis does not mean that homosexuality is dysfunctional in America but only in Hyde-minded America, but no matter how narrowly he draws the boundary, Davis has to make some choices, because, within every group, no matter how small, there are different voices, and he has to decide whose he will listen to.

IV

The sociologist, according to Merton can describe her subject’s values, but she cannot dispute them; she can discover their moral attitudes but not say whether they are warranted. She can find out whether homosexuality is a manifest or even a latent problem in American society, but if heterosexuality is the norm, she cannot find out whether the norm is fair or reasonable, for science cannot tell her what is good or bad or what sex her partner ought to be.

Child abuse might be wrong in a sociologist’s eyes, but, on Merton’s view, whether the practice is wrong is not a question for sociology. Is Merton correct? Can sociology discover whether a society’s norms are mistaken? Yes, as long as the sociologist can distinguish between what her subjects think and what they would think were they better informed or more reasonable. The sociologist, on Merton’s view, can distinguish between her subjects’ manifest and latent problems. She can say that child abuse is a problem in S even though the members don’t think so, for she can reason that they would think so if they better understood the effects of the practice. The sociologist, on Merton’s view, can know what her subjects think but also what they would think in a possible world different but not remote from the real one. In other words, she can look for a world in which the members have all the facts, know all the functional and dysfunctional effects of child abuse or homosexuality, and decide whether the members would disapprove of the practice there.

Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent problems implies that the sociologist can correct the members’ beliefs about many of their own practices. On Merton’s view, x is a social problem in S if the members would recognize a discrepancy between x and the norms of S if they understood the effects of x. Since members often don’t, a discrepancy might not be manifest. As a result, a sociologist, using the methods of Merton’s sociology, can correct her subjects’ use of terms like ‘dysfunctional’, ‘deviant’ and ‘social problem’.

However, the norms of S can be hidden from the public’s view as can the effects of a practice. That is, their manifest norms, those they currently endorse, might not be their latent norms, those they would endorse were they fully informed and reasonable. As a result, a social problem can be latent in S in the sense of either (1) or (2):

1. Members of S do not fully understand the effects of the practice, but if they did, they

would see that it is (not) a problem in S.

(2) Members do not fully understand their norms, but if they did, they would see that the

practice is (not) a problem in S.

Blumer does not consider either (1) or (2). Merton allows (1) but not (2). However, his reasons for (1) are equally reasons for (2), even if he does not himself think so.

Merton overlooks the distinction between final and instrumental norms. Members of S can be committed to a norm for its own sake or the sake of another norm or end. In other words, the norm can be of final or instrumental value for them. The value is instrumental if the members would not be committed if they did not believe that following the norm was means to some other of their ends. But such beliefs, a belief that x is a means to y, can be mistaken, and, moreover, the sociologist can be in a better position to recognize the mistake than the members are. Thus the sociologist can dispute the members’ norms by asking whether the beliefs they are based on are true.

Weber does not believe values or ends to be entirely given or outside the purview of rational choice or empirical science; he believes only that final values are. As a result, on Weber’s view, the sociologist can dispute her subjects’ values, as long as she can dispute the beliefs that they are based on. Merton should agree. The norms of S are within the purview of sociology, when they are instrumental rather than final.

Given that some norms in S could be based on the mistaken beliefs of the members, Merton can say that the members would not endorse them were they better informed or more reasonable; he can say that while these are their manifest norms, their latent norms are different. Heterosexuality might be the manifest norm in S because the members have a false belief about sexuality or false beliefs about emotional commitment or the basis for a stable relationship, but were they to revise their beliefs, their manifest norms would be different. In such a case, Merton could say that heterosexuality is the manifest but not the latent norm and, as a result, that homosexuality is a manifest but not a latent problem in S. Since, in such a case, the sociologist is saying what is, what values her subjects would express were their beliefs more reasonable, she is mentioning their values rather than using her own. In other words, a sociologist can say (2) without saying anything that is value laden (laden with values of her own) as long as the norms mentioned in (2) are not final.

But imagine that the manifest norm is final and that the members value heterosexuality for its own sake. Can a sociologist say in such a case that they would not require heterosexuality were they better informed and more reasonable? Does Merton’s distinction between the manifest and latent apply to the members’ final as well as their instrumental values.

Weber believed that a society’s final ends or values are outside the realm of reason. Like tastes, they are not reasonably chosen. But such a conception of rational choice is not adequate, for we can ask whether the members would choose the end were they to make their choice under conditions favorable to sound judgment. Many current models of rational choice include descriptions of such conditions, and, as a result, provide standards by which to assess a member’s choice of final ends or values. As a result, the sociologist can ask whether her subjects would endorse their final values (norms) were they fully informed and reasonable. Even if the members value heterosexuality for its sake, the sociologist can have reason to say that homosexuality is a manifest but not a latent problem in their society, if she has reason to believe that the norm would not survive their enlightenment.

In judging what norms her subjects would endorse under ideal conditions, the sociologist is not replacing their values with her own, for the values, though latent, are theirs (the values they would have endorsed had they been more reflective), but her judgment is not free of her own values either, for in order to decide what values they would endorse were they fully reflective, she has to rely on what, on her view, counts as full reflection and on what norms, on her view, would survive such a process. Moreover, she will not be convinced that their norms would survive reflection if they are too different from her own (she assumes that if they are able to reflectively endorse compulsory heterosexuality, she should be able to as well, but since she isn’t, she concludes that their endorsement wouldn’t survive reflection). Models of rational choice can be used in sociology to decide whether a society’s norms are reasonable, but in order for a sociologist to employ them, she will have to rely on her own sense of right and wrong. As a result, in saying that a norm is final but latent (rather than manifest) in S, a sociologist is relying on her own values while describing the values of S; she is saying both what is and what ought to be.

Even if a sociologist can reasonably object to her subjects’ values or concerns, why should she? Are such assessments a proper task for sociology? Blumer doesn’t ask whether his subjects could reflectively endorse their present concerns or acts of collective definition, and Merton doesn’t ask what norms his subjects would endorse when calm, coherent and informed, but should they? If their studies of social problems are to inform public policy, they should, for what needs reforming are not the practices the public happens to disapprove of but those they should disapprove of and, as a result, it is especially important those be the practices the sociologist picks out to study.

Within a caste society, enlarged opportunities for higher education are, on Merton’s view, a social problem (for they are dysfunctional); Merton does not approve of caste systems, and presumably he would not recommend that a caste society limit opportunities for higher education to the higher castes, but we are left to wonder how the sociological study of educational opportunities in such a society is supposed to bear on public policy unless the study speaks to whether enlarged opportunities are worthy of approval. A sociologist should reserve the term ‘social problem’ for conditions that she has reason to believe should be reformed or that her subjects would want to reform were they fully informed and reasonable, for only then does her study contribute to the very interests that years ago gave the sociological study of social problems a clear and compelling purpose: an interest in diagnosing and finding cures for social ills.

Conclusion

Blumer and Merton tried to make the study of social problems value-neutral but did not succeed, for they often used their own ethical terms to pick out the problems they wrote about. However, in the name of neutrality, they did not consider whether the public’s concerns were illegitimate or the public’s lack of concern a moral failing. As result, though their studies were not neutral, they avoided a central question, the question of what the members of S should disapprove of, and such a question, as I explained in this paper, does fall within the purview of science and, as a result, should be included in the sociological study of social problems.

Michael Root

University of Minnesota

December 5, 2000