2. Moral Philosophy:
a) Seeks answers to fundamental questions about value and obligation.
b) What is the nature and sources of value (i.e., good and bad)?
c) What ought we to do?
d) What makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong?
e) How ought we to live our lives?
f) What kind of people should we be?
g) These questions are interconnected and a moral philosophy seeks systematic
answers to these questions.
3. Nietzsche:
a) Nietzsche represents a fundamental challenge to Western moral
philosophy.
b) So, I'm going to:
(1) Start with a history of Western moral
philosophy up to the time of Nietzsche (mid-19th century).
(2) Then, I'll explain his challenge.
(3) Then, we'll look at some modern
alternatives to Nietzsche and his challenge.
4. The Ancient Greeks:
a) Recall the Principle of Sufficient Reason: there is a reason for
everything.
b) The ancients understood this in terms of purpose--everything has a
purpose.
(1) Obviously, artifacts have purposes.
(2) Biological structures have functions and it
is easy to conflate functions and purposes.
(3) But even non-living things have purposes,
e.g., the rain falls so that plants may grow. Plants grow so that animals may have
food, and so on.
(4) All this culminates in human beings, for
whom everything else exists. Anthropocentrism.
c) On this view, everything fits together in a certain way.
d) There seems to be a projection phenomenon going on here, but it is a
common one--says something about the human mind.
4. Christian Philosophy:
a) When the Christians came along, they found this picture congenial,
since it raises a question for which they have a ready answer.
The question: Whose
purpose(s) are served by all these things in nature?
b) Their answer of course is God's. For Aristotle, this is not a part
of the picture, but Christianity saw all of this as part of a master, divine plan.
5. Natural Law Ethics:
a) This Greco-Christian world view had some important implications for
ethics.
b) Values--good and bad--can be defined by reference to this plan.
What is good is whatever is in accordance with
the plan; what is bad is
whatever goes against this plan.
c) Although we don't know all the details of the plan, we do know
smaller elements of it and also where human beings figure into it, at least relative
to the rest
of nature, viz., nature and everything in it is there for us.
d) The world of values and the world of facts are one and the same.
Value judgments in general and moral judgments in particular are equally
objective matters of
fact, the latter being determined by things' natural purposes or functions.
(Role of St. Thomas Aquinas in all this.)
e) Two types of laws of nature:
(1) descriptive
(2) prescriptive--natural is good, unnatural is
bad.
f) Examples: Catholic Church's views on charity, sex (the
family).
g) Natural law ethical theory is not very widely accepted these days,
though of course many of its particular pronouncements on moral issues are.
It's just that the
theory behind these judgments is no longer widely accepted among those who think seriously about these matters, i.e.,
philosophers. They have found other grounds for traditional moral beliefs about value and obligation. More on this later.
6. The Influence of Modern Science:
a) The main reason natural law ethics is not widely accepted these days
has to do with the rise of modern science.
Specifically, there are 3 features of modern
science that doomed natural law ethics:
b) First, heliocentrism in astronomy.
c) Second and more important was a methodological
innovation--explanation in terms of efficient causes rather than final causes. Explain this
carefully. In this
mode of explanation, there is no room for teleology, i.e., purposes. So, good and bad simply don't enter into a
scientific
description and explanation of the world.
d) Third, the importance of Darwin: the theory of evolution, with its
mechanism of natural selection, dealt a devastating blow to the Christian
world-view, despite the
fact that it is consistent with the existence of God. No longer was it possible to talk about Nature's purposes,
where
"Nature" is really God.
e) In the new scientific world view, God becomes an absentee landlord,
so to speak. Compare theism and deism.
f) Is modern science just another fad or fashion? This is a deep
question addressed in Chapter 5, which I won't answer. However, many educated
people thought not. Why?
Because of its predictive and explanatory success. AND, of course, the success of technology based on the
new
science. (expl. the difference between science and technology).
7. The Place of Values in a World of Facts:
a) The world as it is described and explained by modern science has no
place for values in general and morality in
particular as objective features of the
universe. And, Nietzsche believed,
GOD IS DEAD
b) But, of course, people still make judgments of good and bad,
right and wrong. What can be said about these judgments?
c) A discussion of them can be part of what Hume called ‘a science
of man.' Specifically, we can ask the following questions of a moral code
and/or a set of
values:
(1) What is its historical origins?
(2) Whose interests does it serve?
(3) What causes people to accept it?
(4) What are its effects on people who live
under it?
This involves historical, sociological, and
psychological investigations of morality–what Nietzsche. calls a ‘genealogy of morals.'
d) For the scientist, "naturalizing" morality in this way
strips it of its compelling nature. It "de-mythologizes it.
8. Nietzsche's Task:
a) In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche set out to do a naturalhistory
of Western morality.
b) He was shocked and disgusted by what he found.
c) Western morality is, at its core, Jewish morality, which Nietzsche
calls "slave morality." See 388.3.
d) Notice the naturalistic explanation he gives and how this
demythologizes morality. It seems to lose its grip on us.
8. Christian Morality:
a) Well, this is all very bad and ugly, but it gets worse.
b) Slave morality reaches its heights, or depths, with Christian
morality. The dominant motif is one of denial
and sickness. It is hostile to life
and life-giving forces. Read 389.1.
c) In the Genealogy of Morals he goes on at great length about
this. Two elements of Christianity come in for particularly heavy criticism:
(1) its irrationalism (cf. the
Doctrine of the Holy Trinity)
(2) the celibacy of the priesthood
9. The Alternative:
a) Alternative values can be found in human history, though this is
rare. Nietzsche describes in detail the morality of the Ubermensch (untranslatable).
b) values are self-created for these guys. The motif is one of health,
vigor, and what he calls THE WILL TO POWER.
c) Are these the true values? Do these tell us how we really ought to
behave? Of course not.
10. Nietzsche's Perspectivism:
a) There are no objective moral facts about the world.
There are only perspectives, ways of interpreting the world according to various values we
might have. They can be described in various ways but they do not give us an
objective basis for ethics.
b) There are no moral facts because there are no facts at
all!
c) Contrast with skepticism.
11. Two Questions: (395)
a) Are we free to believe whatever we like, since no
interpretation or perspective is privileged?
b) Is objectivity impossible?
c) On the first question, the answer is no. Some
interpretations are better than others, just as in the case interpreting a novel or a work of art.
(1) Contrast Christianity and
science (396).
(2) The real test is what is
useful, and Nietzsche would argue that science is more useful than Christianity, better
at meeting our needs.
(3) But the slaves might say,
"Hey, we're doing pretty well with Christianity, i.e., slave morality. We've even got
some of the Ubermenschen
convinced of it." In other words, applying Nietzsche's own
test to the question of
objectivity, the leaders of the slaves might say it is better
to foster the view that
Christianity tells us the objective
truth about morality. There is no reason to follow Nietzsche's advice.
We can call
this a self-referential paradox.
d) On the question of objectivity, Nietzsche says that even
though there is no objective truth about the world, we can achieve an objectivity of
sorts, through a 2 step process:
(1) First, realize that the world
cannot be understood through a single point of view.
(2) Second, cultivate an
"intellectual conscience," which as far as I can tell involves critically
examining one's own
beliefs, especially about morality. This in turn involves subjecting moral beliefs, our
own and others, to the
following questions:
(a) What is its historical origins?
(b) Whose interests does it serve?
(c) What causes people to accept it?
(d) What are its effects on people who live under it?
This involves historical, sociological, and psychological investigations of morality.
e) Another Self-Referential Paradox: Why accept Nietzsche's advice?
Certainly he cannot argue that this is the way the world really is, since his
perspective is just one among many. You can imagine the high priests of slave morality saying, "Look, doing all this just
doesn't serve our interests,
which are to rule the world and hold down the
Ubermenchen.
12. Alternative Perspectives on Morality:
a) Recall that with the advent of modern science, the
search for final causes is abandoned. There may be some divine plan for the world, but we
have no way of finding out what it is, so there is no point in trying to live our lives
in accordance with it. This
is what Rachels means at the
bottom of 398 when he says there are no moral facts.
b) How, then are we to understand morality, if it is not a
matter of acting in accordance with God's plan?
c) Among men of intellect and learning, even for the
faithful, there is a felt need for some rational basis for morality.
d) This led some thinkers to seek such a basis in some
facts about human nature and the human condition. Rachels discusses two attempts to do this:
(1) Social Contract Theory
(2) Utilitarianism.
13. Social Contract Theory:
a) Thomas Hobbes (1588-1670?) was the first modern social
contract theorist.
b) His ethics starts with psychological egoism: Human
beings always act in what they believe to be their own best interests. From this psychological
thesis, he argues that morality must be based on self interest. The right thing to do is whatever furthers one's self
interest. The wrong thing to do
is whatever retards one's self interest.
c) There are obvious and enormous benefits to social
cooperation.
d) Specific rules include:
(1) Tell the truth
(2) Keep your promises
(3) Don't steal, assault, murder,
etc.
e) The basis for these rules is self interest. This is an
objective matter of fact. But, you might ask, wouldn't it be better if everyone obeyed these
rules except me?
f) Yes, said Hobbes, but everyone sees this and so they get
together in a commonwealth and turn over the enforcement of these rules (most of
them,
anyway) to a SOVEREIGN who has absolute power to enforce the most important rules. For the others, we
use informal sanctions,
such as peer pressure.
14. Basis of Morality for Hobbes:
a) Human nature, not some God-given rules we are supposed
to follow. Morality is objective.
b) Hobbes has an answer to an old and difficult
philosophical question: Why be moral? Answer: Self interest.
c) Hobbes assumes no altruistic motives. Though we are
often obligated to act against our self interest (e.g., in keeping promises) in the short run,
we are not acting against our long-term self interest by following these mutually agreed upon rules.
15. Utilitarianism:
a) David Hume agreed with Hobbes that moral judgments were
ultimately based on our feelings and were not reflective of some objective moral
facts
about the world, as we find in natural law ethics. However, he believed Hobbes's conception of human nature was
impoverished. He
believed that we naturally have feelings of concern for the welfare
of others. When we make a moral
judgment (e.g., that an action is right or
wrong), we are making a judgment from an impartial point of view, taking
into account the interests of mankind as a whole.
b) This view later came to be known as Utilitarianism. Its
two most important advocates were Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
c) It consists of a theory of value (Hedonism) and a
principle of right action (the Principle of Utility). More
on these shortly.
16. There is a fundamental division among moral philosophers about what makes right
actions right:
a) Deontologists believe that right and wrong are
determined independently of the consequences of actions, e.g., some philosophers have held
that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by one's intentions.
b) Consequentialists believe that the rightness or
wrongness of an action is entirely determined by the consequences of that action. Some
consequentialists believe that there is some goal or end to be maximized and that actions
are right if they maximize this goal
and wrong
otherwise. These folks are called 'Utilitarians.'
17. Bentham: His Utilitarianism consisted of two parts:
a) A theory of the good, i.e., a theory of what has value
or is valuable. The theory he adopted is called 'Hedonism.'
b) A theory of right action, i.e., a supreme moral
principle that tells us what to do in any situation.
18. Hedonism:
This is the doctrine that happiness or pleasure is the only
thing that has positive intrinsic value, and unhappiness or pain is the only thing that
has negative intrinsic value.
a) know the difference between instrumental and intrinsic
value
b) Hedonism is not a theory about what one ought
to do.
19. The (total) utility of an action, in Bentham's system, can be defined as the
total amount of pleasure produced by the action minus the total
amount of pain produced by the
action. To calculate the utility of an action, one considers the following parameters:
a) intensity
b) duration
c) certainty
d) propinquity or remoteness
e) fecundity (chances of it being followed by like
sensations)
f) purity (chances of it not being followed by unlike
sensations)
g) extent
20. Bentham's Utilitarianism:
a) Bentham's Utilitarianism, sometimes called Hedonistic
Utilitarianism, can be stated as a supreme principle of morality by which actions or
social
policies are to be judged.
b) An action or social policy is morally right or
justified if and only if
Doing that action (or instituting
that policy) maximizes utility
c) Notice that we compare an action or policy with its
alternatives
d) You could be a utilitarian without being a hedonist,
though I shall not discuss non-Hedonistic forms of Utilitarianism
e) The essence of utilitarianism is that the right thing to
do is whatever maximizes the good.
f) A sloppy formulation: One should always do the greatest
good for the greatest number. Two reasons why it is sloppy:
(1) Sometimes, all the
alternatives produce pain or unhappiness
(2) Sometimes one alternative
produces a small amount of happiness for a large number of people and another
alternative produces a large
amount of happiness for a small number of people. The problem is that the
principle of doing the greatest good for the greatest number
provides no guidance about what we should do.
21. Some Practical Implications:
a) Both Social Contract Theory and Utilitarianism have
practical implications that differ from standard Judeo-Christian morality.
Consider for example euthanasia and homosexuality.
b) They differ from each other, however, on the question of
whether or not we have extensive duties to help others. In deciding whether
or not to spend
money on yourself and your family or send it abroad, it would seem that Utilitarianism implies that you
should do the
latter (in line with Christian ethics) whereas Social Contract Theory implies that you have no such
obligations. Read some of Narveson
on p. 404.
c) We care more about those close to us than those who are
not; the fundamental problem is whether or not this should make a difference
morally
speaking. Social Contract Theory says yes, whereas Utilitarianism says no.
Read quotation from Singer on p.
405.
22. Contrast with Nietzsche:
a) Nietzsche on Utilitarianism: The problem is with
impartiality, which he thought was not really possible, and besides, it would mean that
the Ubermench
would view himself and his interests as on a par with the slaves.
b) Nietzsche on Social Contract Theory: Morals by agreement
would be fine, says Nietzsche, among equals. But this is entirely inappropriate
for the
Ubermenchen. For them, others are to be used to meet their own needs and interests. Social Contract Theory
is as ridiculous as a
morality that puts the interests of animals on the same level
as humans.
23. Nietzsche's Positive Views:
a) A fundamental distinction among moral theories:
Obligation Theories and Virtue Theories.
b) Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theory are theories
of obligation. The fundamental question for them is "What ought we to do?" It seeks
to
discover what all and only right actions have in common. By contrast, Virtue Theories
start with an account of the
virtuous man or woman.
What kinds of character traits should we have? What kind of person should we be? Aristotle and
Socrates had Virtue Theories.
c) Virtue theories don't have a lot to say directly on the
question of what we should do, just as Obligation Theories don't have a lot to say
directly
about how we should lead our lives. But, of course, there is some overlap.
24. The Values of the Ubermenschen:
a) The antithesis of the "slave": The Ubermensch
is proud and self-directed-- HE CREATES HIS OWN VALUES. By contrast, the slave is
humble
and takes his cues from others when it comes to living his life.
b) Rachels points out that this is oversimplified. Pride is
appropriate in some circumstances; humility (modesty) in others. Similarly with
self-direction and deference to authority (408.1).
c) Nietzsche's straw man: Many of the traditional virtues
he condemned were the virtues of the monk in medieval Europe, e.g., poverty, chastity,
and obedience to authority. These are not the virutes of 19th century (or 20th
century) Europe and America.
25. Is the Ubermensch Amoral?
a) Distinguish ‘immoral' from ‘amoral'.
b) It depends what we mean by morality. What is morality? Two
possible answers:
(1) A set of rules by which one
lives one's life, or a set of values (i.e., things one thinks important), or a set of
virtues. In this sense, the
Ubermensch is not amoral. Nietzsche said of himself that he
has the most severe
morality of all.
(2) On the other hand, if we
conceive of morality as a set of rules, values or virtues by which one limits the pursuit
of self-interest, then
Nietzsche's Ubermensch is amoral.
c) What, after all, is morality? A profound philosophical
question. Afunctional analysis would hold that morality is a set of rules by which we
regulate
our conduct so that we can get along in the world. This is close to Social Contract Theory's conception.
26. Nietzsche's Immoralism:
a) For Rachels, it consists in his willingness to judge not
merely that some people are better than others but that the latter exist fundamentally
to serve
the interests of the former.
b) Does he bear moral responsibility for Hitler? Probably
not.
Hume and Ayer
1. Hume (18th century) and Ayer (20th century) represent different reactions to the
rejection of natural law ethics--different from Nietzsche and
different from the Social Contract Theory and
Utilitarianism. The selection from Hume illustrates a certain view which is sometimes called
'Ethical Subjectivism.' Ayer
favors 'Emotivism.' Let us discuss each of these.
2. Ethical Subjectivism:
a) Devout Christians say that homosexuality is immoral. We might agree and
also say it is immoral or we might disagree and say that there is
nothing morally wrong about
it.
b) A third alternative is to say that it is all a matter of opinion.
One might say:
Devout
Christians are expressing their own personal opinions and many may agree with
them . But others may have different
opinions. Where
morality is concerned, there are no "facts," and no one is "right." he
has his opinion; others have their opinions;
and that's the end of it.
c) The main idea of Ethical Subjectivism: When people make moral
judgements they are just expressing their feelings towards it. Ethical judgments
express no
objective matter of fact. Now no one denies that when someone says that an
action is right or morally justified that he or she approves
of
it. What is distinctive about Ethical Subjectivism is that Ethical
Subjectivists hold that this is the ONLY thing that one is saying. Ethical
Subjectivism is a claim about the meaning of moral language.
3. A More Precise Statement:
a) "X is morally right" (justified, good, etc.) said by Smith
means the same thing as:
"I (Smith)
approve of X."
b) "Y is morally wrong," (immoral, unjustified, bad) said by
Smith means the same thing as,
"I
(Smith) disapprove of Y."
4. There are three objections to Ethical Subjectivism:
a) The Infallibility Objection
b) The No Real Disagreements Objection
c) The No Place For Reasons Objection
5. The Infallibility Objection to Ethical Subjectivism:
a) One problem with Ethical Subjectivism is that it makes us all
infallible about ethical issues. As long as we are being sincere, we can never be
mistaken because
we cannot be mistaken about our feelings.
b) This seems crazy, however. Only God is infallible in his moral
judgments. But, if subjectivism is true, and we always speak sincerely, we can
never be mistaken
about moral judgments.
6. The No Real Disagreements Objection to Ethical Subjectivism:
a) The problem here is that Ethical Subjectivism cannot make sense out
of moral disagreement.
b) Suppose Jones says, (i) "Abortion is always wrong."
Suppose Smith says, (ii) "Abortion is
sometimes morally right."
c) If Ethical Subjectivism is true, then (i) means the same as: (i') I,
Jones, always disapprove of abortion." and (ii) means the same as:
(ii') I, Smith,
sometimes approve of abortion."
d) Now here is the problem: If Ethical Subjectivism is true, then Smith
and Jones have nothing to disagree about, as long as they are being sincere.
Jones can admit
that Smith sometimes favors abortion and Smith can admit that Jones always opposes it, but still, they have
nothing to disagree
about.
e) This, however, seems false! They do have something to disagree
about. Hence, Ethical Subjectivism is false.
7. The No Place for Reasons Objection to Ethical Subjectivism:
a) The problem here is that there seems to be no place for
giving reasons in
ethics.
b) If someone asks you why you like vanilla ice cream, there really
isn't much to say by way of justification. On the other hand, if someone asks
you why you think that cheating on your taxes
or your spouse is wrong, it does seem appropriate to give reasons.
E..g., the Golden Rule, universalizability,
harm to others, etc.
c) So, once again, we have a modus tollens argument against Ethical
Subjectivism.
8. Emotivism:
a) Usually, when we use language, we are trying to state facts or to
put it another way, expressing propositions. Propositions have a subject-
predicate structure
of the form x is P. E.g., Bismarck is the capital of North Dakota. Rapid City is the capital of South Dakota. It
is a basic
law of logic that all propositions are true or false.
b) But sometimes we use language for purposes other than expressing
propositions. Sometimes we issue commands ("Shut the door.") or ask
questions
("Is Rapid City the capital of South Dakota?") And sometimes we are simply expressing feelings or emotions:
"Ouch!"
"Damn!"
"Right On!"
"Go Blazers."
c) It is a distinctive feature of these expressions of emotion that
they are neither true nor false.
9. Expressing Emotion vs. Reporting that One is Having an Emotion:
a) This is a vitally important distinction, if we are to understand the
difference between Ethical Subjectivism and Emotivism.
b) Consider the difference between expressing pain by saying,
"Ouch!" and reporting that one is feeling pain. The doctor pokes you in a
certain place and asks if
it hurts. You say, "I am feeling a dull pain right there." The difference between the two is that the latter sentence
is
true (or false) but the former is neither.
10. Main Idea Behind Emotivism:
a) Despite appearances, moral language is not propositional language,
it is not fact-stating language. Instead, its primary purpose is to express
emotion, specifically
attitudes one has toward certain things. It has two other purposes as well:
(1) to influence the attitudes of others toward
those things.
(2) to influence behavior
b) Moral terms (or terms with a moral connotation such as 'murder')
cannot be precisely defined because part of the meaning of the term is
an emotion, attitude or
sentiment.
c) So, if I say that X is right, wrong, good, bad, morally justified,
morally unjustified, I am not expressing some alleged fact about X but simply
expressing my feelings
toward x.
d) This means that moral utterances are neither true nor false, which
has some extremely important implications.
e) Specifically, it allows us to escape some of the traditional
objections to Ethical Subjectivism.
11. Response to the First Two Objections to Ethical Subjectivism:
a) 1st objection: infallible means 'can't be mistaken'
Expressions of attitudes are not true or false, so one cannot attribute to the Emotivist the view
that people never have false moral beliefs, since, strictly speaking, they have no moral
beliefs at all--just moral attitudes.
b) 2nd objection: Emotivists can make sense out of moral disagreement
by distinguishing disagreement in attitude from disagreement in belief.
Moral disagreements are
disagreements in attitude.
12. The Third Objection:
a) Recall that the 3rd objection to Simple Subjectivism is
that there seems to be no place for reason in ethics. That is, it seems to make no sense
to give
reasons for one's moral views.
b) In the selection from Ayer, he tries to provide an
account of the place of reason in ethics. In other words, it is a fact about the way people use
moral
language that we give reasons for our moral judgments:
(1) If X says, "Abortion is
always wrong," and we ask why, he might say: "Abortion is the taking of innocent
human
life." In this way, he offers
us a reason
for his moral judgment.
c) How might the Emotivist handle reasons in ethics? Read
Ayer, 429.1
13. The Emotivist Answer:
a) Since moral language is intended to express emotions and
guide the behavior of others and even oneself, a reason, or a good reason, for a moral
judgment is something that influences the attitude or behavior of others in the direction that one wants.
b) A good reason, then, is whatever successfully influences
the attitudes and behaviors of others.
c) If, for example, I wanted to get someone to share my
negative attitude toward abortion, I might describe in detail fetal development, show him
pictures, say emphatically, "this is an innocent human life," etc. If he comes
to share my attitude and if I successfully
influence his behavior, I
have successfully supported my judgment.
14. The Big Problem:
a) It can't be correct, however, to say that anything that
works, anything that is successful in changing someone's attitude or behavior
is a good reason for a moral judgment.
b) If I appeal to the prejudices of others, I can
successfully change their attitudes and behaviors, but my reasons won't be good ones.
c) If you are an anti-Semite and I want you to have
negative feelings toward a certain individual, call him Goldbloom, I might say, "Goldbloom
is
scum because he is a Jew."
d) But that cannot be a good reason for the judgment.
Bambrough
15. Purpose of the Article:
a) Refutation of Emotivism and Subjectivism; establishing
that morality is objective and that there is such a thing as moral knowledge.
b) He does this by considering various arguments that have
been offered against the objectivity of morals and the possibility of moral knowledge;
and, he has some positive arguments of his own.
c) It is important to disistinguish between effectively
criticizing an argument against X from giving a good argument in favor of X. Usually, it is
easier
to do the former than the latter.
d) Note the parallel between Cartesian skepticism and
skepticism about moral knowledge. But also notice that there are differences.
16. Reasons Why Morals Are Not Objective:
a) Moral disagreement is more widespread and persistent
than disagreements about factual matters.
Replies:
(1) some moral questions are not
seriously in doubt.
(2) many ordinary factual questions are.
b) Moral opinions are conditioned by environment and upbringing.
Replies:
(1) So too are many ordinary factual
opinions (e.g., different cultures have different astronomical views)
(2) Burial practices (433.3), marriage
practices (434.1), property rights (434.2), care of the aged (434.2) all differ because
circumstances
and conditions differ, but that is consistent with true general moral
precepts.
c) Moral disagreement can reach an impasse. E.g., abortion, what
counts as an impeachable offense.
Reply:
(1) Same is true of ordinary factual
disagreement.
(2) More generally, the idea that two
people could agree on all the facts but disagree on the morality of an action begs
the question against the
objectivist because the latter would say that if they agreed on
all the facts, they would
agree on the moral facts as well.
d) There are no recognized methods by which moral disputes are to
be settled whereas there are such methods in the sciences.
Replies:
(1) If this means that the methods
of science are inapplicable to ethics, that may be true, but there is no reason to
suppose that the only objective
methods are the methods of science.
(2) There are methods in
ethics--appeals to the Golden Rule, consistency (universalizability), etc.
A Reply to the Reply: There is something
to this methodological objection; what counts as the appropriate way to settle a moral dispute depends
on the correct
theory of morality, e.g., utilitarianism, social contract theory. There does not seem to be a similar methodological
tangle in the
sciences.
17. Bambrough's Argument for the Objectivity of Morals: (432.2)
(1) We know that the child ought to have an anesthetic.
(2) If (1) is true, then there is at least one moral fact
that we know.
Therefore,
(3) There is at least one moral fact that we know.
(4) If (3), then moral judgments are objective matters of
fact.
Therefore,
(5) Moral judgments are objective matters of fact.