The Economic Agent: Not Human, But Important
Don Ross
Department of Philosophy and Department of Finance, Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Alabama at Birmingham
School of Economics, University of Cape Town
1 Introduction
Critics of mainstream economics typically rest important weight on the differences between people and the 'agents' that populate economic theory and economic models. Hollis and Nell (1975) is both representative of and ancestral to many more recent variations on the theme. Lately, the upgraded status of behavioral economics (BE) within the discipline's mainstream has encouraged a number of writers to use revolutionary rhetoric in promotion of a 'paradigm shift' that includes the rejection of 'rational economic man' (Ormerod 1994, Heilbroner and Milburg 1995, Fullbrook 2003). The current leading developers of BE are generally more circumspect, claiming that their approach complements standard theory rather than promising to supplant it (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004, Angner and Loewenstein this volume). However, they generally join the more florid critics in supposing that microeconomics is bound to improve its empirical relevance to the extent that it substitutes the study of people for that of abstract economic agents. Another body of thought that promotes this view stems from Sen's (1977) attack on standard economic agents as 'rational fools', amplified in Davis's (2003) argument that since economic agents lack some essential properties of human individuals, economic theory requires fundamental reform if it is to make progress in explaining human behavior.
That economic agents and people have different properties
should strike no one as surprising. Whereas people are pre-theoretical entities
found in the world, economic agency is a theoretical construction elaborated as
part of the development of a family of models. In philosophical terms, we might
therefore describe the view that economists should forget about economic agency
and directly study people instead as an expression of normative
phenomenalism. This would be the thesis
that the proper objects of scientific attention are manifest phenomena, which
should be described directly rather than by way of intermediate theoretical
kinds. This is not a view we find on display elsewhere in the philosophy of
science. Though strong empiricists, such as Bas van Fraassen (1980, 2002), deny
that we are entitled to ascribe model-independent reality to the unobservable objects
of reference used in scientific theories, I have never heard anyone insist that
physicists ought to stop modeling fields and manifolds and go back to
generalizing directly about rocks and tables. Elsewhere in this volume, I
extensively discuss the reasons why economics has attracted a level of
anti-theoretical hostility not
encountered by other sciences (aside from evolutionary biology). I suggest that
this discussion is useful background for explaining the eagerness with which
revolutions in economics are promoted on grounds we don't encounter elsewhere
in science. In the present essay, I will assume that normative phenomenalism,
especially as applied arbitrarily to and only to economics, is not rationally
motivated. This assumption does not foreclose the possibility that either
current critique or the future course of economic science could reveal the idea
of economic agency, either in general or in some common particular form, to be
unhelpful. Use of any given agency concept in science is subject to requests for justification; but the mere
fact that economic agency is abstractly constructed establishes no prima facie case against such justification.
It might be objected that normative phenomenalism is a fair
standard for application to economics in particular because economic theory,
unlike physical theory, generalizes only or mainly over observable types. In
this connection, MŠki (1986, 1992) points out that Friedman's (1953) famous
methodology isn't in fact the standard sort of instrumentalism it's typically
taken to be because, unlike philosophical instrumentalists about the
unobservable entities of physics, Friedman assumes the objects of economics to
be manifest: consumers, firms, prices, etc.. He then doubts that economic
theory truly describes these objects, useful though it is for predicting their
trajectories. He does not doubt, as the instrumentalist does of bosons, that
the basic objects of economics exist. Though I agree with MŠki about what
Friedman thought on this question, I do not think that Friedman's opinion here
is correct. Because the words used by
economists, unlike 'boson', are derived from everyday vocabulary, it is easy to
forget that in their theoretical context they denote abstractions. Despite
slightly quaint philosophical jargon, Stigum (1990) offers nice examples of the
point: ÒWe have knowledge by acquaintance of the salary we received last year,
but we have knowledge by description only of what our income was, i.e., of the
maximum amount of money we could have spent last year and been as wealthy at
the end of the year as we had been at the beginning of the year É We have
knowledge by acquaintance of the price of our house, but only knowledge by
description of its current market valueÓ (p. 550). So it is with agency in
economic theory: we gaze upon and shake hands with people, but not with
economic agents. But, in the absence of an argument for normative
phenomenalism, this fact by itself no more implies that economists should stop
theorizing about agents, or equate them with people, then similar logic would
rightly advise them to stop theorizing about incomes or to equate incomes with
salaries. Again, this is not to deny the validity of requests for justification
on grounds internal to the goals of economics (as opposed to external
philosophical grounds).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will first
sketch the standard concept of the economic agent as featured in contemporary
microeconomics. I will then show why the practice of economists does not equate
this agent to a person, and why economists' longstanding interests in
'individualism' and 'microfoundations' should not be interpreted as suggesting
otherwise. This will show how, in detail, economists should respond to
criticisms reflecting normative phenomenalism. In section 5 I will indicate why
and how (some) behavioral economists propose to modify agency in light of
studies of people, in cases where normative phenomenalism is not assumed. The core of this argument involves
contesting the view held by increasingly many behavioral economists that their
program collapses into the ambition of the new 'neuroeconomics' to identify and
explain the processes by which brains comparatively value actual and
prospective rewards. I will maintain that what I will call 'modular neuroeconomics'
(as found in work by Glimcher 2003 and Caplin and Dean forthcoming) is
importantly different in its implicit attitude to standard economic agency from
a more reductionist version of neuroeconomics that has lately been stapled to
BE in would-be service of a paradigm shift (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec
2005). Having explained why modular neuroeconomics preserves rather than
challenges the standard concept of economic agency, I will defend the continued
use of that concept against calls for its replacement by objects and processes
identified through psychological and neuroscientific observation.
2
Economic agency
There is a clear historical path by which the standard
concept of the economic agent was developed (Mandler 1999). This agent first appeared
in the work of the early neoclassical theorists (Jevons and Walras) as a
maximizer of ceiling-less hedonic utility laboring under a finite budget,
subject to diminishing marginal returns from consumption within classes of
commodities he deemed to be close substitutes. I deliberately use the pronoun
'he', because at the point of his historical arrival the economic agent was
both normatively male in his status as a social atom and (more importantly for
present purposes) human, in that he relied on 'creature sensations' to both
form his close-substitute classes and to rank them with respect to the utility
they delivered. His agency revolved around his efforts, given his limited
means, to create the most appealing inner environment he could, as determined
by his own introspective judgment.
Although the early neoclassical agent was human, he was
already not a whole person. In sympathy
with Mill's refusal to follow Bentham in regarding all sources of satisfaction
– pushpin and poetry, a foot message and an end to poverty – as
lying on a single commensurable scale, Jevons (1871) took the economic agent to
be the aspect of the person
concerned with the consumption of 'lower' wants. We can fully understand what
was 'lower' about these wants only by going slightly outside the frame of
Jevons's text and importing some knowledge of the Victorian world-view. To some
extent the lowliness of economic wants lay in their materiality. But Victorian
idealism was closely bound up with the morality of social obligation: material
goods were 'low' in part because, unlike 'spiritual' goods, their consumption
as sources of utility was private; 'higher' wants were higher in part because
attending to them expressed commitment to public civilization. Given the
importance of atomism as a property of the economic agent for which he is
widely rebuked by his critics (including contemporary ones), this point merits
emphasis. The Victorians were pointedly and self-consciously divided amongst
themselves as regards metaphysical atomism versus holism, with the
scientifically minded such as Jevons inclining to the former and most
philosophers defending the latter. But neither Jevons nor Walras were moral
atomists; both rejected the idea that a
person should give his highest priority to what they regarded as his economic
interests.
Some readers might have jumped to the conclusion that I am
calling the early neoclassical agent 'human' because he had 'feelings'. It has
long been fashionable to contrast the 'cold calculator' featured in economic
theory with the warm, sentimental and impulsive beings celebrated by all
romantics and by most Western humanists. Though this is important for
understanding sources of non-rational antipathy to economics, it seems to me
ethnocentric to view emotional parochialism and impulsiveness as the core
properties of the human; Western romantic humanism is a peculiar, not a
globally typical, idealization of human nature. Thus I would question the
long-run philosophical importance of contrasting the early agent's passions
with the later agent's lack of them. Instead, I suggest, what made Jevons's
economic agent human by contrast with his contemporary successor was the
former's grounding in consumption within the boundaries of his body. The early neoclassical agent was an aspect of the
human animal. Thus there was an
implicit one-to-one mapping between these agents and human organisms, which all
applications took for granted.
As recognized by many writers, and reviewed succinctly by
Bruni (2005) and Bruni and Sugden (2007), Jevons's introspective agent was on
the way out before the twentieth century began; Pareto, in particular, worked
to reduce his defining properties to a mere disposition to consume in
accordance with representation by indifference curves. Following on this lead
using more powerful mathematical resources, the introspective agent was killed
stone dead in the ordinalist revolution of the 1930s and 40s led by Hicks,
Allen and Samuelson (Mandler 1999). As related by Ross (2005), however, what
never disappeared from most economists' (or other people's) informal conception
of the economic agent was the idea that he was still (as it were)
'ontologically grounded' in the human organism. By this I mean only that the
one-to-one mapping between agents and organisms presumed by Jevons and Walras
(henceforth, 'A -> O') remained the basic reference point for
understanding the place of agents in the empirical interpretation of economic
theory, even as the agent's human properties were steadily stripped away. There
were motivations for this conservatism, as we will see; it wasn't merely a case
of conceptual inertia. But, I will argue, we can make more consistent sense of
the character of most economics since Samuelson by dropping the attribution to
its foundations of the assumption of A -> O.
The ordinalist revolution did not so much modify the concept
of the economic agent as, to begin with, attempt to eliminate him. In the
canonical ordinalist texts, Samuelson (1938, 1947) set out to derive the
existence of sets of preferences mappable onto the real numbers by monotonic,
complete, acyclical, and convex functions from observable schedules of
aggregate demand. He would have preferred not to call these 'utility'
functions, but the lure of semantic continuity turned out to be a more powerful
force than his preference, and he quickly surrendered the point to convention.[1]
As the label 'revealed preference theory' was intended to suggest, his utility
functions were intended as descriptions of actual and hypothetical behavior,
not inner evaluations of experienced relative states of satisfaction. It is
common to attribute the motivation for this to the behaviorism and positivism
that dominated the psychology and social science of the 1930s, 40s and 50s, and
certainly this influence played its part. However, imagining it to have been
the main, let alone the sole, motivation ignores the fact that Samuelson
completed a process that had been underway for decades in economics, and which
thus reflected a special dynamic internal to the discipline. This was the felt
pressure to make economics a social science
independent of any foundations in individual psychology. Cold war neuroses
demanding adherence to 'methodological individualism' did much to obscure the
point in retrospect. But as good Keynesians, Hicks and Samuelson were, in a
very important sense to which we will return later, uninterested in individual agents, a concept of which they merely
inherited from an earlier neoclassical theory they profoundly transformed. If
we let Samuelson's (1947) mathematics speak for itself, as he largely though
inconsistently does himself in Foundations, then among the short and general things we might say about the role
of the agent in revealed preference theory the most accurate is that there
isn't one. There is observable aggregate demand, and if this has certain
testable properties then the existence of continuous preference fields is
implied. What stabilizes these fields might or might not be properties of
individual psychologies; the revealed preference theorist disavows professional
interest in this question, a point on which Samuelson is explicit.
All this makes it easy to imagine that, and how, the agent
might have disappeared altogether from economic theory had the discipline
technically matured in a slightly different context. Indeed, someone might well
argue that the agent did substantially
disappear despite the fact that the word 'agent' soon made a comeback in the literature following on Samuelson.
There are three possible interpretations to be distinguished here. By
'interpretations' I refer not to claims about what historical economists
actually intended, but to attributions that might be offered by philosophical
reconstructions that apply retrospective principles of charity in full knowledge
of contemporary economics. The possible interpretations are:
(1)
The role of the agent was eliminated from microeconomic theory
after World War Two.
(2)
Postwar microeconomic theory retained a concept of the agent,
but with substantial modifications that imply abandonment of the commitment to
A ->
O (whether or not many economists, who are not in the philosophy business,
noticed this).
(3)
The absence of agents in Samuelson's version of revealed
preference theory was an idiosyncratic wobble in the evolution of microeconomic
theory; the reappearance of the word 'agent' in subsequent canonical texts
indicates stronger continuity with early neoclassicism than Samuelson
suggested, in particular, continued ontological orientation around A -> O.
Contemporary paradigm-shifters based in BE, along with Sen
and his followers, adhere to interpretation (3) and then, in rejecting social
atomism, take themselves to be calling for the overthrow of a historically
unified neoclassical tradition. (Thus they often refer to the contemporary
mainstream as 'Walrasian'.) I will defend interpretation (2).
Let us now hoist the target of the conflicting interpretations onto the table. Again, there can be no dispute that Samuelson's avoidance of the word 'agent' failed to stick as a practice: the subtitle of Rubinstein's (2006) elegant formulation of the core elements of microeconomic theory, which deserves to be regarded as authoritative on matters of current convention, is ÒThe Economic AgentÓ. I will summarize the part of Rubinstein's formulation that might plausibly be taken to be definitive of economic agency. This is the part that can be stated independently of any assumptions about representations or computations taken to be aspects of agents' psychologies; were such assumptions to be incorporated into the definition of agency then the question distinguishing the defenders of interpretations (2) and (3) above would necessarily be begged in favor of the latter. Note that the judgment about what to regard as 'definitive' that I will express below is mine, not Rubinstein's. Note also that Rubinstein's formulation reflects the consolidation of postwar consumer theory provided by Debreu (1959), rather than the less exact version found in Samuelson (1947); this is a point that will be important in the later discussion.
The agent is a reference point for ascription of a utility
function. Utility functions are constructed from preference functions or
represent preference relations. A preference function or relation generalizes a
series of answers to a series of evaluative questions about elements x, y,
É, n of a set X, with one answer per question of the form 'x
is preferred to y' (x
y), 'y is
preferred to x' (y
x), or 'x and
y are interchangeable in preference
ranking' (I). Rubinstein shows
that two forms of generalization are equivalent:
(1)
Preferences on a set X are
a function f that assigns to any
pair (x, y) of
distinct elements in X exactly
one of x
y, y
x, or I,
restricted by two properties: (i) no order effect: f (x, y) = f
(y, x); and (ii) transitivity: if f (x, y) = x
y and f (y, z) = y
z then f (x, z) = x
z and if f (x, y) = I
and f (y, z) = I then
f (x, z) = I.
(2)
A preference on a set X is
a binary relation
on X
satisfying (i) completeness: for any x, y
X, x
y or y
x; and (ii) transitivity: for any x, y, z
X if x
y and y
z then x
z.
A utility function is a representation of a preference
relation according to:
represents
if for all x, y
X, x
y if and only if U(x)
U(y).
If the foregoing is taken to restrict the conception of an
agent then it follows that an agent's preferences are not lexicographic (Debreu
1960). This also follows from conceiving of preference relations as continuous.
From Debreu (1954, 1960), any set of continuous preferences is represented by a
continuous utility function.
The agent distributes her investments in alternative
feasible states of the world in accordance with the weak axiom of revealed
preference. I use a formulation of my own here instead of Rubinstein's: for two
complete states of the world x, y: x
y, if the agent pays opportunity cost c + y in
exchange for x, then the agent
will never pay opportunity cost c +
x in exchange for y. This implies that the agent's behavior will be
consistent with the hypothesis that she maximizes a utility function according
to which U(x)
U(y).
When agents are located in markets where they encounter
consumption problems, more is generally assumed of them. In particular, it is
supposed that when they are faced with alternative investments in
quantitatively measurable combinations of elements (bundles) from their utility
functions, their preferences satisfy monotonicity (for any element x
X, x +
x), continuity, and convexity (consumption behavior is
consistent with representation by neoclassical indifference curves). Stronger
assumptions, particularly that utility functions are differentiable, are
typically added if we are concerned to show that a particular model of a
consumer's optimization of consumption given a budget is explained by reference
to her preferences. Note that economists are almost never moved by this concern
except when they are engaged in explicit justification of abstract theory
– that is to say, when they're not actually doing economics.
In light of the foregoing, our prior question about the
ontological presumptions around agency in postwar economic theory comes down to
this: what import should be attached to saying that a reference point for
ascription of a utility function, as just defined, is an 'agent'? 'Reference
point' here just means an element of some index constructed for a particular
analytic exercise; so all the weight lies on concept of the utility function.
It should be evident that what I identified earlier as the 'human' properties
of Jevons's agent make no appearance in the definition. Nor, at least until the
rise of BE, did they play any explicit role in interpretations of the formalism
in applications. Now, there is no room for serious doubt that in the Western
intellectual tradition the prototypical agent is the goal-pursuing aspect of a
single person over the course of her biography from the dawn to the demise of
her mature competence in practical reasoning (Ross 2002). The idea has a
relatively clear and constant conceptual core from the work of Aristotle
through Kant. From this perspective it should seem puzzling that Samuelson's
avoidance of reference to agents didn't continue to be respected: reference
points for ascriptions of utility functions don't seem particularly to resemble
philosophers' agents. Why then is it standard practice we find Rubinstein
reflecting in using 'the economic agent' as his subtitle in 2006?
In aiming to be empirical scientists, rather than members of
the community of mathematicians who study constrained optimization,[2]
economists necessarily suppose that their theory gives a general description of
some class(es) of empirical phenomena. At the most crude level of description,
there seem to be two alternatives here: the theory can be about people, or it
can be about emergent systems of production, consumption and exchange, in a
context of agnosticism about who or what the ultimate units of these activities are (if there need to be ultimate such units at all; see Ladyman and Ross 2007
for reasons to doubt this). Once the issue is put this way, it might be
supposed that the answer to the question at the end of the previous paragraph
is obvious: utility functions must be proxies for individual flesh-and-blood
consumers lest we implicitly endorse mysterious 'group minds' that don't
decompose into individual minds; methodological individualism follows from
metaphysical atomism. If utility functions map one-to-one onto people for
philosophical reasons, then in light of the same philosophical tradition
according to which A -> O, a theory of the utility function is a theory of the
agent.
However, economists are usually reluctant to accept
important professional doctrines simply on philosophical grounds, as they
should be. One consequence of the public prominence of the Chicago School has
been to greatly exaggerate the perceived commitment to methodological
individualism in workaday economics. Agnosticism about microfoundations need
not imply – as it certainly didn't for Keynes or Samuelson –
endorsement of a transcendent Hegelian spirit which, in addition to thinking
about itself and moving history along, also produces, consumes and trades. The
respectable scientists who work today in complex systems theory (who are
respectable as scientists regardless of whether one shares their confidence in
their approach) believe in emergent processes and entities, behavior of which
cannot be derived from behavior of their constituents in vitro, but generally do not believe that
feedback-regulated dynamical systems are manifestations of Spirit. Of course,
complex systems theory did not yet exist in the 1950s. But this didn't deter
Samuelson from haughty indifference about the atomic material contents of the
economist's structural black boxes. (For example, at one point in the Foundations
[p. 87] he effectively implies that the
firm in production theory is not a 'company' in the everyday sense, since the
latter but not the former may make profits; but, he says, studying
institutional contexts that allow companies to gather rents is not the
economist's business. This would imply that it is also not in the economist's
brief to say why people form companies in the first place.) The real liberator
of economists from the ball-and-chain of microfoundations was Keynes, who
enjoyed emphasizing that the concerns of the philosophers in whose company he
had been intellectually trained were of no practical import in the dangerous
concrete world where policy was called upon to keep revolution at bay. Keynes
made economics both theoretically autonomous and professionally thrilling, and
these two attractive aspects of the profession as it set about reorganizing the
postwar order were closely related to one another. The conquering
macroeconomists of the Bretton Woods era were neither metaphysical atomists nor
metaphysical holists; they were practical structuralists who left metaphysics
to others.
I have already alluded, in my reference to 'Cold War
neuroses', to one reason this golden moment didn't last. Opposing Stalinism
obviously didn't rationally require that
anyone swear fealty to methodological individualism; but war is no friend to
subtlety (nor, as emphasized by Mirowski [2002], were the military funding
sources that fueled the expansion of postwar science, including economics[3]).
It cannot be rigorously demonstrated, but nevertheless seems very likely, that
extra-theoretical political factors in the postwar democracies constituted the
most decisive influence on economists' return to the rhetoric of social atomism. Because such rhetoric was also
widely associated – by the loosest, Humean, kind of relation – with
defense of markets against 'collectivists', and because economists are indeed
appreciators of markets, Chicago School celebrities readily promoted the idea
that economic theory has both descriptive and normative individualism built
into its core.
Though I contend that this was indeed more a matter of
rhetoric than logic, it would be seriously mistaken to suppose that the only
reason economic theory didn't continue down Samuelson's agent-free path is the
purely external, sociological one that its popular image was captured by cold
warriors. In the first place, as I argue elsewhere in this volume, the
completeness of the capture is often exaggerated. In the second place,
economists were not unaware that most of their applied work continued to focus
on aggregate magnitudes and relations. Economists had reasons, grounded in microeconomics rather than metaphysics,
for thinking that agency couldn't be
excised from their theoretical foundations. I will concentrate on two.
First, the invention of game theory (GT) by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in 1944 allowed economists to model the interactions of
idiosyncratically varying utility functions rendered interdependent by
contingent distributions of scarcity. Nothing in the mathematics stipulates
that these must be interpreted as the utility functions of people; indeed, in the most useful contemporary economic (as opposed to psychological) applications of GT,
they represent objectives of firms rather than of humans (Ghemawat 1998; Klemperer
2004; Milgrom 2004). However, GT required the enrichment of utility theory that
von Neumann and Morgenstern (and then Savage) provided in order to incorporate
players' uncertainty about the valuations of and information available to other
players. This enrichment was elucidated at every step by heuristics drawn from
folk psychology, and thus the non-mathematical version of the vocabulary of
game theory is full of psychological notions: beliefs, conjectures, aversion,
attraction. Furthermore, and more substantively, GT made it possible for
economists to use the core elements of their conceptual toolkit (constrained
optimization and opportunity cost) to systematically study individual choices
in strategic contexts and so, like good opportunistic scientists, they duly
embarked on such study. If we are to base our views of disciplinary boundaries
on what scientists actually do instead of on philosophical doctrines about how
the world is objectively carved,
then we must agree that the early game theorists thereby widened the scope of
economics, regardless of whether a revealed-preference purist would approve.[4]
Finally, GT seemed to demand progressive deepening of links between economics
and psychology as it technically evolved over the past 35 years. It can
be given a strictly behaviorist
interpretation, according to which one uses it to guide inferences about
players' stable behavioral orientations through observing which vectors of
possible behavioral sequences in strategic interanimation are Nash equilibria.
But the power of such inferences is often limited because most games have
multiple Nash equilibria. Efforts to derive stronger predictions led a majority
of economic game theorists in the 1980s to interpret games as descriptions of
players' beliefs instead of their
actions. On this interpretation,
a solution to a game is one in which all players' conjectures about one
another's preferences and (conditional) expectations are mutually consistent.
Such solutions are, in general, stronger than Nash equilibria, and hence more
restrictive. As pointed out in criticism by Binmore (1990), the resulting
'refinement program' draws game theorists not just into psychology but deep
into philosophy, since it
requires them to study their own 'intuitions' about which chains of argument
must be pursued if an agent is to count as 'rational'. In this context the idea
of agency looks fundamental to
microeconomics.
Second, the formal completion of general equilibrium theory by Arrow and Debreu (1954) required the concept of an 'economy' to be strictly regimented, and this in turn demanded imposition of strong general constraints on 'participants' in such economies (Debreu 1959). In particular, it was necessary to assume that the participants could rank all possible states of the world with respect to value, and that they never change their minds about these rankings. Again, nothing required that 'participants' be interpreted as coextensive with people. As argued at length in Ross (2005), if agents in general equilibrium are identified with utility functions, then the fact that changes in utility functions imply changes in agent identity is an excellent reason not to identify such agents with people. However, an important part of the intended point of general equilibrium theory, all the way back to Walras, has been to serve as a framework for thinking about the consequences of changes in exogenous variables, especially policy variables, for welfare. Regardless of whether descriptive individualism is persuasive as social metaphysics – the reader will have gathered that I think it is not – there remain the best of reasons for endorsing normative individualism: improvements and declines in the feelings of particular people about their well being is what most people, as a matter of fact, mainly care about, so for an economist to regard anything else as the appropriate topic of welfare analysis is to implicitly impose the economist's parochial value scheme on society. Policy makers should ignore the advice of such economists.[5] Thus if the loci of preference fields in general equilibrium theory are not at least idealizations of people, then it is not evident why efficiency, the touchstone of general equilibrium analysis, should be important enough to warrant touchstone status.
Theoretical developments in the 1970s added economic
substance to this philosophical concern. The 'excess demand' literature of that
period, centering around the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Sonnenschein
1972, 1973; Mantel 1974, 1976; Debreu 1974), showed that although all general
equilibria are efficient, there is no unique one-to-one mapping between a given
general equilibrium and a vector of individual demand functions. (Put more
directly, for a given set of demand functions there is more than one vector of
prices at which all demand is satisfied.) In tandem with the Lipsey-Lancaster
(1956) theory of the second-best, Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu challenged the
cogency of attempts by welfare economists to justify policy by reference to merely
inferred (as opposed to separately and empirically observed) subjective
preferences of consumers. Note that this problem arises whether one assumes an
atomistic or an intersubjective (and aggregate-scale, sociological rather than
psychological) theory of the basis of value. Nevertheless, the excess demand
results shook the general postwar confidence that if one attended properly to
the aggregate scale then specific properties of individuals could be safely
ignored.
Both the theory of individual choice under uncertainty and
welfare theory are extensions of core
microeconomic theory. Therefore, the fact that both embroil economists in
issues about agency is not a slam-dunk argument for interpreting that core
using the standard semantic label chosen by Rubinstein. However, here it is
important to remember that if the pressure to regard economics as being about
agents isn't decisive, the basis for resistance to such an interpretation isn't
very powerful either. As observed above, in denying that macroeconomics had
necessarily to be derived from microeconomics, Keynesians expressed commitment
to pragmatism, not philosophical holism: they left microeconomics behind
(Keynes) or blithely cast aside its early neoclassical commitments (Hicks and
Samuelson) because they thought that rigid fealty to Jevons and Walras stood in
the way of exercising available capacities to control policy-relevant economic
relationships and magnitudes. Therefore, if we come around to the view that
psychologistic GT is relevant to policy, as all behavioral economists believe,
then the same attitude that led Samuelson to drop agents from his foundations
should inspire us to put it back. Furthermore, if psychologistic GT is relevant
to policy because of variations in individuals' utility functions and attitudes
to risk, then it seems our idea of welfare is implied to be richer than merely
the vague utilitarian commitment to maximize community indifference curves that
characterizes most economics applied at the scales of national and international
policy.
I think that these considerations do defeat interpretation
(1) of the place of agency in postwar economic theory. Economics is motivated
by a broader set of empirical observations than merely noticing that ecologies of self-maintaining entities
collectively demand more consumption goods than the world can provide; it is
equally fundamental to the discipline as we now find it that these entities
have available to them and use importantly different strategy sets and
strategies for coping with specific aspects of their scarcity problems. Once we
have got as far as talking about 'entities with varying utility functions and
strategy sets' then it would simply be conceptually obtuse to deny that our
focus is on agents. Indeed, we should arrive at this conclusion with some
relief. It spares us the need to try to make general sense of preference or
consumption while not being able to say that there is any kind of thing that
is, in general, a possible locus for having preferences and consuming. Let me
be careful in framing the significance of this point. I don't wish to make
philosophy seem too important here, and I don't believe that we can aspire to
close the whole conceptual system by reducing basic economic concepts to some
extra-economic bedrock. Instead, preference, consumption and agency,
operationalized together as a triad, plausibly constitute a collective
conceptual primitive for economics, and as long as this doesn't leave economics
stranded apart from other sciences this should be regarded as foundations
enough. My point here is just that leaving agency in the picture doesn't
seriously compromise foundational elegance given that preference and consumption are already admitted.
Therefore, declining to identify
utility functions with agents would give more weight to philosophy – refusing to 'say what
comes naturally', just out of philosophical scruples – than doing so.
However, giving up the radical ambition to eliminate agency
from economic theory need not carry us, with Sen and the behavioral economists,
all the way to interpretation (3). I will argue over the course of the
remaining sections of the chapter that although economics is about agents, it
is not best regarded as staked to A -> O.
Before I launch into this, let me deflect a potential charge
that I have announced battle with a straw opponent. It might be objected that
the paradigm shifters have no need to accept a generalization as strong as A -> O,
and, indeed, do not insist on it. They
will agree that many applications of economics treat firms, households, unions
and even countries as agents. Furthermore, they will note – indeed, will
emphasize – that models inspired by neuroeconomics focus on sub-personal
agents (Montague, King-Casas and Cohen 2006, p. 438). This idea of representing
people as communities of agents – synchronic, diachronic or both at once
– goes back to the very dawn of BE (Strotz 1956), and so has some claim
to being regarded as among its basic points of departure from neoclassicism.
These points are duly acknowledged. I do not claim that any
economists of note maintain A -> O as an analytic or metaphysical
necessity. They are thus open to extending the concept of agency to apply it to
entities other than whole individual people, and they do regularly so extend
it. However, my key point is precisely that behavioral economists must regard these as extensions. They join classical economists and early
neoclassicals in regarding whole individual people as the paradigm or reference
cases of agents. This is an essential assumption underlying any campaign to
bring aspects of human psychology into the foundations of economic theory
– as opposed to simply conjoining aspects of economics and psychology
when specifically studying individual human choice. Now, if some who have employed
paradigm shifting rhetoric want at this point to say that the latter idea is
all they ever had in mind to promote, then disagreement dissolves. As noted
above, I do not aim to tighten membership in the club of economists so as to
exile the students of individual choice to another province where they must
call themselves psychologists; such rigidity about disciplinary boundaries is
silly. However, I claim that we dissolve the alleged basis for suggesting that
economics is in theoretical crisis or would benefit from a paradigm shift if we
give up the idea that the paradigmatic economic agent is a whole adult person.
I will argue that the postwar practice of, and the direction of theoretical and
practical progress in, economics is such that economists should be seen as
venturing away from base camp whenever they turn their attention to
non-aggregate phenomena. The contemporary concept of the agent is primarily a
theoretical construction that facilitates modeling of aggregate phenomena; and
it does a better job of this then would an agent fleshed out according to the
profile of the human being furnished by psychologists.
3.
Animal agents
As explained in the previous section, the agent in postwar
economic theory is an abstraction. There are no manifest folk entities onto
which agents need numerically map. In neuroeconomics, neurons and groups of
neurons may be agents. In development economics, agents are statistically
relevant households. In much macroeconomics since the 1970s, entire populations
of countries are modeled as if they reflected a single 'representative' agent.
By contrast, as also described above, the agent of BE is not abstract: she (no
longer gendered, as in Jevons's time) is a manifest, living, breathing animal.
More specifically, she is a social animal
with a complex, multi-part control system that is too decentralized to produce
the relentless consistency of the agent as previously defined.
Behavioral economists and their supporters among
psychologists, philosophers and others have lately been remarkably successful
in convincing other economists that in modeling agents they been neglecting
important empirical considerations, and should feel chastened by discoveries
coming from cognitive science generally and cognitive neuroscience particularly
(Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec 2005). To cite one example, as Rubinstein
(2007, p. x) says Ò[t]en years ago it was difficult to publish a paper in the QJE
which included a 'present-bias' assumption.
These days it is almost impossible to publish a paper in the same journal which
ignores present-bias, let alone one which criticizes the approach.Ó
The discoveries that are supposed to chasten mainstream economists can be broadly sorted into four sets: (1) findings that people don't reason about uncertainty in accordance with sound statistical and other inductive principles; (2) findings that people behave inconsistently from one choice problem to another as a result of various kinds of framing influences; (3) findings that people systematically reverse preferences over time because they discount the future hyperbolically instead of exponentially; and (4) findings that people don't act so as to optimize their personal expected utility, but are heavily influenced by their beliefs about the prospective utility of other people, and by relations between other peoples' utility and their own. All of these are taken to threaten the supposed 'dogma' of mainstream (typically called 'neoclassical' or 'Walrasian') economics that people are rational and self-interested. The findings in sets (1) – (3) directly undermine (attributed) assumptions about peoples' practical consistency. Set (4) is often emphasized as undermining assumptions about narrow self-interest. This is an assumption which, it is quite easy to show, few economists make outside of institutionally constrained settings that specifically justify it (Cox 2004; Weibull 2004). However, to the extent that people's preferences drift with those they pick up from reference groups, this will further undermine intertemporal consistency. Of course, none of these putative discoveries undermine the standard model of economic agency unless it is supposed that the paradigmatic economic agent is a natural (including socially constructed) person.
Rebel flags would not be flying from the battlements of top journals if many economists did not find the call for self-chastening persuasive. In aiming to resist it, I owe an account of this disposition to be humbled. The main part of the explanation, I believe, lies in the simplified history of their discipline that most economists imbibe from textbooks. Philosophers, whose discipline largely consists in its history, are apt to under-appreciate the extent to which economists, like most scientists preoccupied with achieving strikes into new terrain rather than consolidation behind the lines, typically get by with shallow narratives about the development of their paradigms. Any history of economics that gathers all 'neoclassicals', from Jevons through Samuelson to Chicago, into a single relatively homogenous doctrine is bound to be a caricature. So then working economists, highly alert to what works and doesn't work in the practice of modeling, can be readily brought to admit that the caricatured picture needs a fundamental make-over if they are to have a conceptual and methodological framework that is truly adequate to their knowledge and judgment. In addition, in my experience, no small number of economists suffer from an analogue to post-colonial guilt over their discipline's perceived arrogance as self-nominated 'queen of the social sciences'. The less nuanced BE manifestos tend to have a populist air; allowing that psychology might partly re-write basic economic theory is an obvious way to send a clear signal that economists have put imperialism behind them.
In the simplified history of thought that often frames
casual (and some not-so-casual) methodological reflections in economics, it is
acknowledged that economists have a long history of ignoring psychologists.
This, it is then frequently supposed, has stemmed from a conviction on
economists' part that, in regarding people as narrowly selfish and materially
motivated, they operated with a more realistic understanding of at least the rational
parts of behavior than psychologists. But
now, it is thought, BE empirically vindicates the psychologists, while still
allowing an indispensable role for economists because of their training in
formal modeling. In embracing the call for paradigm change inspired by BE,
then, economists can refute the charge that their minds are closed to
theoretical change motivated empirically and by non-economists, particularly
the oft and unfairly neglected psychologists.
This impressionistic history of interdisciplinary relations isn't entirely false, of course; economists do have an established tradition of distancing themselves from psychology. As alluded to in the previous section, in the late 1930s and 1940s two threads in economic theory that had been developing separately were tied together. One thread was Keynes's focus on aggregate structural features of large economies without regard to the kinds of individual agents or actions that compose them[6] – that is, the then-new macroeconomics. The other was the attempt, clearly set in play by second-generation neoclassicists (Pareto and Fisher) near the turn of the century, to squeeze the psychological assumptions about economic agents down to a minimal core – ultimately, to nothing but consistency of preference rankings plus the idea that no agent would be content to consume only one type of good, no matter how cheap it became ('non-monomania'). Note that the second assumption is a substantial psychological hypothesis, and much more plausibly true of human beings than the first. Then, with Samuelson, as we saw, the need for even this final plausible human property was eliminated; we don't need to hypothesize non-monomania if we can use properties of observed demand to yield downward-sloping marginal utility functions empirically. This has frequently been interpreted, following the lead of Robbins (1935, 1938), as at last making a clean break between economics and psychology.
Despite their shared rejection of interpersonal comparisons of utility as unscientific, there is an important difference between the attitudes of Robbins and Samuelson toward scientific psychology. Whereas Robbins rejected the behaviorism then prevailing in psychology,[7] revealed preference theorists considered it to be a virtue of RPT – albeit, as I said earlier, a secondary one – that it was consistent with the up-to-date psychology of their time. They thus took it that ideas about how people internally represent their own preferences – most importantly for previous economists, their supposedly not subjectively liking each additional increment to their stock of a good as much as they subjectively liked the previous increment – are unscientific claims not just as economics but as psychology. This point can be used to smooth the narrative that supports the self-chastening attitude. One can say: at least some important postwar economists meant to remain responsible members of a partnership with psychology, but then the profession missed the bus at the cognitive revolution in the 1960s. Fortunately, the paradigm shifters can continue, thanks to findings in experimental economics, to the undermining of aggregate welfare measures by Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu, and to the way in which game theory evolved, the bus eventually came around again and economists could redeem the earlier error by this time climbing aboard.
In Section 2 I referred to the fact that the rise of the refinement program in game theory plunged economists deep into modeling of belief profiles and other objects conceptualized using the language of psychological states. This encouraged interpretations of agency consistent with A -> O. But it simultaneously introduced a tension into this commitment by inflating the computational demands on agents. The players of many refined games – e.g., those that find so-called 'sequential equilibria' (Kreps and Wilson 1982) – are computational prodigies, instantly updating all their beliefs, using all valid principles of Bayesian probability, upon receipt of any information. The capacities such refinements imply for agents are not plausible capacities of finite human beings whose inboard computational hardware was built by natural selection's incremental tinkering. And, sure enough, experimental economists duly showed that when people play the games analyzed by game theorists in laboratories, they often do not appear to behave like the agents in the models and they converge on vectors of strategies that are often not Nash equilibria (let alone subgame-perfect or sequential equilibria) according to the models (Camerer 2003). Thus, it seems to paradigm shifters, the 'assumptions' about agency of standard microeconomics need correction by the empirical facts of cognitive science.
The correction in question, according to the revolutionary manifestos, turns out to be drastic. People approximate traditional economic agency behaviorally in that they often accomplish their projects at bearable costs; but they don't exhibit any of the core computational properties attributed to economic agents by general equilibrium theory, rational-expectations macroeconomics, or game theory with refinement. 'Their' behavioral rationality typically turns out to really be natural selection's rationality, evolution having supposedly built rough situational rules of thumb ('heuristics') into people that serve them well as long as their environments are not too strange by comparison with their ancestral ones (Gigerenzer et al 1999). This critique then appears to be reinforced by cognitive neuroscience, which musters evidence for biases, heuristics and framing effects operating directly in the processing systems of the brain (Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec 2005). Thus, it is concluded, economics collapses not just into abstract computational psychology, but all the way into computational neuroscience. That the word 'collapse' is not too strong is indicated by the sorts of things some neuroeconomists claim to discover. Recently, a team reported having determined from inspection of dopamine neurons that people do not value rewards by reference to their opportunity cost (Knutson et al 2007); they infer from this that economic theory requires revision. Open-ness to chastening from extra-disciplinary sources has gone remarkably far for any economist who admits that studies of the brain might imply revision in her view of opportunity cost as the basic state variable in microeconomics.
Once economics is taken to collapse into psychology, then discoveries in sets (1) – (4) above are naturally interpreted as tearing its standard theory apart. Furthermore, the news seems to have been getting worse since the early days of BE. Findings in sets (1) – (3) can, at least in principle, be accommodated by constructing new kinds of valuation functions. For example, people / agents can be taken to maximize within frames, even if not across them. Hyperbolic discount curves can be approximated by composing exponential ones of different slopes (Laibson 1997, 1998). However, cognitive science has lately been shaking free of a hyper-rationalistic and atomistic legacy of its own. The past decade has seen enormous upgrading of the significance attached to affect in explaining both mentation and behavior in people (Damasio 1994; Panksepp 1998). Furthermore, affect itself is increasingly understood as both responding to and conditioning dynamic social interaction, an approach to modeling that seems to be borne out by the discovery of mirror neurons (Frith and Wolpert 2004). As individual people appear less and less to be autonomous bearers and computers of valuations, whose preferences explain their exchanges but are unchanged by them, and come instead to be seen as resembling adaptive nodes in social colonies where valuations continuously modulate one another in interacting cascades,[8] the more hopelessly inaccurate it is thought to be to model people, or aspects of them, as traditional economic agents.
Instead, it is suggested, the agent must cease to be 'bloodless'. This metaphor is apt, as we saw: the agent of classical economics (Sen's preferred model), and that of early neoclassicism, were not abstractions but organisms (or aspects of organisms). This will seem to be a banal observation if it is read simply as pointing out, with so many others, that BE aims to put emotions and lapses of rationality – failings of the flesh, as it were – back into economics. It is an equally familiar point that BE replaces the narrowly selfish agent with a socially concerned (both altruistic and envious) creature, though commentaries that make much of this often exaggerate, sometimes outrageously, the extent to which neoclassicism presupposes narrow selfishness. I want to emphasize something much less remarked upon in contrasting the (human) animal agent with the agent as characterized in Section 1. The former objects are, as it were, made by nature and 'found' in it by scientists, even if in modeling them they abstract away from all but a few of their properties; whereas the latter are not natural objects but constructed artifacts used to build models of phenomena that are, at least in the first place, social (in economists' jargon, either competitive or interactive / strategic).
Quite obviously, it could hardly be of greater importance or interest that we study the human organism. That study is, furthermore, sometimes crucial to applications of economic theory, especially when groups to which it is applied are small. However, I will now argue, study of the human organism is not a part of economics in a sense continuous with the core activity of postwar neoclassicism; whereas it is (of course) strongly continuous with psychology as practiced by Helmholtz and other founders of that discipline. There would be slightly less confusion abroad in the land, I suggest, if BE had instead been carried out under the label 'the psychology of valuation'. In saying this I am not asserting a normative claim about the 'proper' business of each discipline, or about how researchers ought to sort themselves among academic departments or about which journals should publish whose articles. On the contrary, I personally find it pleasing when the institutions of academe are allowed to become riots of methodological and conceptual diversity, at least insofar as this does not undermine the value attached to modeling rigor. Rather, what I mean to argue is that with respect to two substantively different scientific subject matters, which have historically been called 'psychology' and 'economics', BE is much more in the tradition of the former than the latter. Furthermore, BE no more implies that standard economic theory should undergo a revolutionary transformation than does any other part of psychology. I make this point by reference to ontology rather than methodology. BE, like psychology, studies the properties of people, whereas economics studies markets and networks, employing for this purpose an idea of 'agency' that is related to the concept of the person only by historical semantic tradition.
4.
The heartland of economics
To someone who both thinks that microeconomics is directly about individual human choice and behavior, and who also thinks that people are paradigmatic agents, the reason that agency is conceptually central to microeconomics needs little elaboration. As discussed in Section 2, if one is doubtful of the first two claims then the basis for the third is less obvious. In Section 2 I argued that agency indeed is central to microeconomics, given the sorts of modeling activities and analyses in which microeconomists in fact engage. However, I defended this claim strictly historically and pragmatically. Although I think that pragmatic considerations are highly relevant to ontology, I don't think that circumscribing the significance of philosophy should lead us to regard logic as irrelevant. The place of agency in economics should also partly be understood by reference to the logical structure of current theory.
The central objects of economic study are investment allocation, competition and strategic interaction. Economists investigate these processes by building models of their operations under different circumstances which are often, though not exclusively, inspired by real institutional environments. It is something like an analytic truth that competition and interaction must go on amongst distinct units; the economic agent is then whatever turns out to be the most serviceable concept of the competing or interacting unit. What mainly constrains this concept are features of the target explananda – which are, again, not the agents themselves, as in BE, but the competitive markets and interactive networks (which together largely determine the investment environment). Thus the properties of economic agents, as captured in the analysis derived from Rubinstein in Section 1, are those that facilitate modeling of competition and strategic interaction.
A system is competitive (is a market) to the extent that
agents have isomorphic utility functions and identical strategy sets given
identical budget constraints. By 'isomorphic' I mean that if all goods are
tradable and there is a fully fungible and liquid medium of exchange then
agents can be modeled as if their utility functions differ only in index
permutations: one utility function is designated as 'i's' and another as 'j's', where the claim that i
j is primitive
and entirely open to interpretation before
a model is mapped onto an empirical subsystem of reality.[9]
In a competitive setting, i and j
aim at the same sort of end – e.g.,
maximization of expected monetary profits – except that i aims to maximize i's profits and j aims to maximize j's. If a market is perfectly competitive then, because no agents face special
costs of capital or transaction costs, budget constraints are strictly
functions of exogenous initial endowments and will converge if fluctuations in
asset values are random walks. However, markets are imperfect if they include
opportunities for earning rents or generating externalities, which may arise
from asymmetries of information, from regulatory constraints, or from the
existence of nonexcludable and/or non-rival goods. If agent i's utility maximization is constrained by j's maximizing behavior, then wherever these
constraints are not fully captured by perfect market relationships i and j are
members of an interactive network to be modeled as a game. Games in extensive
form may be indefinitely embedded in one another, with terminal nodes of any
one game assigned as initial nodes of others, and with payoff sets of outcomes
expanded accordingly as agents are added by concatenation of new games. Since
markets can be modeled without loss as games (trivial games in the case of
perfectly competitive markets), game theory generalizes economics. This is
important philosophically because it spares us any need to try to draw a crisp
line between imperfectly competitive markets, systems that don't 'feel like'
markets because many prices are shadow prices, and interactive networks where
non-parametric factors dominate.
Which empirical substructures of models are identified by economists with agents is thus derivative on which empirical substructures they identify with markets and strategically interactive networks. The kinds of phenomena most often modeled as agents in economic applications are firms and households. In international economics, the agents are often countries. Typically, however, when firms, households and countries fail to behave as agents (e.g., exhibit cyclical preferences), we explain their behavior by 'breaking them up' into sub-agents, recognizing that CEOs and shareholders have different utility functions of their own, that treating husbands and their wives as unitary consumers often makes for misguided welfare policy, and that trade and exchange rate policies are temporary equilibria in dynamic games amongst producer lobbies and groups of politicians. Nevertheless, only in BE and in experimental economics are the phenomena identified with agents usually individual people.
This is of course not news to economists who nevertheless
think that people are the paradigmatic agents (though I fear it does sometimes come as news to some philosophers who
scarcely distinguish between microeconomics and decision theory). They may
shrug it off precisely on the basis of emphasizing the previous point above.
Even if the agents in most applied economics are aggregate, the standing
pattern of disaggregating down to people when aggregate agency hits trouble
shows that the exemplary agents
still have the same identity they did for Jevons.
I think this is the strongest argument the advocate of A -> O
has available. I am unpersuaded by it, however. A first part of the reason for
this is a certain general view of the relationship between special sciences and
philosophical ontology. I do not think that philosophers are entitled to
suppose that where a science is inexplicit in practice about how its
fundamental objects are related to those in other sciences or in metaphysics,
philosophers perform a service when they infer the most parsimonious such set
of relations they can and call this 'rational reconstruction'. This attitude
rests on the idea that sciences have, as it were, background 'philosophical intentions'
that transcend what their practitioners actually do, so that where scientific
practice is silent or equivocal on metaphysics, philosophers may pipe up on its
behalf. I don't see any evident justification for this attitude other than a
very general belief that metaphysical commitment – any metaphysical
commitment – is preferable to metaphysical agnosticism. And that belief, in turn, seems to me to have no justification
at all.[10]
In light of this, I suggest that we should accept that
economics is committed to A -> O only if we
find applied economists actually making use of it in practice. A mere general
tendency to decompose complex systems that exhibit imperfect agency into
sub-agents falls short of this. What we would instead need to see is a working
tendency to regard well-performing models in which the agents are individual
people being regarded as authoritative over models in which the agents map onto
some other sort of entity. Many readers will think this tendency is exhibited
in economists' regularly manifest preference for models that can be given
'microfoundations'. Philosophers typically refer by microfoundations either
to grounding compatible with an atomistic
or individualist ontology or with
grounding explanations in distinct physical objects with well-behaved
boundaries (such as people) and concrete causal mechanisms (such as supposedly
'realistic' computations in people's brains). Economists generally mean by
microfoundations something much more specific and sui generis: equilibria among sets of optimization functions.
This is indeed a preference for agent-based models (and thus for interpretation
(2) over (1)). Philosophers are apt to think that this economists' preference
is merely a specific expression of their preference for decompositional reduction because they take for granted,
contrary to what I have been arguing – and begging the question with
respect to what is presently at issue – that a preference for agent-based
models necessarily indicates a commitment to A -> O.
The hasty assumption I attribute to some philosophers
readily arises from supposing that agent-based explanations get their
'grounding' (or at least purport to get it) from the idea that agents represent
the targets of their optimizing behavior as goals, and that their 'rationality'
consists in their literally computing plans of action to realize them. I do not
doubt that organisms with brains represent and compute (though I certainly do
doubt, following Clark [1997],[11]
that representation and computation of the sorts of abstract relationships
studied by economists are carried out entirely 'in organisms' heads'). However,
what is important about agency for economists is consistent correlation of
agents' behavioral responses with changes in relative scarcities (and hence in
imputed opportunity costs), not – at least before the coming of the
refinement program in GT – to any putative mechanistic basis for such
responses. On a sufficiently abstract conception of computation, all responses
to changes in relative scarcities are computed. But starfish, which are
perfectly respectable agents, do not perform the relevant computations with
their brains, because they do not have brains; dynamical coupling between
naturally selected dispositions in their motor systems and environmental
contingencies 'realize' the computations (as cognitive scientists say) and lead
them to pursue prey and flee from predators in highly rational ways. A similar
point can be made about a large firm: that strategy X, distributed over the
aggregated behavioral tendencies of many branch offices, tends to maximize
profits (or something else, like share value) in response to changes in supply
or demand parameters does not entail
that any individual person's
brain, or any individual machine consulted by a person, explicitly represented
or computed the relevant relationships. They may instead by stabilized by
environmental constraints that no agents directly represent (Satz and Ferejohn
1994).
Becker (1962) shows that the fundamental property of the
standard model of the market – downward sloping demand for any good given
constant real income – depends on no claim about the computational rationality of any agent; it depends only on the
assumption that households with smaller budgets and therefore smaller
opportunity sets consume less. Thus even the majority of applications in the
area of economics most directly related in principle to the theory of choice,
consumer theory, make no necessary working use of the supposed identity of
economic agents and biological / psychological people. This fact should be
taken at least as seriously as anything said about 'individual consumers' in
opening chapters of introductory micro texts. I claim that a practical, philosophically fuzzy-minded,
attitude about whether they are committed to a view on A -> O is
what most economists prefer to any more
explicit thesis that the philosophically motivated attempt to thrust upon them.
Any claim to the effect that such a preference is feckless because metaphysical
completion is a virtue of a scientific theory begs the question at issue.
Pressed on the issue of just what their agents are, economists are quite
entitled to say: anything in an empirical substructure of a model that,
interpreted in light of the analysis of agency given in Section 1, yields
predictive leverage and explanation through integration with other established
models.
Obviously, though, a significant number of important
economists – BE polemicists, Sen, others – do not say this. Behavioral and experimental economists who
resist this claim in a non-question-begging way (i.e., do not merely assume its
denial in regarding their activity as economics instead of as psychology) may
appeal to empirical discoveries about the way in which the brain computes
reward values. I will deal with this basis for defense of A -> O in
the next section. For the moment let us remain in the heartland where
neuroeconomic exotica are still unremarked. There, the two main developments in
postwar theory discussed in Section 2 that blocked Samuelsonian elimination of
agency from microeconomics altogether (the emergence of the refinement program
in game theory and the attempt to derive welfare implications from general
equilibrium theory) are sometimes conjoined with a largely thoughtless assumption of A -> O that is merely
inherited from earlier neoclassicism. As
a residual, philosophical, commitment to A -> O,
this is not what I have in mind by a practical,
working commitment to it – a
commitment that influences applied modeling.
When philosophers talk about 'practice' in a science they
generally mean to refer to experimental protocols and accepted standards of
evidence. This is still somewhat closer to epistemological norms than what I
have in mind by 'practice' when considering a discipline that is as driven by
engineering concerns as economics. Just as the de-psychologization of economics
began before Samuelson, so did its increasing concentration on policy guidance,
which in turn led to steady improvement in techniques for measuring and
studying econometric relations among aggregate variables – relations that
are, or are at least widely thought to be, under the control of governments and
central banks. The Keynesian revolution of the 1930s was an overnight triumph
among economists because, as I mentioned in Section 3, in abandoning
microeconomic modeling of macroeconomic phenomena Keynes was perceived as liberating the profession, exploiting his status as an
all-around intellectual to give his more diffident colleagues license to
dismiss ontological scruples they had maintained in deference to philosophical
tradition. In the everyday practice of economics, despite the excitement over microfoundations that arose in
the 1970s, there has been no looking back on this liberation. The overwhelming
majority of working economists never estimate the utility function of an
individual person. They measure elasticity coefficients of aggregate demand and
production functions from changes in prices, interest rates, income
distributions, national savings rates, and other index quantities. Most applied
economists pay lip service to the idea that all of these things somehow 'boil
down to' decisions by individual people. But by the weight of behavioral
evidence this interest is usually perfunctory and the lip service is typically
conventional. For example, textbooks in international economics admit that
so-called 'community indifference curves' used to represent national welfare cannot
be disaggregated into individual
indifference curves without destroying the point of using them; most books
cheerfully note this as a cautionary note and move on without further ado,
assuming that the idea of 'national welfare' makes sense in its own right.
This
is not to deny the clear fact that much economic theorizing in the mid-range
between foundation building and specific applications consists in constructing
microfoundations for models of aggregate-scale phenomena. However, the 'micro'
here refers to the distinctive explanatory logic of microeconomic theory,
not to decomposition of markets or networks into atoms. Let us consider an
example. Going back to Tinbergen (1962), economists have represented trade
flows between pairs of countries using so-called 'gravity models'. The original version of the gravity equation takes the form
where Mijk is the value of the flow of good or
factor k from country
to country
, Yi and Yj are income in country i and j respectively,
Ni and Nj are populations of countries i and j,
Dij is the distance
between countries i and j, and Uij is a lognormally distributed error term with E(Uijk) = 0 (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). The name 'gravity model' derives
from the fact that the equation represents a 'strength of attraction' based on
countries' relative sizes and distances. Its original basis was intuitive and
its justification in policy applications was for many years strictly empirical.
It was not deemed fit to be regarded as a proper part of trade theory until it
could be derived from a model of rational behavior by countries aiming to
maximize returns on factors of production. An early effort by Anderson (1979),
based on the assumption that goods produced in different countries are at best
imperfect substitutes, was criticized for being ad hoc (but see Anderson & van Wincoop 2003 and Baldwin
and Taglioni 2006). More
recently, Feenstra, Markusan and Rose (2001) proposed and empirically tested a
microfoundational explanation widely thought to suffice, based on monopolistic
competition that results from countries producing surplus differentiation of
goods in consequence of optimizing inframarginal production efficiencies, and
then engaging in mutually advantageous reciprocal dumping. Now, the point of
this example in the present context is that among economists who think that
Feenstra's account is empirically persuasive, it provides sufficient microfoundations for the gravity model because it
shows why rational agents, which in this case happen to be countries, would
produce and trade in accordance with the model's description. There is no
further methodological requirement that the countries be disaggregated so that
production of differentiated output can be attributed to particular models of
firms; it is enough that the trade behavior optimizes inframarginal
efficiencies and is a self-enforcing equilibrium. Thus 'microfoundations' here,
as generally, refers not to ontological 'grounding out' in behavior of people
as ultimate units, but to closing the model of an economic phenomenon in
strictly economic terms, where
'economic' is defined by reference to an axiomatic theoretical system for
identifying equilibria among behavioral dispositions or strategies of agents.
Any requirement that these agents be individual people requires an
extra-economic motivation.
Even in the realm of high theory, where microfoundations
involve explanation by reference to agents learning to forecast monetary and
fiscal policy, the agents in question are 'representative' optimizers whose
ontological status is indeterminate. In some canonical models whole economies
are modeled as though they are single ('infinitely lived') agents whose
business cycles result from the schedules on which they invest and take profits
(Kydland and Prescott 1982; Long and Plosser 1983). The underlying
justification for this is the assumption that what are being modeled are
markets in which utility functions differ only indexically. For this reason it
doesn't matter to the formal analysis
what sorts of extra-economic entities the utility functions map onto; all that
matters is that econometric tests, based on measuring aggregate variables, can
distinguish between one model and another. These tests require agents in the
technical sense I have discussed; they do not require that the agents in
question be people.
I advance a speculative counterfactual hypothesis about the
sustaining motivation for concern with microfoundations in high theory. This
speculation is that the devotion to constructing such foundations would not
have been remotely as strong as it has been if the mathematics of microeconomic
theory were not far more powerful and elegant than those of macroeconomics.
Imagine for a moment a possible world in which this did not hold. In that
world, if the mandarins of economic theory nevertheless put some of their best
efforts into looking for microfoundations, this would have to be because they
shared a driving philosophical conviction that sound explanations of phenomena
must resemble those of an idealized version of classical physics, in which all
principles boil down to mechanistic relationships among atoms. Mirowski (1989)
argues persuasively that this was true of the early neoclassical economists;
but, I contend, this is precisely the prison that Keynes unlocked. The possible
world in which economic theorists are lashed forward by firmly maintained
philosophical convictions seems very far from the one inhabited by actual
current economists; an excellent way to persuade a typical economist to drop
an opinion is to convince her it derives
from a philosophical hunch. And there is in any case no pressing call to
attribute philosophical faith to economists because a much more plausible
account of the centrality of attention to microfoundations is readily
available: economists want to deploy their most powerful technical toolkit,
that of microeconomics, wherever they possibly can. This expresses a highly
rational general principle. If application of a model of an infinitely lived
representative agent allocating his future self-payments in an atomless measure
space survives econometric testing then it would be foolish not to use the
model in question. Infinitely lived agents and atomless measure spaces are
hardly less metaphysically peculiar
than flows of information and exchanged assets in complex systems that
stabilize some such systems into markets. Metaphysical peculiarity or comfort
simply have nothing to do with the matter.
Failure to appreciate that microfoundations means
equilibrium dynamics rather than thoughts experienced by people has contributed
to confused interpretations of what is politically and even morally at stake in
macroeconomic policy debates. Consider, for example, the controversy between
new classical macroeconomists and Keynesians over business cycles. Popular
commentators frequently assert that the former show ideologically inspired
callousness when they deny that there is 'involuntary' unemployment. However,
as Lucas (1978) stresses in tones of justified exasperation, a new classical
theorist's microfoundational claim that all unemployment is voluntary is not
about any aspect of any worker's psychological state, and thus does not
possibly imply denial of the sincerity of anyone's misery or frustration; it is
merely denial of the Keynesian claim that there are competitive equilibria in
which human capital is wasted.[12]
Microfoundational though it is, the macroeconomic dispute is about properties
of markets, not about any properties of people.
So much for interest in microfoundations as a possible
direct indicator of commitment to A -> O. What about the possible
indirect motivators identified earlier? In Section 2 I reviewed the two main
developments in postwar economic theory that blocked Samuelsonian elimination
of agency altogether. These were the emergence of the refinement program in
game theory and the attempt to derive welfare implications from general
equilibrium theory. Now I will say why I do not think that game theory provides
a justified basis for doing economics according to the assumption that A -> O. I
will defer consideration of why we treat people as the proper objects of
welfare concern to the very end of the essay.
In game theory, the refinement program largely expired by
the turn of the century, mainly choking on a problem of its own rather than
being smothered by the activities of economists turning into psychologists. The
problem in question has a striking character in the present context: different
possible refinements, applied separately or together, pulled economists'
intuitions about rationality in conflicting directions. In consequence, game
theory began increasingly to converge with, and become as unscientific as, the
philosophy of ideal practical reason. Whether such philosophy is or is not a
potential contributor to psychology – I here take no stand on that question
– engagement with it has clearly seemed to most economists to be leading
them away from their core business. The obvious way to reverse this drift into
philosophy is the one that has mainly institutionally prevailed among
economists: implement a stronger and cleaner distinction between 'rationality'
in the thin sense – that is, Samuelsonian consistency of behavior with
representation by preference orderings – and 'rationality' in the
psychological sense of boundless in-board computational capacity.
In keeping with this, three main lines of research have
taken centre stage among game theorists over the past ten years. One line
applies classical game theory to contexts, such as auctions among highly
capitalized players bidding for very valuable assets, in which institutional
forces incentivize consortia to indeed behave like computational prodigies
(Klemperer 2004; Milgrom 2004). These consortia are not biological or
psychological entities. Of course their representatives are such entities; but
they are not imagined as doing their own computations, nor as choosing
strategies using native, in-board cognitive resources. They have external
computing equipment, including game theorist consultants with fancy software of
their own. Second, game theorists have explored investment patterns in
distributed markets by modeling them as games involving large numbers of
players facing common uncertainty where all know that all know about the extent
of uncertainty, and all know what technologies can be used to manage it (e.g.,
Morris & Shin 2003). Here again is a use of game theory that eschews any
appeal to psychological idiosyncrasies: players essentially use their models of
the game situation to stabilize their expectations about one another, and they
are embedded in institutional settings that are taken to constrain their
utility functions, eliminating any special personal properties. Finally, the
leading approach to multiple equilibria that has far overtaken appeal to
refinements in popularity is application of evolutionary game theory (Weibull
1995; Samuelson 1998; Cressman 2003). This replaces the hyper-sophisticated
agents of the refinement program with thoughtless players who simply inherit or
copy strategies from others, with the probability of a strategy's getting
inherited or copied being correlated with the strategy's success in previous
rounds of iterated games. In this approach, strategies themselves, rather than
agents, are the players of the games, with agents merely standing in to play
their brief turns in a competitive process that continues beyond their
individual lifespans. Agents must remain 'rational' in the thin sense –
which is to say no more than that they remain agents – but much, most or
all strategic and inferential computational demands are offloaded onto the
selection process itself; thicker rationality 'goes virtual'. Young (1998)
remains an exemplary set of applications.
Consideration of evolutionary game theory brings us to the
edge of another kind of modeling that is rising in popularity in the more
faddish precincts of economics, based on complex system theory (Anderson and
Pines 1988; Arthur 1994; Arthur, Durlauf and Lane 1997; Blume and Durlauf 2005)
It is noteworthy that many of the same people who advocate increased
'psychological realism' in economics are also fans of applying complex systems
theory to social science (e.g. Ormerod 1999; Gintis 2000; Beinhoker 2006). Denial of what philosophers call
'ontological reductionism'[13]
– that is, atomism – is part of the very point of complex systems
theory, with its emphasis on 'emergent' structures. These are properties and
relations which are stabilized by bi-directional (that is, 'bottom-up' plus 'top-down) feedback relations and which cannot be
decomposed into properties and relations of their parts. This new emergentism
should, in my view, be approached with caution due to worries over stability of
state variables across models. However, the simultaneous popularity, often in
the same breasts, of extreme anti-reductionism and the view that economic theory ought to apply directly
to individual objects with manifest boundaries is prima facie surprising. The odd conjunction suggests two things
at once: tendencies in some quarters to favor ideas simply because they rebel against neoclassicism, and relatively
reflexive assumption of A -> O that flies under theorists'
radar because it is implicit, thereby sometimes capturing even those who are
avowedly opposed to the intellectual tradition from which it is inherited.
5. Behavioral economics and neuroeconomics: the molar and
the molecular
The argument of Section 4 was directed against interpreting
recent trends in economic theory through the lens of ontological reductionism
– more specifically, against interpreting economists' widespread interest
in microfoundations as reflecting commitment to such reductionism. The most
prominent current defenders of A -> O split into two camps in their
attitudes to reductionism. Sen-style humanists oppose psychological reduction of O to A, preferring instead that A -> O be
preserved by inflating A. Their
motivations are largely grounded in normative considerations, upon which I will
touch in my concluding remarks. Behavioral economists, by contrast, sometimes
push for even more radical reductionism than is mandated by the A -> O
thesis. Encountering violations of thin economic rationality in O-referenced
behavior, they sometimes explain this by modeling people as corporate entities
that emerge from the strategic interactions of sub-personal agents (Strotz
1956).
I have elsewhere (Ross 2005) argued for denial of A -> O
from (as it were[14]) both
'below and above', and the idea that people are loci of – indeed are
created and maintained by – strategic interaction of sub-personal agents
is a concomitant of this denial that I have specifically endorsed and expanded
upon (Ross et al forthcoming; Ross
forthcoming). However, as part of the present essay's concern to resist the
collapse of economics into psychology and/or neuroscience, I will here
emphasize a tension within the decompositional approach. This arises over
whether the sub-personal agents posited to explain economically relevant
behavior of whole people are or are not identified with functional-anatomical
parts of their brains.
In earlier work (Ross 2005, 2006b) I have emphasized the
contrast between picoeconomics and neuroeconomics. The term 'picoeconomics' was coined by Ainslie
(1992, 2001) to denote applications of game theory to model what philosophers
have traditionally called 'weakness of will' phenomena, including relapse to
addiction, inconsistent financial saving, over-eating, and procrastination.
Ainslie and other picoeconomists explain these common behavioral patterns as
sometime equilibrium outcomes of games played amongst sub-personal interests,
which arise as manifestations of hyperbolic discounting of future rewards at
the personal scale. The identities of such interests are directly inferred from
goals attributed at the personal scale by folk psychology. Thus, for example, a
person trying to quit smoking has a short-range interest in having a cigarette
and a long-range interest in not having one. The former interest might
strengthen its prospects by promoting an interest in going to the bar, where a
smoking lapse is more likely, while the longer-range interest might advance its
cause by teaming up with an interest in going jogging. Hyperbolic discounting
may give the smoking interest an advantage in short temporal ranges despite the
fact that, from a longer range, the person's behavior reveals a preference for not
smoking. (Typically, the most important such behavior is voluntary suffering
from restraint which would be pointless if relapse is sure; such behavior
constitutes investment.) Whereas picoeconomics thus begins from the level of
manifest behavior, neuroeconomics (Glimcher 2003; Montague and Berns 2002;
Montague, King-Cassas and Cohen 2006) appeals to the ontology of anatomical and
functional brain areas developed by neuroscience and identifies sub-personal
agents, which may at times be in conflict, with functionally delineated groups
of neurons (especially neurotransmitter systems). The utility functions of
these units are implicit under a linear or dynamic programming interpretation
of the algorithms they compute when physically healthy. Determination of these
algorithms, mainly by comparing mathematical models with neuroimaging data, is
the bread-and-butter work of the neuroeconomist.
People who are reluctant to acknowledge or have difficulty
understanding the possible existence of anything that isn't a three (or four)
dimensional hunk of matter (Heller 1990) are apt to simply assume that if
picoeconomic interests are not mere metaphors, they must ultimately reduce to
neuroeconomic agents. However, this is inconsistent with Ainslie's
understanding of the interests, which he identifies with their objects rather
than their bearers. He is explicit that interests persist in time only for as
long as the behavior they motivate is a standing possibility. Thus the
procrastinator's interest in idly surfing the web while he tries to complete
his tax return lasts for only as long as the task remains uncompleted or a less
obviously unproductive distraction doesn't displace surfing in his attention.
Of course, people have less fleeting interests such as in avoiding punishment
or getting rebates from the government; willpower precisely consists in finding
shorter-range interests that align with these, and by this device bringing the
influence of the longer-range interests to bear on motivation in the present,
where rewards are not hyperbolically discounted. Another of Ainslie's favorite
examples is of an annoying interest in scratching an itch, which will fade
entirely if even briefly ignored; unless the itch is caused by a foreign
irritant, as most itches are not, the interest in scratching is the itch. Thus picoeconomic interests aren't
sub-personal in the same sense as groups of neurons with specialist functions.
The former are sub-personal in the sense that they have sharply limited
projects that may not be endorsed by the whole person, but it is molar
responses – behavior of a whole
person at a time – with which they are associated. The agents of
neuroeconomics, by contrast, are sub-personal in the sense of being molecular
components of organisms.
The contrast between 'molar' and 'molecular' scales of
description and explanation is a well established one in psychology, crucial to
the behaviorist program from which picoeconomics descends. Molar-scale
descriptions situate behavioral systems in environmental contexts, sorting
their dispositions and properties by reference to equivalence classes of
problems they face. These equivalence classes can be highly heterogeneous from
the molecular point of view while remaining stable objects for scientific
generalization due to external environmental pressures that 'capture' different
molecular processes within distinctive patterns. The logic here is the same as
that which explains convergence in evolution by adaptation to niches. At the
level of phylogeny, the relevant external pressures are ecological; in the case
of people they are mainly social, and frequently institutional.
By contrast, neuroeconomic models are computational and
cognitivist in character. The 'economics' in neuroeconomics denotes a family of
models of the way in which the so-called 'reward system' in the brain –
roughly, the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system that projects from midbrain
areas to orbitofrontal and pre-frontal cortex – comparatively values
alternative allocations of attention, motor response and consumption. Such
models provide algorithms by which the reward system is taken to estimate the
expected opportunity costs of attending to one stimulus rather than another and
of preparing one motor response rather
than another. One of the current leading functional forms in the literature
corresponds closely to the Black-Scholes model of portfolio option pricing
(Montague and Berns 2002). In contrast to picoeconomic interests, which are
often though not necessarily consciously accessible to people, neuroeconomic
computational mechanisms never are. They are thus, to invoke a metaphor
familiar to many economists, 'under-the-hood' causes of behavior. Psychologists
refer to such trains of behavioral causation as 'molecular'. This talk is not
intended to refer to chemistry, notwithstanding the importance of neurochemical
agents to neuroeconomic applications. 'Molecular' here is intended purely as a
logical contrast to 'molar', and is thus infrequent in the language of
reductionists who deny the scientific validity of an autonomous molar scale.
Since molar-scale ontologies are developed by reference to
organism-environment interfaces whereas molecular-scale ontologies are based on
in vitro functions of internal
computational organs, as a matter of logic molar and molecular scale models of
one and the same system can vary independently. Of course logic cannot
establish that they in fact do so
vary, since this is an empirical matter. Strong reductionists expect that they
don't, and thereby expect the molar scale to turn out to be redundant for
psychological explanation. No one believes that they vary completely independently, since this would amount to denying
that brains influence behavior.
Bearing in mind this contrast drawn in psychological terms,
we can identify several different ways in which one might construct economic
models of people and their behavior as reflecting interactions among
sub-personal agents (or, in the case of the final alternative below,
interactions between a unitary agent and non-agentic aspects of the organism):
(1A) One can model a person as synchronically composed of multiple sub-agents with conflicting
utility functions (following the lead of Schelling (1978, 1980, 1984). Then a
pattern of personal-scale behavior might be modeled as the solution of a Nash
bargaining game among these agents. (The restriction to Nash bargaining, as
opposed to some other model of bargaining, might appear unmotivated. Note,
however, that bargaining among synchronous sub-personal agents would have to be
non-cooperative and un-governed by norms, lest the very point of so decomposing
the person be lost. Under those assumptions Nash bargaining is the most general
modeling framework.)
(1B) One can model a person as synchronically composed of
multiple sub-agents with different time preferences. The reconstruction of
hyperbolic personal time preference as resulting from competition between
steeply exponentially discounting 'limbic'[15]
regions and more patient (less steeply exponentially discounting) 'cognitive'
regions (McClure et al 2004) is
currently very popular with behavioral economists. In this kind of model,
molecular-scale discounting with properties familiar to microeconomists is
taken to explain molar-scale discounting featuring the properties emphasized by
psychologists and behavioral economists.
(2) One can model a person as diachronically composed of multiple selves (each one of which
controls the whole of a person's behavior for an interval of microseconds to
hours) with differing utility functions and imperfect knowledge of one another,
but where later agents' utility depends on investments by earlier agents. Then
a pattern of personal behavior can be modeled as the subgame-perfect or
sequential equilibrium of an extensive form signaling game in which agents
choose actions with attention to the information this reveals about the
probable preferences of their successors (Prelec and Bodner 2003). Since this
has the effect of attaching some present utility to future rewards, it can
(though of course it might not) implement willpower and correct for
personal-scale intertemporal preference reversals that may otherwise arise due
to hyperbolic discounting. Benabou and Tirole (2003) show in a full modeling
exercise that such games can rationalize the suite of core picoeconomic
behavioral phenomena described by Ainslie (1992, 2001). These models of
molar-scale phenomena involve no molecular-scale hypotheses at all.
(3) One can push the agentic aspect of the person 'deeper
into the organism', in effect treating parts of a person's brain as generating
exogenous environmental impacts on the agent. Allowing for important variations
in details, this modeling approach is shared by Loewenstein (1996, 1999), Read
(2001, 2003), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2005). These models (of which only
Gul and Pesendorfer's are fully explicit in economic terms) all explain
personal-scale violations of thin economic rationality as resulting from
'visceral' temptations to immediately consume certain sorts of rewards, which
the agent may or may not successfully resist. In these models, resisting
temptation is expensive for agents (paid for in short-range suffering), but so
is succumbing (paid for in lower longer-range utility). Thus the appearance of
a temptation constitutes a negative shock along the agent's optimizing path.
How agents respond to such shocks is simply a function of relative costs, which
agents minimize subject to an exponential discount function. The resulting
behavioral pattern, if graphed as though it were all just discounting behavior,
yields a quasi-hyperbolic curve. This sort of account straddles the molar /
molecular divide, in describing and explaining rational behavior at the molar
scale while explaining inconsistent consumption episodes by appeal to
hypothesized molecular-scale disturbances. If this seems to reflect conflicted
intuitions, a moment's reflection should render the source of the tension
familiar: it simply amounts to keeping economics and psychology strongly
separate. Agents remain abstract constructs, but humans in manifesting
agent-like behavior are constrained by properties of their bodies.
Interestingly, models of type (3) separate economics and psychology along the
opposite polarity from Jevons, according to whom the economic aspects of the
person pursue creature comforts while the psychological aspect can set its
sights on nobler objectives.
Note that these three modeling approaches all reject A -> O in
the strict sense (i.e., as analytic
rather than as identification of a prototype; see Section 2), but in quite
different spirits. Approaches 1A and 1B simply add isomorphic complexity to
both side of the equivalence so as to yield the following sort of picture:
A1 -> O1
A2 -> O2
A3 -> O3
É
An -> On
where A1, É, An compose the agent A, O1,
É, On compose the (brain of) the organism O and A and
O are coextensive.
Approach (3) continues to numerically associate each basic
agent with exactly one person, while allowing that the agent is only an aspect
of the person. Approach (2) makes the person a derivative and sometime agent; a
person achieves agency in the limited and temporary sense that a firm or
country might, to the extent that intrapersonal signaling remains on an
equilibrium path.
I will offer some provisional assessment of the relative
current returns being delivered by these modeling strategies. Let the reader
bear in mind here that it is still very early days for neuroeconomics and even
the near future may not much resemble the immediate past.
Models of type 1 are certainly the most popular with neuroeconomic
researchers. This is natural: science always tries to get as far as possible
with reductionist models because they are conceptually, ontologically and
structurally simplest. Indeed, we typically arrive at more complex models in
science only through processes of correcting first-generation reductionist ones
that turn out to be too simple in revealingly specific ways. An example of a
type 1B neuroeconomic model could be obtained by setting the model of the
dopamine reward system proposed by Schultz (2002) in the black box of the steep
'limbic' discounter (the 'b discounter') of McClure et al (2004) and developing a correspondingly detailed
model of their more patient 'cognitive' discounter (the 'd
discounter') to go along with it. This example – the closest to a worked
out one I am aware of – leads directly to an early intimation of the
usual fate of straightforwardly reductionist models in our complex world:
Glimcher, Kable and Louie (forthcoming) and Kable and Glimcher (unpublished)
recently report fMRI data that they take to confute the hypothesis that
different parts of the brain discount future rewards at different rates. The
easier testability of reductionist accounts is their noble but tragic Popperian
virtue.
It is important to point out here that models of the 1A type
do not have to be read in a reductionist
light. Suppose that, following Glimcher (2003), we interpret groups of neurons
as economic agents. Suppose in particular that we so interpret the dopamine
reward system. But now suppose that instead of reading the computational processing
account of that system directly as the economic
model of it, we derive its utility function
by asking what its output would be if it optimized consistently given a
maximally powerful statistical representation of its input data. (That is,
suppose that we modeled it axiomatically instead of inductively.) This applies
the concept of economic agency to the dopamine system in the same way that
(non-behavioral) economists apply the concept to firms and households. In
effect, it takes the economic model of the system to be a molar-scale account
of the system in isolation, with a first-order computational account such as
that of Schultz (2002) being its comparatively molecular counterpart processing
model. (An account at the scale of cellular mechanisms would, on this picture,
be comparatively molecular relative to the first-order computational one.) In
light of the genesis and long history of the molar / molecular distinction in
the stricter precincts of behaviorism, where all peeking under hoods was
discouraged, this suggestion that there could be a molar account of a part of the brain is apt to seem strange
and disorienting. However, it is not merely speculative. Recently, Caplin and
Dean (forthcoming) have furnished the first 'molar economic' model of the
dopamine system in vitro. This
model could in principle be used (for example) as input to an account of
personal addictive behavior by setting it into a dynamic bargaining game with
the correspondingly modeled inhibitory serotonergic system as its opponent,
yielding a molar-scale economic complement to some currently popular
molecular-scale neuropsychological accounts of addictive processes. The value
of the economic model would lie in its potential identification of consumption
properties that addiction might share with other, molecularly distinct,
pathologies of impulsivity, which in turn could be expected to be relevant to
policy and to non-pharmacological modes of treatment. See Ross et al (forthcoming) for more details of this picture.
If this nascent approach to modeling bears
empirical fruit, it should undermine the 'rebel' spin currently attached to BE
about as directly as can be imagined, since it will preserve the separateness
of economics from psychology in the exact Paretian spirit, while at the same
time equally clearly violating A -> O 'from below'. I will
refer to this possible explanatory / modeling strategy as 'modular
neuroeconomics', in recognition of the way in which it involves conceiving of
sub-personal, functionally individuated agents as both neurally implemented in
specifiable ways and as relatively
autonomous optimizers from the modeling point of view.
Next let us consider type 3 models. In general, but again
emphasizing the caveat about early days, models of this type are performing
well in confrontation with data (Green and Myerson 2004). In light of the
ontological flexibility of type 3 models, in which factors influencing behavior
can be sorted pragmatically into exogenous and endogenous as suits the modeler,
this is not surprising; while type 3 models often make excellent experimental
design tools, Popperian virtues are not among those they parade. In this
respect, type 3 models will have a familiar quality for both the economist and the
most common kind of philosophical critic of economics (e.g. Rosenberg 1992). I
think it is a safe prediction that, given economists' strong interest in
engineering applications – which, in the picoeconomic and neuroeconomic
domains are mainly (potential) medical applications – type 3 models will
be the most frequently observed over the coming years, even if modular
neuroeconomic accounts sweep the boards with respect to unifying power,
explanatory generality and theoretical rigor. Note, however, that because type
3 modeling rests on taking a casual attitude to ontological commitment,
successes of such models cannot be used
to establish that economics is a mere supplementary representational language
for neuropsychology (cf. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec 2005) unless no less
relaxed modeling strategies succeed and yield progressively improving track
records. Existing type 3 models draw the distinction between agentic and
non-agentic aspects of brain function in a way that is essentially arbitrary:
why is a typical person's urge to slop cardiovascularly disastrous butter on
her toast not an expression of her preferences while her standing attraction to
a sports car, for which she might save for years, is such an expression? Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2005)
define an exogenous temptation as a choice option for an agent with the
property that its presence in the choice set makes the agent worse off, either
because this results in her making a worse choice than she would have made in
the option's absence, or because to cope with the option the agent must incur a
cost of 'self-control'. This basis for distinction is clear enough for their
operational purposes. But its only justification is pragmatic: it allows us to go on applying standard
consumer theory in the face of apparent hyperbolic discounting and preference
reversal. Pragmatism is a thoroughly respectable motivation for any economist;
but it should not be expected to reveal unifying ontological principles –
for example, that neuroscience describes 'real' processes to which economics
should be expected to conform. (Gul and Pesendorfer agree.)
Finally, let us consider type 2 (picoeconomic) models. Scientists with reductionist
intuitions are often inclined to regard them as beset by indeterminacies, and
therefore as more like philosophical stories than scientific accounts. For
example, should we expect a typical person's behavior to be described on the
molar scale by one hyperbolic curve or many? Only the latter answer seems
plausible. As Green and Myerson (2004) note, both temporally delayed and
uncertain rewards are generally discounted hyperbolically. However, people's
degree of future discounting (their future-respective 'k-values', alluding to the standard equation[16])
are not good general predictors of their uncertainty-respective k-values. Gambling addicts, for example, show the low
relative concern for the future typical of all addicts (high future-respective k-vales) (Holt, Green and Myerson 2003), but also
unusual tolerance for risk (low uncertainty-respective k-values) (Petry 2001; Dixon, Marley and Jacobs 2003).
Ainslie (1992) observes that most people discount money less steeply than
specific streams of consumption. Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) and Read (200)
point out that people do not hyperbolically discount future supplies of purely
utilitarian (in their conceptual system, 'non-visceral') rewards such as petrol
or computer paper; but we should not infer from this fact that they would not
hyperbolically discount risk associated
with the petrol supply. All of these points arise despite the fact that it is difficult to operationally
disentangle intertemporal and uncertainty-based contingencies in economic
models, since delay implies uncertainty outside of contexts where strict
determinacy and perfect knowledge obtain, and (given instantaneous consumption)
there can be no uncertainty about consumption without at least minimal delay.
Finally, there is strong evidence that interval variance has some degree of
influence on valuation of future rewards (Green and Myerson 2004); but, as Read
(2001, 2003) objects, the picoeconomic framework abstracts away from this.
These indeterminacies would constitute embarrassments to
picoeconomics only given a molecular interpretation of it. Ainslie and other
advocates of picoeconomics (including me) have invited this interpretation by
usually assuming that the picoeconomic model concerns delay discounting rather
than probability discounting. This would
invite a critic to suppose that the evidence of Glimcher, Kable and Louie
(forthcoming) and Glimcher and Kable (unpublished) mentioned earlier
counter-indicates the picoeconomic model along with its molecular-scale
counterpart, the McClure et al (2004)
opponent brain-system model. A more careful interpretation of this evidence
would have it as showing that the brain does implement computation of future discounting at a
specific rate, while the behavioral phenomena discussed in the preceding
paragraph are molar-scale generalities that hold despite the brain's discounting dispositions. Picoeconomic
models should be regarded not as proto-neuroeconomic accounts of discounting,
but as molar-scale profiles of the responses of organisms to differences in
reward rates under different frames of attention. Exogenous influences from
environments (including, in some organisms, social and cultural environments)
likely play as critical a role in cueing and regulating these frames as do
neural mechanisms. Thus we should not understand the picoeconomic agent as composed
out of neuroeconomic ones.
The general conclusion I draw from these reflections is that
there is room for all three types of models in the economics of personal and
sub-personal behavior, though I am doubtful about the long-run viability of
reductionist versions of type 1 models. Apparent conflicts between picoeconomic
and neuroeconomic approaches arise from assuming that there is a unique way of
partitioning agents into sub-agents, so that a picoeconomic ontology of
interests for a person must be isomorphic to a neuroeconomic ontology of brain
areas for that person. The motivation for this is reductionism: the idea that
molar-scale phenomena are in principle fully explicable by reference to
molecular phenomena. But this is just a piece of philosophical dogma that fits
the actual history of science very poorly (Ladyman and Ross 2007). The only
empirically justifiable motivation for holding that one domain of modeling
should reduce to another is actually observing the redundancy and abandonment,
in that particular instance, of molar-scale models and their replacement by
molecular-scale ones. I argued in earlier parts of the present essay that no
such trend is manifest as between economics in general (i.e., outside of the
avowed behavioral economics movement itself) and psychology or neuroscience.
This does not at all imply that psychology and neuroscience are irrelevant to economics. The judgments of people, and of
sub-personal picoeconomic interests, depend on neural computations of reward
values as crucial input.; but neuroeconomics models the brain's valuations
rather than the molar person's.[17]
Thus (as in general) molecular-scale processes constrain molar-scale ones
without reducing them.
The key implication of this form of anti-reductionism in the
present context is that we can agree that people are not identical to economic
agents without this necessarily implying that economic agency as traditionally
understood is a useless or confused theoretical construct for explaining
aspects of individual behavior. 'Necessarily' here needs emphasis. Rejecting an
a priori motivation for collapsing
economics into psychology does not in itself answer an obvious question implied
in the criticism of standard microeconomics based on cognitive and behavioral
science. That question is: if economic agents are asocial computational
prodigies and people are constitutively social cognitive duffers, then what is
the relationship between economic agents
and people? To answer that there is no relationship would conjure
up a mystery, except to a critic of mainstream economics so radical that she
doubts that it ever succeeds at predicting anything.
I will argue in the concluding section of the chapter that,
far from ignoring the social constitution of people, attention to this fact
about them yields the answer to the question just posed.
One portentous claim emanating from the cognitive and
behavioral sciences that is widely interpreted as implying trouble for
mainstream economics is that people are pervasively, sub-consciously and
irresistibly sensitive to manifold social cues, pressures and signals. Thus
their preferences are not exogenous with respect to their strategic or
consumption behavior. This claim lies at the core of Sen's (1977, 1999)
critique of standard preference theory and what he calls 'welfarism'. A
stronger claim is often made by anthropologists, sociologists and social
psychologists that people are socially constituted. This claim is likely to strike many economists as a
fundamental challenge to their way of thinking. However, in this final section
of the chapter I will outline a perspective from which it is not. The basic
idea is that once we get as far as recognizing people to be molar-scale objects[18]
by comparison with their brains, then we can regard them as socially
constituted without having to surrender the relevance of distinctively economic
(as opposed to psychological) modeling to explanation of important aspects of
their behavior. The perspective I will summarize here is not new, having been
extensively elaborated in Ross (2005) and elsewhere. Readers are referred there
for arguments. Here I will present, for the most part, only conclusions.
Human organisms are chemically integrated in meiosis, grown
in the womb and then detached from their mothers' bodies at birth – they
are not socially constructed. If it is
nevertheless correct to claim that people are constituted socially,
this must reflect the fact that they are created from human organisms by social development. Of course
this process relies on properties of their brains: humans' giant cortex, and
dispositions immanent in biases in neural connections and in the architecture
of neurotransmitter pathways prepare them, unlike tigers, to be socialized.
But the fact that we can distinguish between a very short pre-socialized phase
and a socialized phase of a human organism's life supports a distinction
between, as it were, the 'raw brain' and the person as a node in a dynamic
social network. Raw human brains resemble tiger brains more than they resemble
people. That people are socially constituted but their brains are not is the
basic reason why behaviorists were right to emphasize the molar / molecular
distinction. It doesn't suggest the dualist idea that persons transcend
their brains; brains must adapt to
socialization during development, and socialization is constrained by what
brains can and cannot process.
To understand how people
are socially created, something must first be said about why such developmental
trajectories have been stabilized by selection. Let us distinguish between social
animals and herding animals. Whereas the latter – wildebeest, for
example, or corals – gain advantage merely by staying close together and
coordinating their schedules, the
former exploit efficiencies from joint contributions to ranges of projects that
individuals can't perform alone, using some degree of specialization, either
merely of talent or of dedicated roles. All available evidence suggests that
natural selection, given the platforms it has had to work with in terrestrial
history, can produce this in two ways: by adapting animals' genetic structures
to increase the value of the inclusive coefficient in fitness functions, as in
social insects and naked mole rats, or by adapting animals' brains so they develop
enough book-keeping capacity to strategically discriminate among conspecifics
and can thereby play strategic games involving reciprocal rewards and
sanctions. High intelligence (cognitive plasticity) is far from continuously
distributed across species, and sociality is far from continuously distributed
across clades. It is thus of powerful significance under regression analyses
that the entire hyper-intelligent club, which includes apes, elephants, dogs,
toothed whales, corvids and parrots along with a few others, is social.
Within this club, humans are ecologically special in
navigating an effectively boundless domain of novel collaborative projects.
This is made possible by signaling systems – languages – that
stabilize ranges of possible signal meanings by digitalizing information. That
is, human syntax enables one human to direct another's attention to a specific
object of reference even when it is not present to be pointed or gazed at; I
can communicatively refer to 'Napoleon' exactly, not just to an indefinite
range of things sharing to various degrees Napoleon's analog blend of
properties (i.e., 'napoleonishness'). Thus humans can jointly track objects
over time and space even when they are not present, and coordinate on future
plans involving hypothetical objects picked out by digital contrast with other
members of classes into which the grammars of public languages permit them to
be sorted (Ross 2007).
Some philosophers have suggested that language plus shared
perceptual saliences are sufficient to account for people's ethologically
unique capacity to coordinate. This is confused: the range of projects that can be distinguished thanks to
recursive grammar makes the human coordination challenge orders of magnitude more complex than that faced by any other species. Game
theorists encourage us to underestimate the difficulty of social coordination
by solving for equilibria in situations they have already modeled as definite
games. They readily forget that their own chief skill is in seeing how to abstract
useful strategic models of empirical situations which don't come pre-packaged
in terms of utility functions or strategy sets. Real human game players must
implicitly construct models of their strategic situations in real time, without
benefit of explicit principles, and they must jointly coordinate on these
constructions; two interacting people who don't conceptualize their situation
in terms of (roughly) the same game should expect not equilibrium but
unpredictable chaos. Finally, let us bear in mind that every time a person
takes an action she offers a move in a game with everyone whose welfare is
potentially influenced by it and who might become aware of it – directly,
by observing it or through gossip, or indirectly, by inferring it from outcomes,
or second-order, by being influenced by the actions of someone else who is
influenced by the original action. The overwhelming majority of human actions
are thus simultaneously moves in multiple games with multiple sets of players
of multiple n.
This all implies that most human choices of actions, no
matter how small in scale, amount to general equilibrium problems. For example,
to determine the best strategic response to my colleague's suggestion that we
nominate a third colleague for a certain committee, I should, if I want to
implement full rational agency, model the entire strategic history of our
species (at least to the point in the future beyond which, due to discounting,
I lose interest). This game is self-evidently intractable.
It gets still worse. A person's brain has a trillion neurons
and 1013 synaptic connections, organized into semi-modular
sub-systems that communicate imperfectly with one another, behave
semi-autonomously and can no more be micro-managed by a frontal executive
system than the President of the United States can plan every postal delivery
and sentry assignment. These are of course the neuroeconomic agents discussed
in the previous section. Not only do I not know the exact utility functions and
strategy sets of the n other people with
whom I'm strategically enmeshed, but I face significant uncertainty in
predicting my own utility
function and distribution of strategy sets, because much of my behavior is
regulated by parts of my brain to which I have no more access than a third-person
observer.
People clearly do coordinate,
often very smoothly, over substantial stretches of time and place, and across
large groups. Even more clearly, they don't do so by solving computationally
impossible problems. The model of social coordination as solving for general
equilibrium by solving an unbounded-n game must be missing
something important. In social embeddedness and language, the very phenomena
that lead to the impasse, lie the clues to what this something is. People
sensibly insist that others with whom they enter into coordination games
narrate comprehensible, publicly manifest stories about themselves and conform
their behavior to these stories. Thus they enforce and enable predictability,
including self-predictability.
They mutually ease the imposed burden of this task by assisting each other as
co-authors of narratives, recording expectations, rewarding enrichments of each
other's sub-plots, and punishing overly abrupt attempts to revise important
character dispositions. Parents initially impose this regime of
self-construction on their children, later handing over primary control (often
involuntarily) to their offspring's peer groups. Thus people become and remain
distinct. The fact that self-creation and self-maintenance are projects requiring effort is what explains prevailing normative individualism, even while ('metaphysical')
descriptive individualism is false. Individuals are centrally important to most
of us partly because they don't
just drop out of the womb. I will return to this point at the end of the
chapter.
A crucial enabling aspect of this whole edifice is that
humans are biologically adapted to be highly behaviorally sensitive to very cheap
rewards (e.g. smiles, laughter, raised
thumbs) and punishments (e.g. frowns, eye rolling, refusal of efforts at
conversation). Not only are the standard punishments very inexpensive relative
to the pain they inflict, but they can be withdrawn so as to leave almost no
damaged infrastructure that then requires a new infusion of capital to put
right; a person says ÒI forgive youÓ and the other's misery is (typically)
instantly relieved. Some leading game theorists make the social coordination
problem too hard, thereby motivating extravagantly hypothesized genetic
adaptations to fix it, by exaggerating the costs of everyday rewards and
punishments (Gintis 2006; Seabright 2006). People avoid 'cheap talk' problems,
in which their threats and promises would be ignored because it's doubted that
these would be followed up if ineffective, by being psychologically adapted to
care a great deal about rewards and punishments that cost others almost nothing
(Ross 2006a).
The effect of everyday pressures on people to construct and
maintain selves is to drastically shrink the ranges of utility functions and
strategy sets over which people must coordinate their constructions of games.
The structures of these self-narratives then emerge as apparent framing effects
and departures from proper Bayesian reasoning when we put people into
experimental games and model these games as if the players weren't constrained
by their own biographical and autobiographical plots.[19]
This is a ubiquitous feature of the experimental literature in behavioral
economics. Researchers define their subjects' games as if they were unconstrained
by socialization, show that the outcomes do not match the Nash equilibria of
these games, and thereby draw two generic conclusions (as background for
various more specific conclusions that give us real psychological knowledge).
The first sort is unobjectionable: people are constrained by socialization. But that is a truism, certainly known by
Jevons, Walras, Samuelson, Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas alike. The second
generic conclusion is that therefore standard economic theory is refuted
because that theory is necessarily about unsocialized agents. This I reject.
I argued in previous sections that nothing in economic theory requires that economic agency be
identified with individual people. Economic agency is a theoretical
construction. Economists use it to build abstract models of firms, nations,
labor unions, consortia in auctions, lineages in evolutionary games and other
feedback-sensitive, incentive-driven systems that have no psychological
properties at all. The usefulness of the construction is not cast into doubt by
behavioral economics or by cognitive science more generally.
It is thus open to us to ask whether economics has any relevance to cognitive science (and hence to
cognition understood as social). If the answer were 'no', economists in the
spirit of Keynes might shrug this off and leave worries about unification of
the sciences to philosophers. But the answer is not, in fact, negative. I just
summarized an account of the universal human disposition to construct selves
and to enforce such construction in one another. The explanation of this
pattern is that it allows people to achieve many of the gains possible for
economic agents – gains from trade, from specialization, and from
consistent investment over time – despite the fact that their brains are
too large and necessarily de-centralized as control structures to pull off
economic agency by themselves. Thus economics plays a direct role in explaining
the basis of social cognition. Furthermore, self-construction is only the first
(necessary) aspect of the achievement of large-n coordination. The truly heavy lifting is done by the
ultimate self-maintenance engines: institutions.
Most readers of this chapter will save money for relatively
comfortable retirements. You will do this despite the fact that you would, if
put in a systematically unfamiliar consumption environment, discount the future
hyperbolically and therefore tend to reverse your preferences for prudent
investments when temptations to immediate reward presented themselves, then
spend still more resources trying to defeat your own myopia as you learned the
patterns governing the novel circumstances. Most of you will avoid this in your
actual lives because your behavior is hemmed in and guarded by walls of
culturally evolved and collectively designed institutions. If you persistently
spend more than your income, this will be reflected in a falling credit rating
that will inconvenience you now. Perhaps
a recent housing bubble has allowed you to splurge for a few years, but as of this
writing market institutions are busy transmitting information about you and
hundreds of millions like you that, through still other institutions, will
correct your lack of prudence. If you aren't corrected quickly enough, the bank
manager who supervises your mortgage may act to speed up receipt of the
message. If very many of you are too sluggish responding to the news, the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank may reinforce it with an interest rate
hike. And so on.
All of these institutions press you to approximate your
behavior to that of an economic agent. They can't literally transform you,
biological – psychological entity that you are, into such an agent. Even
while struggling to save, you may visit a casino. You will buy some items this
year that you will disdain and throw away in a year's time merely because your
tastes change. But you, together with your fellows in society, have enough in common with economic agents, especially in modern
institutional settings, that non-trivial predictions about your individual
behavior can be had by modeling you as if, within temporal and institutional
constraints, you were such agents. Furthermore, because you live in aggregated
markets with dynamics that aren't very sensitive to psychological factors, and because you also play n-person games with other agents who are incentivized
to stabilize one another's preference consistency, you can improve your
prospects by learning some economic theory and feeding this social knowledge
back into your personal planning. Feedback loops of this sort are the very
logical essence of social cognition. Both your person-hood and your
approximate economic agency – which, I have argued, are not the same
thing – are socially constituted.
Individualism is thus descriptively false. As explained
above, that is part of the reason why it
is normatively important. This
insight should allow us to see that we don't need to justify concerns for
aggregate welfare by disaggregating it – which we can't in general do, as
Arrow's theorem makes clear. The proper normative defense of macroeconomics
without microfoundations has two parts, one familiar and narrowly economic and
one less familiar and broader. First, if a policy takes a society to a higher
community indifference curve than it was on before, but the new allocation and
the old are Pareto-noncomparable, then we should still find that winners can
compensate losers using less than the whole of their winnings; the new policy
should bring about a Scitovsky-Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Second, we should see
this as a normative improvement
on utilitarian grounds because individual
preferences are not exogenous. As modeled by Binmore (1998), people will
bargain to a new distribution under the new dispensation and then they will
adjust their distributive norms – that this, their collectively
determined concept of justice – so as to rationalize the bargaining
outcome. This will not at all impress a philosopher with Kantian intuitions,
since the result may fail to 'respect' any given person's prior idea of
fairness – justice is de-coupled from individual autonomy. But under the
perspective I have defended here, such autonomy is a myth anyway if regarded as
meaningful outside of an
institutional specification. Such a specification is a norm-governed network.
(It will happen now and then to be a market. In these unusual circumstances
norms of justice doesn't matter and are only applied when people get confused.)
When people adjust their norms they approximate different agents.
The Kantian philosopher is unimpressed by this story because
she doesn't see any touchstone against which to regard the distribution on the
higher community indifference curve as necessarily better. But the economist has an evaluative standard: the
people are materially richer. The economic agents they formerly approximated
may or may not have all had their preferences optimized; this we can't tell,
for both economic and philosophical reasons. The economic reason is that
Scitovsky-Kaldor-Hicks improvements aren't necessarily Pareto-improvements. The
philosophical reason is that non-autonomous agents before and after
institutional norm-readjustment are different agents. But although economics
studies such agents as its first-order objects, and although these agents are
not identical to the more enduring human entities that approximate sequences of
them, the ultimate justification of
economics is that it is useful for guiding our efforts to make material
human animals materially better off. In a
world not merely of pervasive scarcity but much outright poverty, the
justification for the philosophical ethicist's activities seems to me to be
comparatively thin gruel.
Thus, I conclude, a defense of economics as both objective
science and normatively helpful engineering is best articulated without A -> O.
Economics is not, and should not become, a kind or branch of psychology. It is
about agents, in the sense that it is interactions of agents about which it
makes discoveries; and the agents it is about are not people. Its discoveries
are nevertheless very important to people.
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[1] Many economists, however, now refer to 'objective functions' rather than 'utility functions'. I hope that this becomes standard usage, but fear that the influence of behavioral economics will get in the way.
[2] Rosenberg (1992) argues that that is in fact what economists are, whether they mean to be or not. I disagree.
[3] In echoing
Mirowski here, I intend to cast no aspersion on Cold War era economists. Fully
morally reasonable scientists who are passionate about their subject matter
should be expected to make non-vicious
political compromises when unprecedented resources for their work flood around
them. Had economists not been influenced by the interests of the postwar military
there would have been something seriously wrong with the extent of their
dedication as scientists. Of
course, some will dispute my suggestion that most of the relevant compromises
were non-vicious. That discussion must be left to another occasion.
[4] Thanks to Erik Angner for stressing this point to me.
[5] I do not mean here to just dismiss views of those, such as Sen (1999), who think that people's subjective preferences are often unreliable guides to their well being (though I am suspicious of such views). The intended targets of this remark are critics, such as radical environmentalists, who believe that something other than the welfare of particular human beings is the most appropriate basic standard of valuation. In my opinion this requires an unsustainable level of moral arrogance, and is especially unpalatable when promoted by materially comfortable people in a world suffering from significant levels of true poverty.
[6] Keynes is sometimes cited (e.g., by Angner and Loewenstein, this volume) as a precursor to psychologistic economics because he attributed business cycles to contagious emotions. However, this suggestion plays no direct role in his theory, which requires only that high-unemployment states be disequilibria. As later economists made much of, it is important that his theory assumes incomplete expectations on the part of consumers, producers and investors. But this was more of an oversight than an insight.
[7] He referred to it as a Òqueer cultÓ (Robbins 1935, p. 87).
[8] Such cascades are simulated in so-called 'swarm intelligence' models; see Kennedy and Eberhart (2001).
[9] This phrase refers to standard model-theoretic semantic interpretation of scientific theory construction; see Ruttkamp (2002) for the formulation that, in my opinion, ideally equilibrates between explicitness and useful generality.
[10] Davies (forthcoming) argues that most contemporary philosophy is infected to its core with residues of theology. I agree.
[11] See especially Chapter 11.
[12] I do not intend here to imply preference for either side in this major and long-running theoretical controversy.
[13] This locution is required to distinguish between reducing composite objects into parts, and reducing so-called 'high-level' theories to less abstract theories ('intertheoretical reduction'). Philosophers of science have generally been more interested in the latter than the former.
[14] I add this locution to mark the fact that I elsewhere (Ladyman and Ross 2007) am party to denial of the metaphysical image of reality as sorted into 'levels'.
[15] For years it was standard practice to refer to the older structure as the 'limbic system' and the newer brain as the 'cognitive system', based on the idea that emotional responses are primitive and rational ones are an adaptive refinement. As Paul Glimcher urges me to point out, over the past decade or so it has become clear that this is misleading; the older part of the brain performs many 'rational' calculations, and emotional judgments and motivations are crucial to the functioning of frontal cortex. However, it remains true that the older and newer parts of the brain developed under different evolutionary pressures.
[16] vi = Ai /
(1 + kDi), where vi,
Ai, and Di represent the present value of a delayed
reward, the amount of a delayed reward, and the delay of the reward,
respectively. The 1 in the denominator prevents the rise in reward value from
going infinite when delay is zero. The k parameter is a constant that is proportional to the degree of temporal
discounting, with higher and lower k
values describing greater and lesser degrees of discounting, respectively.
Thus, an agent with a higher k
value would discount delayed rewards more than an agent with a lower k value; the former agent therefore would be more
impulsive than the latter.
[17] For example,
a group of dopamine neurons maximizes their utility by suppressing competing
serotonergic circuits. If they are too successful the result is addiction,
which is a disaster for the person and which few people want (Ross et al forthcoming).
[18] In fact, people
are better conceived as processes than
as objects.
[19] It's possible to induce people to escape from these constraints, in which case they tend to act much more like economic agents; but this requires deliberate effort in experimental design. See Binmore (2007).