CURRICULUM
VITAE
G. Lynn Stephens
1.
Education
2. Teaching Experience
Professor of Philosophy
University of Alabama at Birmingham, since 1986.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1979-1986.
Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame, 1977-1979.
3.
Publications
Books:
When Self Consciousness Breaks, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000. Co-authored with George Graham.
Philosophical Psychopathology, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.
Co-edited with George Graham.
Seven Dilemmas in World Religions, Paragon House, New York,
1994. Co-authored with Gregory Pence.
Papers:
“Mind, Brain, and Meaning”, Inquiry,
Vol.44, No.2, June 2001,
pp. 227-237.
“Psychopathology, Freedom, and the Experience of Externality”, with
George Graham, Philosophical Topics, vol. 24, no. 2, Fall 1998: pp
159-182.
"Descartes and the
Problem of Our Knowledge of the External World", chapter in Philosophy
Then and Now, edited by N. S. Arnold, T. M. Benditt, and G. Graham: Blackwell, 1998, PP 237-260.
“Mind
and Mine”, with George Graham, in Philosophical Psychopathology, 1994.
“Self-Consciousness,
Mental Agency, and the Clinical Psychopathology of Thought-Insertion”, with
George Graham, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, Vol.1, 1994.
“Voices
and Selves”, with George Graham, in Philosophical, Perspectives on
Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification, J. Sadder, M. Schwartz, and O.
Wiggins, editors. Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994.
“Unconsciousness
Sensations”, Topoi, Vol 7, No. 1, 1988.
“Kantian
Noumena and Peircian Noumena”, in Proceedings of the Sixth International
Kant Congress, 1985, ed. G. Funke and T. Seebohm, Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology, Inc., 1988.
“Minding
Your P’s and Q’s: Pain and Sensible Qualities”, Nous, Vol XXI, No. 3,
1987, with George Graham.
“Are
Qualia a Pain in the Neck for Functionalists?” with George Graham, American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol XXII, No. 1, 1985.
“The
Myths of Mental Illness: A Philosopher
Examines Theories of Human Behavior”, Family Medicine: Journal of the Society of Teachers of Family Medicine, Vol. XVII, No. 5, 1985.
“Noumena
Qualia: C. S. Peirce on Our Epistemic
Access to Feelings”, Transactions of
the C. S. Peirce Society, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 1985.
“Pain
and Strong Cognitivism”, with George Graham, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Rochester, New York, 1983.
“Cognition
and Emotion in Peirce’s Theory of Mental Activity”, Transactions of the C.
S. Peirce Society, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1981.
“Peirce
on Psychological Self-Knowledge”, Translations of the C. S. Peirce Society,
Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1980.
“Medical
Ethics”, with G. Gayle Stephens, M.D., in Family Practice, second
edition, W. B. Saunders, New York, 1978.
“Transparency
and Modality” with Herbert Heidelberger, Philosophy Phenomenological
Research, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, 1978.
Comments:
“Thought Insertion and Subjectivity”,
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and
Psychology,
Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2000, pp 203-206.
“Defining Delusion”, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, Vol.
6, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 25.
Commentary on “Free Will In Light of Neuropsychiatry”, Philosophy,
Psychiatry, and Psychology, 3:2 (1996)
pp 97-98.
“Ultimate
Differences: Commentary on J. A. Gray’s
“The Contents of Consciousness”, with George Graham, Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 18:4 (1995) pp 698-699.
Commentary on “Kant,
Thought, Insertion, and Mental Unity”,
with George Graham, Philosophy, Psychiatry, amd Psychology, Vol. 1.2,
1994.
Reviews:
Review of Ian Hacking’s Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of
Memory, in Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, no.1, March 1997, pp 185-187.
Review of Owen Flanagan’s
Consciousness Reconsidered, and Robert Kirk’s Raw Feeling”, in The
Philosophical Quarterly, (1996) pp
417-421.
Review of Stephen
Braude’s First Person Plural:
Multiple Personality and Philosophy of
Mind, with George Graham, Ethics 105 (1995) pp 655-657.
“Where Are Colors?” review of C. L. Hardin’s Color for
Philosophers and D. R. Hilbert’s Color and Color Perception,
Philosophy and Behavior, 19.2, 1991.
Review of Richards
McDonough’s The Argument of the Tractatus, Nous, Vol XXIV, No. 3,
1990.
“Does Inner Sense Make
Sense”, review of D. M. Armstrong’s and N. Malcolm’s Consciousness and
Causality, in Behaviorism, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1987.
Review of John Smith’s Reason
and Purpose, Nous, Vol. XXI No. 4, 1987.
Review of Robert
Almeder’s The Philosophy of C. S. Peirce, Nous, Vol. XVII, No. 4,
November, 1983.