1. p. 5: “I suppose that piety is the same in all actions, and that impiety is always the opposite of piety, and retains its identity, and that, as impiety, it always has the same character, which will be found in whatever is impious.” Socrates here invokes – as a premise for the coming argument – the claim that an important concept must have a stable meaning independent of its applications in particular circumstances.
2.
p.
6: Euthyphro claims to derive his concept of piety by reference to the behavior
of the gods. Note that this entirely fails to analyze the concept.
3.
Socrates makes this objection when he says
that a list of examples of pious actions doesn’t analyze the concept of piety,
because it fails to say what all the pious actions have in common.
4.
Euthyphro
tries an analysis: what is pleasing to the gods (= what they regard as `just’)
is pious and what is displeasing to them is impious.
5.
Socrates
objects that the gods disagree among themselves about this very thing.
Therefore, for any given action Euthyphro’s analysis will find it both pious
and impious.
6.
Euthyphro
then claims that all the gods agree
that what he’s doing is just.
Socrates challenges him to provide an argument for this claim, but he demurs.
Socrates then grants him this premise for
the sake of argument. This is a tactic often used in arguments. Let’s pause
to consider it a bit.
7.
If
your opponent advances several premises you’re not sure of, there’s no need to
dispute all of them. In fact if you can grant some of your opponent’s premises,
even some with which you don’t actually agree, and yet successfully block his
argument anyway, this makes your own
counter-argument even stronger.
You’ve shown that your opponent’s argument won’t work even on grounds of his or her own partial choosing.
8.
So,
the next analysis for consideration is: pious acts are those that are
unanimously loved by the gods and impious acts are those unanimously despised
by them. Acts on which they disagree shall be regarded as undetermined with
respect to piety.
9.
Socrates
now asks (p. 10): “Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious
because they love it?”
10.
In
other words: Is something rendered pious
by being loved by all the gods, or do they love it because it has some
characteristics independent of them that make it pious?
11.
This
is a dilemma. A dilemma is a question
that has two or more possible answers that contradict one another. The possible
answers to a dilemma are called its `horns’.
So what Socrates gives Euthyphro here is a two-horned dilemma. Euthyphro
chooses the second horn.
12.
But
now, Socrates points out, Euthyphro still owes him what they were looking for
in the first place, namely, the general characteristics of an action that make
it pious (and that thereby cause the gods to love it). Euthyphro has chosen an
argument that takes him around in a circle.
13.
Socrates
then tries to help him asking whether all piety is just. Euthyphro says `yes’.
Then Socrates asks whether the set of pious acts is a subset of the set of just acts. (By Socrates’s analogy: the set of
odd numbers is a subset of the set of numbers.) Euthyphro says `yes’.
14.
So
now Socrates asks for the characteristics that pick out the subset of the just
acts that constitutes the set of pious acts. Euthyphro answers that the part of
justice relating to piety is that involved in attending to the concerns of the
gods, while the remaining part of the set of just acts is the set that attends
to the concerns of people. This principle, determining concepts by partitioning
sets they form part of, is often a useful analytical procedure – which is why
Socrates has encouraged Euthyphro to try it in this case.
15.
Socrates
now asks Euthyphro what he means by `attending to the concerns of the gods.’
With some prodding and help, Euthyphro says that he means `serving them’.
16.
Socrates
now suggests that serving something must benefit that which is served. So he
asks Euthyphro how serving the gods helps them. What does it give them?
Euthyphro answers that it gives them what they love, that is, piety.
17.
Now,
of course, we’re just back at the original dilemma. Euthyphro runs away, the
question to him unanswered.
18.
Can
any of you try to do better on the question than Euthyphro?