Abstracts of Selected Publications

"The Role of Government in Responding to Natural Catastrophes," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 10 (December 2000):
      505-526. Reprinted in Hard Cases and the Free Society, edited by Tibor Machan. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001.

Government at both the state and federal level in the United States has an extensive role in dealing with the effects of natural disasters. The federal government provides subsidized flood insurance to private individuals, businesses, and state and local governments, and it appropriates funds on an ad hoc basis for rebuilding after highly visible natural disasters such as large floods and earthquakes. State governments regulate earthquake insurance (in California) and hurricane insurance (in Florida) in ways that force the insurance industry and some of its customers to subsidize policyholders of disaster insurance. This essay details the various forms of government involvement in disaster assistance and critically evaluates the normative arguments for these forms of government involvement and regulation. It proposes that the federal government should withdraw from the flood insurance market and that state governments should stop regulating private insurance markets in such a way that some people are forced to subsidize insurance for others.

"Post-Modern Liberalism and the Expressive Function of Law," Social Philosophy & Policy 17 (Winter 2000):
     87-109.

It is a common feature of modern law that it can be used to make a statement, i.e., express some values, ideals, or norms. It is a separate question whether or not this expressive function or dimension counts as a good reason for passing or not passing a law. The purpose of this paper is to argue that expressive considerations are not good reasons either for or against a law. The argument is built on a comparative analysis of law and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as expressive vehicles and as vehicles for changing and/or ratifying norms and values. The basic argument is that NGOs are superior to laws and state action on both counts.

"Affirmative Action and the Demands of Justice," Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (Spring 1998):133-75.

The main purpose of this essay is to argue that affirmative action programs in the U.S. that involve preferential treatment are morally and politically unjustified. This is true even if such programs are in fact demanded by distributive or compensatory justice. The paper argues that certain requirements must be met when the state seeks to impose the demands of justice (as state officials see it) on civil society: It has to be done through the legislature and only after an intellectually honest accounting of the intended and unintended beneficiaries and victims. An historical-legal analysis of the way in which preferential treatment programs in the United States have been instituted reveals that these programs have not satisfied the requirements. The paper concludes with a discussion of the larger philosophical significance of these requirements.

"The Monitoring Problem for Market Socialist Firms," in Advances in Austrian Economics, vol. 3, edited by Peter
    J. Boettke and David L. Prychitko (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1996), pp. 41-58.

John Roemer has proposed a market socialist economic system in which the ownership of large firms is structured in a novel way. Roemer recognizes that a crucial efficiency question for his proposal is whether or not these firms will be as effectively monitored as large firms are in capitalist systems. This essay argues that these market socialist firms are unlikely to be effectively monitored because of principal-agent problems not faced by large corporations in a capitalist system and because his proposal for state control of new investment through the selective manipulation of interest rates would create opportunities for influence peddling--opportunities that are largely absent in capitalist systems.

"Capitalism, Socialism, and Equity Ownership," in Liberty for the 21st Century, edited by Tibor Machan and
     Douglas Rasmussen (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), pp. 227-242.

This paper locates socialist dissatisfaction with capitalism in the types of economic organizations characteristic of capitalist economic systems--the owner-operated or classical capitalist firm and the modern corporation. For socialists, the main problem with these organizations is that they have equity owners, i.e., individuals who simultaneously provide capital, receive profits and exercise ultimate decision-making authority. It is argued that market socialist systems must divide these roles among the state and the workers to achieve various socialist goals. However, this fragmentation of roles creates significant opportunities for exploitation that do not exist or are minimized in organizations which have equity owners, i.e., capitalist organizations. In this way, it is argued that market socialist systems are inherently more exploitative than capitalist systems.

"Market Socialism," Critical Review 6 (Fall 1993):517-557

This article consists of a comprehensive statement and critical evaluation of the case for market socialism. It outlines a widely shared socialist vision of the good society and argues that the most plausible version of market socialism could not realize that vision. The argument is that the predominant organizational form in a market socialist system (the worker cooperative which rents its capital from the state) permits and encourages forms of exploitation that are minimized by the characteristic organizations of capitalism (the small owner-operated firm and the large corporation). This argument draws on recent work in the economics of contracts and organizations.

"Equality and Exploitation in the Market Socialist Community," Social Philosophy &Policy 9 (Fall 1991):1-28.

The first section of this paper outlines a particular type of market socialist economic system (one in which worker cooperatives predominate and the state controls most new investment). The distinctive features of this type of system are motivated by reference to traditional socialist goals and ideals. The second section argues that this system can achieve one of these goals (insuring relative equality of material condition) only by forfeiting another (the abolition of exploitation). The main idea of this argument is that if the workers democratically decide how to divide up the net income of the firm, the less skilled workers will exploit the more skilled workers by not paying the more skilled according to the value of their contribution.

"Economists and Philosophers as Critics of the Free Enterprise System," The Monist 73 (October 1990):621-641.

This paper provides a taxonomy of criticisms of the free enterprise system by economists and philosophers. It argues that a common failing of these criticisms is the unwarranted assumption that state action restricting private property rights would solve the problems critics have identified. Both economists and philosophers need to articulate more fully alternative institutional arrangements and explain how the latter would solve the problems they have identified without creating difficulties that are equally serious or worse. Some positive suggestions about how this might be done are offered.

"Marx, Central Planning and Utopian Socialism," Social Philosophy & Policy 6 (Spring 1989):160-199.

This paper lays out and critically evaluates Marx's vision of the economic system of post-capitalist society. The first two sections document and motivate Marx's commitment to the proposition that post-capitalist society would have a centrally planned economy. The last two sections explore the normative and theoretical problems this commitment creates for Marx and his defenders. The key to these sections is a reconstructed version of the argument of the Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek, for the claim that centrally planned economies must be grossly inefficient as compared to market economies.

"Radical Social Criticism," Reason Papers 14 (Spring 1989): 26-33.

This paper discusses the concept of radical social criticism by sketching the burdens of proof a radical critic must shoulder. It provides guidelines for both radical critics of existing society (e.g., Marxists, feminists, and libertarians) and suggests lines of criticism that their more moderate opponents might pursue.

"Marx and Disequilibrium in Market Socialist Relations of Production," Economics and Philosophy 3 (April 1987):23-46.

Section I documents Marx's commitment to the proposition that socialism, as he conceived it, would not have a market economy. Section II shows that this commitment runs fairly deep in Marx in that it is motivated by key explanatory claims deployed in his analysis of the rise of capitalist society from feudalism. I argue that Marx's genetic explanation of the rise of capitalism commits him to the law-like claim that the widespread use of markets tends to produce a capitalist class structure. Section III is a confrontation between Marx and (the theory of) market socialism. As a consequence of the argument of Section II, it is claimed that Marx's views imply that market socialism would probably degenerate into capitalism. The bulk of this section consists of an attempt to show that there is good reason to think that this substantive claim is in fact true. The upshot of this argument is ominous for socialists who are willing to embrace the market: They are, objectively, as the Chinese used to say, "capitalist roaders".

"Recent Work on Marx: A Critical Survey," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October 1987):277-293.

This is a survey of recent work in the Anglo-American philosophical community on Marx. Some attention is also given to work by non-philosophers as well.

"Why Profits Are Deserved," Ethics 97 (January 1987): 387-402.

The first part of this paper retails the Austrian theory of pure or entrepreneurial profit. The second part sketches a theory of desert, that is, a theory which explains the meaning and justification of claims of deservingness. Part III argues that entrepreneurs deserve pure profits as a reward for entrepreneurial creativity. The latter consists in bringing the structure of production more in line with the wants and needs of consumers, according to standard Hayekian-Austrian theory. Entrepreneurial creativity is the basal reason which justifies desert claims, and the objects of desert are the pure profits. Both the basal reason and the objects of desert are determined by the point or purpose of the market, which is to meet people's wants and needs for exchangeable goods and services. Allowing entrepreneurs to keep their profits best facilitates that goal. That's why, subject to some exceptions and qualifications, entrepreneurs deserve their profits.

"Capitalists and the Ethics of Contribution," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (March 1985):87-102.

This paper criticizes the familiar socialist idea that the capitalist is essentially a parasite on the productive process, since he does nothing more than allow capital to be used. The fact that it is his capital is simply an artifact of the structure of ownership of productive assets in a capitalist system, and an economic system need not have a class of persons occupying that role. This paper argues that this picture is fundamentally mistaken. The capitalist does contribute in two ways: First, he is an entrepreneur who makes socially valuable decisions about how productive assets are to be deployed. Second, qua capitalist, he is a supplier of time in the form of command over present goods. The capitalist sees to it that everyone else is paid while production is taking place. Since all production takes time and is valuable, the capitalist does indeed make a contribution in his role as provider of capital, a role that is distinct from his role as entrepreneur.

"Hume's Skeptical Arguments About Inductive Inference," Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (January
     1983):31-55.

This paper lays out and defends a non-standard interpretation of Hume's skepticism about induction and his argument for it. Essentially, it argues for the proposition that Hume believed that inductive inferences never gave us certainty but that they were not, on that account, epistemically valueless. This runs contrary to the dominant view that Hume's skepticism about induction was total, complete or radical in the sense that he believed such inferences to be without any epistemic merit or value.

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